The ICO in Kosovo has published a report "Guest in our own House" that is based on interviewing around 100 people in the North tip of Kosovo. It is nice to see that ICO is interested in the public opinion in that area. However, I was less enthusiastic about how it explained its findings.
The report correctly concludes that "In general, the Ahtisaari Plan – even if rejected on the level of status – is seen as being fine in theory, but not in practice. Non-implementation, whether through omission or commission is a real problem.".
This is not surprising. I have mentioned it many times in blog and many others have mentioned it too. The main problem is in my opinion that Ahtisaari offers fake autonomy. It is autonomy where the approval of Pristina is still needed for many details and that way the purpose of autonomy - making a community less vulnerable for discrimination - is missed.
Unfortunately the ICO doesn't want to criticize the Ahtisaari Plan and instead it comes with a whole lot of rather nonsensical explanations and solutions:
- "The contents of the Ahtisaari Plan are not well known, but when people are informed they point to elements that they find are positive for them."
In every country only a small part of the population tends to read this kind of texts. Most people rely on leaders and newspapers for their opinion. And the leaders of Kosovo's Northern Serbs are clear: their community is seriously threatened when their region comes under Pristina rule - what for them is the main part of the Ahtisaari Plan. By pointing out positive points in the plan the researchers were basically misleading their research subjects because they didn't address the question how these will work out in reality.
- the report ignores policies by government of Kosovo that seriously harm the Serb population, like the denial of access to the Serbian mobile phone system and the export boycott of Trepca North on which many Serb depend for their income. In fact by supporting those policies ICO is supporting Pristina in its attitude that discrimination is allowed as long as you dress it up nicely in politically correct language.
- the report is full of nice recommendations about how the government of Kosovo could make the Ahtisaari Plan more attractive for the Serbs, including many points where until now it hasn't fully implemented the plan. But it fails to ask itself the obvious questions: why isn't that happening yet and what are the chances that that will happen in the future? What we see is that Kosovo has a public opinion that - encouraged by populist politicians - favors anti-Serb policies with some arguing for further cleansing of the Serb population. The fact that the international community in Kosovo keeps a low profile and relies on silent diplomacy to correct too extreme policies certainly hasn't helped to turn this climate around. On the contrary, it has led it to become a hostage rather than a shaper of the public opinion and has contributed to such harmful policies as mentioned in the previous paragraph.
- the report describes the Kosovo Serbs as "technically" a minority. But in fact in the North they are the local majority and part of a Serb-majority area that that continues in Serbia. Many people there are more likely to visit Raska and Kraljevo in Serbia than Southern Mitrovica or Pristina and that very likely will not change when ethnic relations become more relaxed. Unlike the Serbs south of the Ibar these people don't have any reason to learn Albanian and are very unlikely to do so. So there are good arguments to treat these people as a local majority. The fact that the Ahtisaari Plan doesn't do that is a major defect of the plan. Some Ahtisaari Plus plan might repair that but until now those plans are rather vague and both Western and Albanian support has been low.
- Kosovo is a cold house for Serbs. They feel as, at best, unwanted guests in the Republic’s house. The Government for its part fears that the room the Serbs want to build in the north will undermine the foundations of the original house, and bring the whole independence project crashing down.
This is how the report starts its summary. It is rather amazing to see how the existential fears of the Serbs are placed here on the same level as the fears of the Kosovo government. In fact the worst case scenario for the Albanians is a long wait for official recognition, some territorial concessions in areas where hardly an Albanian lives and some concessions on business property rights. None of these is in any way comparable to the delicate position of Kosovo's minorities.
- The provision on contribution from Serbia has potential to be positive, but Pristina
needs to be clear that it would not exercise power of veto over Serbia expenditure plans.
This concerns the infamous clause in the Ahtisaari Plan that all money transfers from Serbia to the Serb minority in Kosovo should go via Pristina - giving Pristina a de facto right of veto. The solution of the report consists of nice wishes but evades the issue: Pristina shouldn't have the power to block such transfers. There should be direct contact between local Serb governments and Belgrade.
The Ahtisaari Plan is in fact full of similar clauses where it provides the Serbs some right and then stipulates that the decision should be approved by Pristina. This way its "rights" are not really rights and can at any point be violated.
The West is repeating the errors it made in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Again it is subscribing to the view of a state as something monolithic that shouldn't be weakened by minority rights. This is a nice prescription for states like France and the US that have strong traditions of individual rights. But it misses the point in new states where previously marginal national extremists now are in charge. Giving a state independence means implicit recognition that they (the Croats in Croatia, the Albanians in Kosovo) have a right to have their own state and that means all others become second rate citizens. In such a situation one should give the minorities real power so that they can get an adequate compromise. That is the only way to avoid discrimination and ethnic cleansing because it will take decades before public opinion and institutions will embrace a more inclusive view of their state.
Showing posts with label Kosovo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kosovo. Show all posts
Friday, May 11, 2012
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
More German NATO troops to Kosovo
On 20 april Spiegel published an article on the emission of more German troops to Kosovo. Hereby an English translation.
Two weeks before the elections in Serbia threatens new violence, NATO fears for an escalation in northern Kosovo. According to SPIEGEL ONLINE sources, it has therefore asked in the German army for the emission of a rapid reaction force. Berlin has complied with the request.
Berlin - The German army sends on urgent request of NATO, again and in the short term, a 550 man strong German intervention force to the Balkans. Amplified by 150 Austrians should the Operational Reserve Force (ORF) prevent a feared escalation of violence in northern Kosovo around the elections in Serbia on 5 May. On Friday evening advised the Joint Operations Command in Potsdam selected parliamentarians that they have agreed to the desire of the commander of NATO troops in Kosovo, KFOR, to transfer the ORF. This was only a few weeks ago gradually withdrawal from Kosovo have been. Now it should, according to planning, from 1 May again be ready to use on site.
The deployment of the task force illustrates the tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. For months there are between Belgrade, that still regards Kosovo as a renegade region, and Pristina dispute over the elections. Originally Belgrade wanted to open polling stations in the Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo , but this was canceled. Now it rumbles in north Kosovo. "With the presently irreconcilable positions of Serbia and Kosovo to carry out the elections and the already volatile situation in northern Kosovo, there is the danger of escalation," said the Joint Operations Command. There was "considerable potential for conflict" for the entire Kosovo.
Currently, NATO has deployed about 5,800 soldiers of the KFOR troops in the Balkans, about 1,300 of them are provided by Germany. Basically, the task of the international troops there since the beginning of the operation in 1999 in the prevention of new conflicts between Kosovo and Serbia. In recent months, the actually planned further reduction of the international units of NATO was very questionable, as the situation in Kosovo worsened rather than relaxed. As recent as February Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere (CDU) called the situation in Kosovo difficult and a reduction of the units therefore not currently possible.
The task force ORF was recently recalled after a first emergency operation in Kosovo in Germany. In August of last year, the German commander of KFOR troops had first requested it due to the growing tensions in Kosovo. Background at that time were disputes about responsibilities concerning border controls between Serbia and Kosovo. Now the soldiers of the ORF must again turn out in the direction of Kosovo. The force will be composed from the NBC Defence Regiment 750 from Bruchsal and parts of the Artillery Battalion 295 from Immendingen.
Let's hope that this time these troops will do real peacekeeping instead of imposing Pristina's agenda.
Two weeks before the elections in Serbia threatens new violence, NATO fears for an escalation in northern Kosovo. According to SPIEGEL ONLINE sources, it has therefore asked in the German army for the emission of a rapid reaction force. Berlin has complied with the request.
Berlin - The German army sends on urgent request of NATO, again and in the short term, a 550 man strong German intervention force to the Balkans. Amplified by 150 Austrians should the Operational Reserve Force (ORF) prevent a feared escalation of violence in northern Kosovo around the elections in Serbia on 5 May. On Friday evening advised the Joint Operations Command in Potsdam selected parliamentarians that they have agreed to the desire of the commander of NATO troops in Kosovo, KFOR, to transfer the ORF. This was only a few weeks ago gradually withdrawal from Kosovo have been. Now it should, according to planning, from 1 May again be ready to use on site.
The deployment of the task force illustrates the tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. For months there are between Belgrade, that still regards Kosovo as a renegade region, and Pristina dispute over the elections. Originally Belgrade wanted to open polling stations in the Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo , but this was canceled. Now it rumbles in north Kosovo. "With the presently irreconcilable positions of Serbia and Kosovo to carry out the elections and the already volatile situation in northern Kosovo, there is the danger of escalation," said the Joint Operations Command. There was "considerable potential for conflict" for the entire Kosovo.
Currently, NATO has deployed about 5,800 soldiers of the KFOR troops in the Balkans, about 1,300 of them are provided by Germany. Basically, the task of the international troops there since the beginning of the operation in 1999 in the prevention of new conflicts between Kosovo and Serbia. In recent months, the actually planned further reduction of the international units of NATO was very questionable, as the situation in Kosovo worsened rather than relaxed. As recent as February Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere (CDU) called the situation in Kosovo difficult and a reduction of the units therefore not currently possible.
The task force ORF was recently recalled after a first emergency operation in Kosovo in Germany. In August of last year, the German commander of KFOR troops had first requested it due to the growing tensions in Kosovo. Background at that time were disputes about responsibilities concerning border controls between Serbia and Kosovo. Now the soldiers of the ORF must again turn out in the direction of Kosovo. The force will be composed from the NBC Defence Regiment 750 from Bruchsal and parts of the Artillery Battalion 295 from Immendingen.
Let's hope that this time these troops will do real peacekeeping instead of imposing Pristina's agenda.
Saturday, March 10, 2012
How (not) to negotiate on Kosovo
In its heart the problem of Kosovo is rather simple. Serbia wants better living conditions for Kosovo's Serb minority - and to a lesser extent also for its other minorities - and the Kosovo's Albanians want international recognition of their independence. The balance of power is rather in the middle and a solution should be easy to reach. But such negotiations have never been held.
After the 1999 War the West blocked all negotiations for the first five years claiming that Kosovo was not ready. In the later years this was called "standards before status". After the march 2004 riots this policy was given up. Not only were standards no longer needed for negotiations: the West stopped asking for compliance to standards at all. The Ahtisaari negotiations were clearly fake: the Albanians knew they would get their state no matter what so they didn't see any need to placate the Serbs with concessions. And now we have the "technical dialogue" facilitated by the EU.
There have now been 9 rounds of talks. The result of the latest round of talks was that Serbia allowed Kosovo greater representation at international meetings and consented in some border procedures. In exchange it got candidate membership for the EU. So basically these are negotiations between the EU and Serbia. It is the EU and not Kosovo that makes concessions to Serbia. Sure, the Kosovo government has to agree and sometimes it or Albin Kurti protests. But that is always about wanting bigger steps towards full recognition. Not about Serbia's demands on minority rights, refugee returns and monument protection. These are not even discussed.
So one can conclude that these technical talks are not real negotiations but just serve to placate those in the EU who have tied their political fate to the independence of Kosovo. They do this by using blackmail - what unfortunately has become an accepted feature of our supposedly superior Western civilization. This way these "negotiations" do nothing to build trust between Serbs and Albanians and they do nothing to achieve a negotiated solution. On the contrary, by giving the Albanians the feeling that what they do won't influence the process it seduces them to anti-Serb policies.
The Serbian government has been reproached for not having more concrete demands regarding Kosovo. But the problem is that agreements tend to stay on paper. What is the use of talking about improvements to the Ahtisaari Plan when the plan is just a cover-up for a reality where 200,000 refugees cannot return home? The only thing that might achieve some results is setting concrete numerical targets. But after the failure of "standards before status" it is doubtful whether the EU is prepared to support once again concrete targets.
It is doubtful whether it was a good idea to have the EU as mediator (see "Belgrade cannot control political will of northern Kosovo" as to many of its members have - by supporting Kosovo's independence against international law and public opinion - have tied their own reputation to the success of Kosovo.
In fact Albanians and Serbs might achieve a solution rather soon when left alone. But when some time ago Albanian intellectuals started discussing deals with Serbia - including the possibility of border changes this was interrupted by the US that flew in its highest diplomat to warn that this was not acceptable.
I am afraid the Serbs and Albanians will have to muddle through until the West gets finally tired of the Balkans.
History
Some people like to argue to the period before 1999 as a proof that Serbs and Albanians cannot be trusted to settle the subject among themselves. But until Milosevic introduced his discriminatory policies around 1990 the Kosovo Albanians did have adequate rights.
Western politicians now like to stress how bad Serbia treated Kosovo's Albanians in the 1990s. But they forget that many of those discriminatory policies were copies of similar measures that Croatia had taken against its Serbs - with silent support of the Western countries. This one of the things the West likes to forget: how it contributed to the poisoning of inter-ethnic relations by the condoning and encouragement of unilateral measures.
Even if he had wanted later in the 1990s Milosevic was politically too weak to take measures to improve the fate of Kosovo's Albanians - measures that certainly would have been unpopular in Serbia. Some Western pressure could have helped here. But the West was not interested in improving the fate of the Albanians: they only wanted to overthrow Milosevic. And so - instead of exercising just enough pressure to get Milosevic to introduce better rights for the Albanians - the West supported an Albanian guerrilla war and then held a "peace conference" at Rambouillet where it made proposal that it knew would be unacceptable to Serbia so that it had an excuse to start a war.
After the 1999 War the West blocked all negotiations for the first five years claiming that Kosovo was not ready. In the later years this was called "standards before status". After the march 2004 riots this policy was given up. Not only were standards no longer needed for negotiations: the West stopped asking for compliance to standards at all. The Ahtisaari negotiations were clearly fake: the Albanians knew they would get their state no matter what so they didn't see any need to placate the Serbs with concessions. And now we have the "technical dialogue" facilitated by the EU.
There have now been 9 rounds of talks. The result of the latest round of talks was that Serbia allowed Kosovo greater representation at international meetings and consented in some border procedures. In exchange it got candidate membership for the EU. So basically these are negotiations between the EU and Serbia. It is the EU and not Kosovo that makes concessions to Serbia. Sure, the Kosovo government has to agree and sometimes it or Albin Kurti protests. But that is always about wanting bigger steps towards full recognition. Not about Serbia's demands on minority rights, refugee returns and monument protection. These are not even discussed.
So one can conclude that these technical talks are not real negotiations but just serve to placate those in the EU who have tied their political fate to the independence of Kosovo. They do this by using blackmail - what unfortunately has become an accepted feature of our supposedly superior Western civilization. This way these "negotiations" do nothing to build trust between Serbs and Albanians and they do nothing to achieve a negotiated solution. On the contrary, by giving the Albanians the feeling that what they do won't influence the process it seduces them to anti-Serb policies.
The Serbian government has been reproached for not having more concrete demands regarding Kosovo. But the problem is that agreements tend to stay on paper. What is the use of talking about improvements to the Ahtisaari Plan when the plan is just a cover-up for a reality where 200,000 refugees cannot return home? The only thing that might achieve some results is setting concrete numerical targets. But after the failure of "standards before status" it is doubtful whether the EU is prepared to support once again concrete targets.
It is doubtful whether it was a good idea to have the EU as mediator (see "Belgrade cannot control political will of northern Kosovo" as to many of its members have - by supporting Kosovo's independence against international law and public opinion - have tied their own reputation to the success of Kosovo.
In fact Albanians and Serbs might achieve a solution rather soon when left alone. But when some time ago Albanian intellectuals started discussing deals with Serbia - including the possibility of border changes this was interrupted by the US that flew in its highest diplomat to warn that this was not acceptable.
I am afraid the Serbs and Albanians will have to muddle through until the West gets finally tired of the Balkans.
History
Some people like to argue to the period before 1999 as a proof that Serbs and Albanians cannot be trusted to settle the subject among themselves. But until Milosevic introduced his discriminatory policies around 1990 the Kosovo Albanians did have adequate rights.
Western politicians now like to stress how bad Serbia treated Kosovo's Albanians in the 1990s. But they forget that many of those discriminatory policies were copies of similar measures that Croatia had taken against its Serbs - with silent support of the Western countries. This one of the things the West likes to forget: how it contributed to the poisoning of inter-ethnic relations by the condoning and encouragement of unilateral measures.
Even if he had wanted later in the 1990s Milosevic was politically too weak to take measures to improve the fate of Kosovo's Albanians - measures that certainly would have been unpopular in Serbia. Some Western pressure could have helped here. But the West was not interested in improving the fate of the Albanians: they only wanted to overthrow Milosevic. And so - instead of exercising just enough pressure to get Milosevic to introduce better rights for the Albanians - the West supported an Albanian guerrilla war and then held a "peace conference" at Rambouillet where it made proposal that it knew would be unacceptable to Serbia so that it had an excuse to start a war.
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
Culture, negotiation tactics and North Kosovo
Both Serbia and the USA have an in-your-face culture where not much effort is spent on diplomatic niceties and where power is respected. In general not much time is spent explaining your position. It is a strategy that works when you are the strongest but gives problems when someone else is stronger. Interestingly Serbia's adversaries have been successful with the opposite strategy. Instead of arrogance they try to befriend as much people and countries as they can and they spend a lot of effort and money on propaganda. This doesn't mean that they are weak: they stick very stubbornly to their "principles" and refuse any concession where the payback is not very clear.
Kostunica understood this dynamic at least partially. When faced with the US dominated West he adopted at least some stubborn tactics. He wasn't very good in making friends in the West or propaganda but being a lawyer he stubbornly sticked to Serbia's legal rights in Kosovo and that worked. As soon as Tadic rose to power however this vision disappeared. Tadic made one concession after another to the West and each time he asked his audience to trust him. In 2008 he prevented a Russian resolution that might have prevented the transfer of power from UNMIK to EULEX. Later he failed to protest Albanian moves to fire police commanders and most recently he has he has reached a very weak compromise with KFOR on the border posts. He seems unaware that each surrender leads to an increased impression of weakness and that as a consequence new demands or unilateral moves happen.
I am not going to advice on strategy (Tadic might ask Kostunica), but I want to end with a quote from a recent blogpost by Daniel Serwer, an influential voice in America's Balkan policy, that illustrates how far Tadic has failed in explaining his vision on Kosovo to the West. The fragment comes after Serwer has explained that he understands the Albanian position:
I confess to less certainty about Serbia’s perspective. When Belgrade used to say that all of Kosovo is its Jerusalem and therefore cannot be independent, I understand both the sentiment and the implications, even if I can’t agree with the conclusion. But when Belgrade says, as it has lately, that it wants a deal to keep the north, that is more than a little puzzling. None of the main Serbian monuments, churches or monasteries are in the north. Most of the Serb population lives in the south. And the north would have a wide degree of autonomy if the Ahtisaari plan were implemented there.
The only serious objection to the Ahtisaari plan I’ve heard is that it would make Belgrade’s legitimate payments (pensions, teachers, etc.) to the north go through Pristina; some worry that they might be blocked there. This is a soluble problem, not an insurmountable one.
Some people tell me the real issue is Trepca, the large mine that has long dominated the economy of the north. Others say it is face saving: Serbia has to get something, if only “Ahtisaari plus,” whatever that means. Otherwise, Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party will lose the next election to the more nationalist, but now rhetorically quite tame, Tomislav Nikolic. Sometimes I think it is inat (usually translated “spite”) and the hope that by eventually surrendering Belgrade can extract concessions of more importance elsewhere (extraterritoriality for the Serb monasteries for example). Some claim that taking the north is just part of Belgrade’s persistent attachment to the idea of Greater Serbia, and the underlying notion that wherever Serbs are in the numerical majority that territory should be part of Serbia.
But I really don’t get it, so I invite readers to offer contributions to www.peacefare.net.
Kostunica understood this dynamic at least partially. When faced with the US dominated West he adopted at least some stubborn tactics. He wasn't very good in making friends in the West or propaganda but being a lawyer he stubbornly sticked to Serbia's legal rights in Kosovo and that worked. As soon as Tadic rose to power however this vision disappeared. Tadic made one concession after another to the West and each time he asked his audience to trust him. In 2008 he prevented a Russian resolution that might have prevented the transfer of power from UNMIK to EULEX. Later he failed to protest Albanian moves to fire police commanders and most recently he has he has reached a very weak compromise with KFOR on the border posts. He seems unaware that each surrender leads to an increased impression of weakness and that as a consequence new demands or unilateral moves happen.
I am not going to advice on strategy (Tadic might ask Kostunica), but I want to end with a quote from a recent blogpost by Daniel Serwer, an influential voice in America's Balkan policy, that illustrates how far Tadic has failed in explaining his vision on Kosovo to the West. The fragment comes after Serwer has explained that he understands the Albanian position:
I confess to less certainty about Serbia’s perspective. When Belgrade used to say that all of Kosovo is its Jerusalem and therefore cannot be independent, I understand both the sentiment and the implications, even if I can’t agree with the conclusion. But when Belgrade says, as it has lately, that it wants a deal to keep the north, that is more than a little puzzling. None of the main Serbian monuments, churches or monasteries are in the north. Most of the Serb population lives in the south. And the north would have a wide degree of autonomy if the Ahtisaari plan were implemented there.
The only serious objection to the Ahtisaari plan I’ve heard is that it would make Belgrade’s legitimate payments (pensions, teachers, etc.) to the north go through Pristina; some worry that they might be blocked there. This is a soluble problem, not an insurmountable one.
Some people tell me the real issue is Trepca, the large mine that has long dominated the economy of the north. Others say it is face saving: Serbia has to get something, if only “Ahtisaari plus,” whatever that means. Otherwise, Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party will lose the next election to the more nationalist, but now rhetorically quite tame, Tomislav Nikolic. Sometimes I think it is inat (usually translated “spite”) and the hope that by eventually surrendering Belgrade can extract concessions of more importance elsewhere (extraterritoriality for the Serb monasteries for example). Some claim that taking the north is just part of Belgrade’s persistent attachment to the idea of Greater Serbia, and the underlying notion that wherever Serbs are in the numerical majority that territory should be part of Serbia.
But I really don’t get it, so I invite readers to offer contributions to www.peacefare.net.
Saturday, May 08, 2010
On the arrest of Sabit Geci
On 6 may Sabit Geci was arrested on the accusation of involvement with human rights abuses at a secret KLA prison camp in Kukës in Albania. Just like the searches in the Transport Minitry this seems to indicate a more active role for EULEX.
The Center for investigative reporting claims its investigations led to the arrest. Their article contains a lot of interesting links regarding this article. In an interview their investigator Michael Montgomery says that his investigations started as a search for the Serbs who went missing after the war. In this context it is interesting to note that nearly simultaneously with the arrest EULEX came with the news that it has put its investigations in the organ harvesting case on a low level claiming lack of evidence. It didn't help that they didn't get help from Belgrade. Dick Marty from the Council of Europe is continuing his investigations. The Serbian prosecution claims that Geci also was involved in the organ trade.
Just as with the organ trade case Albania is refusing to ccoperate in the investigations in the Kukës camp.
I am still wondering how EULEX hopes to get these cases processed through Kosovo's judicial system, given the problems that the Kurti trial faces.
Postscript: the BBC has a nice background article on UCK prison camps in Albania during the war.
The Center for investigative reporting claims its investigations led to the arrest. Their article contains a lot of interesting links regarding this article. In an interview their investigator Michael Montgomery says that his investigations started as a search for the Serbs who went missing after the war. In this context it is interesting to note that nearly simultaneously with the arrest EULEX came with the news that it has put its investigations in the organ harvesting case on a low level claiming lack of evidence. It didn't help that they didn't get help from Belgrade. Dick Marty from the Council of Europe is continuing his investigations. The Serbian prosecution claims that Geci also was involved in the organ trade.
Just as with the organ trade case Albania is refusing to ccoperate in the investigations in the Kukës camp.
I am still wondering how EULEX hopes to get these cases processed through Kosovo's judicial system, given the problems that the Kurti trial faces.
Postscript: the BBC has a nice background article on UCK prison camps in Albania during the war.
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Meeting Peter Feith
On 12 april I attended a lecture by Peter Feith. His main talk was about the EU diplomatic service, but he dedicated about a third of his speech to Kosovo. And during the question round many questions were asked about Kosovo.
The speech was not very surprisng. He claimed that Russia had agreed that it wouldn't be a good idea when Kosovo returned under Serbian rule. And he said that after the ICJ verdict the pressure on Serbia to be "cooperative" on Kosovo will be sharply increased. Lajcak said something similar recently.
On questions he made on me the impression of diplomacy at its worst. Sure, he is a very competent diplomat. But he uses his skills mainly to evade questions. He nearly totally ignored the refugee problem and when I pressured him on it afterwards he mumbled something about Bosnia where refugee returns had proved impossible too. I didn't see a trace of vision or moral intuition.
The next day Feith went to Dublin where he attended a conference. In his speech there (the link contains a transcript) he talked a lot about the corruption in Kosovo. It looks like Feith is under EU pressure to do more about corruption. The searches in Kosovo's transport Ministry and minister Limaj's house by EULEX on 28 april may have been a result of that.
I think Feith is wrong here too. In Kosovo many thousands of minority properties are occupied. Any effort for justice ends in judicial quicksands. Feith knows about that but he refuses to address the issue. He seems to think that that he can isolate the ethnic issues - for which he doesn't have a solution - from the rest. Bad thinking! It signals to everyone that the easiest way to get rich is an illegal one: stealing from minorities. But when minorities are fair game foreign investors and Albanians without the right connections are vulnerable too. The Limaj raid was a signal that EULEX means business. But my expectation is that the EULEX resolution will soon end in the same quicksands as the Kurti trial.
Some time ago there was an interview on the Dutch television with a woman who had worked as a judge for EULEX. She was now back. In her whole term in Kosovo she had only been able to finish one single case. For the rest she had waisted lots of time on procudures between Mitrovica North and South.
How to proceed? In my opinion one cannot ignore the minority properties problem. Some kind of trust should be established that takes care of those properties and collects rent when these are occupied by Albanians. Procedures should be streamlined so that property restition can happen much sooner.
Next one should recognize that the Ahtisaari Plan does not work. It gives lots of specific minority rights, but at the same time it gives those minorities very little power over their own fate. Given the weak rule of law in Kosovo this means very little protection. Minorities should have a strong say over their fate. As part of this border changes are in my opinion inevitable.
The speech was not very surprisng. He claimed that Russia had agreed that it wouldn't be a good idea when Kosovo returned under Serbian rule. And he said that after the ICJ verdict the pressure on Serbia to be "cooperative" on Kosovo will be sharply increased. Lajcak said something similar recently.
On questions he made on me the impression of diplomacy at its worst. Sure, he is a very competent diplomat. But he uses his skills mainly to evade questions. He nearly totally ignored the refugee problem and when I pressured him on it afterwards he mumbled something about Bosnia where refugee returns had proved impossible too. I didn't see a trace of vision or moral intuition.
The next day Feith went to Dublin where he attended a conference. In his speech there (the link contains a transcript) he talked a lot about the corruption in Kosovo. It looks like Feith is under EU pressure to do more about corruption. The searches in Kosovo's transport Ministry and minister Limaj's house by EULEX on 28 april may have been a result of that.
I think Feith is wrong here too. In Kosovo many thousands of minority properties are occupied. Any effort for justice ends in judicial quicksands. Feith knows about that but he refuses to address the issue. He seems to think that that he can isolate the ethnic issues - for which he doesn't have a solution - from the rest. Bad thinking! It signals to everyone that the easiest way to get rich is an illegal one: stealing from minorities. But when minorities are fair game foreign investors and Albanians without the right connections are vulnerable too. The Limaj raid was a signal that EULEX means business. But my expectation is that the EULEX resolution will soon end in the same quicksands as the Kurti trial.
Some time ago there was an interview on the Dutch television with a woman who had worked as a judge for EULEX. She was now back. In her whole term in Kosovo she had only been able to finish one single case. For the rest she had waisted lots of time on procudures between Mitrovica North and South.
How to proceed? In my opinion one cannot ignore the minority properties problem. Some kind of trust should be established that takes care of those properties and collects rent when these are occupied by Albanians. Procedures should be streamlined so that property restition can happen much sooner.
Next one should recognize that the Ahtisaari Plan does not work. It gives lots of specific minority rights, but at the same time it gives those minorities very little power over their own fate. Given the weak rule of law in Kosovo this means very little protection. Minorities should have a strong say over their fate. As part of this border changes are in my opinion inevitable.
Monday, December 21, 2009
The EU is making the same mistake twice
As they say, those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Once the EU drove Yugoslavia into a civil war with a divisive policy that sets up one ethnic group against the other.
In 1991 EU nations secretly supported separationist preparations in Croatia and Slovenia. Then they prematurely recognized them under the excuse that Yugoslavia had dissolved: a distortion of the situation and dangerous exploit in international law that could be used against any multi-ethnic country. But perhaps the most dangerous was that the EU adopted the self-delusion that everyone would follow them. In fact nothing changed on the ground in Yugoslavia except that one side had gotten an ally and the other an adversary.
Rich provinces all over the world try to secede in the knowledge that they will be even richer when they no longer have to subsidize the rest of the country. In the case of Croatia and Slovenia there was the additional appeal of a speedy EU membership. Given these circumstances the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was probably unavoidable unless the EU adopted an explicit policy that took attraction of a speedy EU membership away. Instead the EU fell for Croat and Slovene propaganda that tried to paint their secession in moral colors. Milosevic was painted as an extreme nationalist. He wasn't. He was just asking what most politicians representing an underrepresented large ethnic group that felt discriminated against would have asked. His political methods weren't always nice, but he was faced with political adversaries in other republics who had extended their power far beyond what had been intended in the Yugoslav constitution. His involvement in mass urder in Bosnia was still in the future: for the moment his policies in Kosovo were very similar to Croatia's policies towards its Serb minority.
A sound policy would have taken a distance and let both sides struggle it out in the political arena. It would have stressed that without an agreement the republics were still part of Yugoslavia, but it the same time it would have discouraged violence or rigorous steps by the central government. Instead the "moral" view of the EU led to immoral behavior. It now considered the rebellious Serbs in Croatia as insurrectionists instead of one side in a conflict. And it discarded Croat discrimination as primarily Croatia's "internal affairs". The result was predictable: Croatia didn't see anymore need for caution in its treatment of its Serb minority and the Serbs didn't see any other way than armed conflict to achieve their goals. Bosnia's war started in a similar way.
One would have supposed that more than a decade later the West would do better with Kosovo. Instead we see exactly the same pattern. The EU again couldn't resist the temptation to choose sides: this time by recognizing Kosovo. It could have chosen a neutral position and appointed a neutral mediator, but instead it appointed Ahtisaari whose misguided principles ("Kosovo should never again under Serbian rule") made any other outcome than unilateral independence impossible. A real neutral negotiator would asked the Albanians to convince Serbia that the rights of the Serb and other minorities were guaranteed.
Now too the real bad things happen afterwards when the EU has no longer the capability to see the behavior of both sides in the same light. Where in Croatia the EU crossed the line with its ignoring of the maltreatment of Croatia's Serbs, it seems now poised to cross the line with the privatization of Brezovica. Anyone can see that that will inevitably result in the end of the employment of many Serbs there. Past actions, like the evacuation of the court house, concerned symbols. Here it concerns directly the survival of Kosovo's Serb minority. And just as in the past the EU hid behind declarations about Croat "sovereignty" it now hides behind Kosovo sovereignty and the Ahtisaari Plan.
In 1991 EU nations secretly supported separationist preparations in Croatia and Slovenia. Then they prematurely recognized them under the excuse that Yugoslavia had dissolved: a distortion of the situation and dangerous exploit in international law that could be used against any multi-ethnic country. But perhaps the most dangerous was that the EU adopted the self-delusion that everyone would follow them. In fact nothing changed on the ground in Yugoslavia except that one side had gotten an ally and the other an adversary.
Rich provinces all over the world try to secede in the knowledge that they will be even richer when they no longer have to subsidize the rest of the country. In the case of Croatia and Slovenia there was the additional appeal of a speedy EU membership. Given these circumstances the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was probably unavoidable unless the EU adopted an explicit policy that took attraction of a speedy EU membership away. Instead the EU fell for Croat and Slovene propaganda that tried to paint their secession in moral colors. Milosevic was painted as an extreme nationalist. He wasn't. He was just asking what most politicians representing an underrepresented large ethnic group that felt discriminated against would have asked. His political methods weren't always nice, but he was faced with political adversaries in other republics who had extended their power far beyond what had been intended in the Yugoslav constitution. His involvement in mass urder in Bosnia was still in the future: for the moment his policies in Kosovo were very similar to Croatia's policies towards its Serb minority.
A sound policy would have taken a distance and let both sides struggle it out in the political arena. It would have stressed that without an agreement the republics were still part of Yugoslavia, but it the same time it would have discouraged violence or rigorous steps by the central government. Instead the "moral" view of the EU led to immoral behavior. It now considered the rebellious Serbs in Croatia as insurrectionists instead of one side in a conflict. And it discarded Croat discrimination as primarily Croatia's "internal affairs". The result was predictable: Croatia didn't see anymore need for caution in its treatment of its Serb minority and the Serbs didn't see any other way than armed conflict to achieve their goals. Bosnia's war started in a similar way.
One would have supposed that more than a decade later the West would do better with Kosovo. Instead we see exactly the same pattern. The EU again couldn't resist the temptation to choose sides: this time by recognizing Kosovo. It could have chosen a neutral position and appointed a neutral mediator, but instead it appointed Ahtisaari whose misguided principles ("Kosovo should never again under Serbian rule") made any other outcome than unilateral independence impossible. A real neutral negotiator would asked the Albanians to convince Serbia that the rights of the Serb and other minorities were guaranteed.
Now too the real bad things happen afterwards when the EU has no longer the capability to see the behavior of both sides in the same light. Where in Croatia the EU crossed the line with its ignoring of the maltreatment of Croatia's Serbs, it seems now poised to cross the line with the privatization of Brezovica. Anyone can see that that will inevitably result in the end of the employment of many Serbs there. Past actions, like the evacuation of the court house, concerned symbols. Here it concerns directly the survival of Kosovo's Serb minority. And just as in the past the EU hid behind declarations about Croat "sovereignty" it now hides behind Kosovo sovereignty and the Ahtisaari Plan.
Sunday, November 22, 2009
ICJ decision on Kosovo to be vague
In an interview with the Russian news agency Ria Novosti the president of the International Court of Justice, ICJ, Hisashi Owada said that the Court’s advisory opinion on whether Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence went against international law will not be "a clear yes or no".
I am still looking for the Russian original - as far as I can see Ria Novosti hasn't published an English translation - so that I can see the quote in context (I don't speak Russian but Google Translate might help). Please help me find it!
On itself it is not a surprise. I had heared similar rumors from people who have contacts at the ICJ here in Holland. Yet there are some strange elements in this interview. First of all it is unusual that a president of a court give an indication of the verdict while the data gathering is still going on. For the rest it looks like there will be some vague general text with the addition of more clear individual opinions of the diverse judges. The question is why the court would lend itself to such a charade.
In my opinion the best outcome would be when the court stated that they can understand why the Western countries did what they did (some face saving) but that it is not legal and there have to be real negotiations. Otherwise the most probable end will be a Kosovo without minorities (they keep being marginalized and leaving) and with a dubious international status for a long time.
I am still looking for the Russian original - as far as I can see Ria Novosti hasn't published an English translation - so that I can see the quote in context (I don't speak Russian but Google Translate might help). Please help me find it!
On itself it is not a surprise. I had heared similar rumors from people who have contacts at the ICJ here in Holland. Yet there are some strange elements in this interview. First of all it is unusual that a president of a court give an indication of the verdict while the data gathering is still going on. For the rest it looks like there will be some vague general text with the addition of more clear individual opinions of the diverse judges. The question is why the court would lend itself to such a charade.
In my opinion the best outcome would be when the court stated that they can understand why the Western countries did what they did (some face saving) but that it is not legal and there have to be real negotiations. Otherwise the most probable end will be a Kosovo without minorities (they keep being marginalized and leaving) and with a dubious international status for a long time.
Friday, October 30, 2009
Ethnic traps in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan
I have recently reading a lot about Afghanistan and Iraq and what strikes me is the similarity between America’s problems there and in the Balkans. Americans keep making the same mistakes based on their misunderstanding of ethnic dynamics.
What strikes one in the Balkans first is that the Americans have no idea how compromises are made. As long as the US is supporting one faction one can be sure it won’t compromise, but somehow that doesn’t register in the US and they keep playing favorites. Even more amazing is that those favorites are largely historically determined and have little to do with present US interests. Yet they keep being promoted because somehow it is supposed to be humiliating for the US if a former ally suffered a defeat. Another US addiction is to borders. Partitioning of both Bosnia and Kosovo is taboo. Why? Because somewhere in the past the US committed itself to those borders. In the mean time it keep deceiving itself that within those borders the conditioned for a peaceful multi-ethnic society are present.
What brings me to Iraq. One of the hottest items it Kirkuk. Should it be controlled by the Arabs or the Kurds. Here too the taboos abound. Kirkuk is a province that should not be partitioned. Let alone that one should look for a comprehensive solution that concerns all the borders of Kurdistan. To make the discussion even more abstract the subject of ethnic cleansing by the Kurds is taboo. Just as in the Balkans the pretense must be maintained that no ethnic cleansing happens under US control. And so we see that the discussions about Kirkuk are about abstract voting rights instead of the real issues.
In Afghanistan the absurdity of US ethnic thinking becomes even more visible. Afghanistan is divided between the Pashtus who constitute some 43% of the population and have traditionally ruled Afghanistan and the other tribes who nearly all speak Dari, a Persian dialect. Afghanistan is relatively recent creation that comes from conquests by the Pashtu rulers. The other tribes have rather mixed feelings about Pashtu rule that has included ethnic cleansing and the Taliban.
The US conquered Afghanistan with the help of those other tribes, but then turned its back to them and offered the Pashtus the governance of Afghanistan. To add injury to insult they imposed a hugely centralized government system. This system was imposed by the American diplomat Khalilzad – himself of Pashtu descent. In its defense we are told that otherwise the Pasthus would become angry and not support us. But don’t expect the Pashtus to be grateful. Many of them sympathize with the Taliban and even president Karzai is pushing for negotiations with the Taliban. They know that Taliban rule means Pashtu rule.
A very basic strategy in Afghanistan would be to give the non-Pashtu provinces the tools to get rid of the Taliban. Many would jump at the chance. It would leave us with only the Pashtu provinces in the need of counterinsurgency. But it doesn’t fit in the US imposed system where only national institutions are reinforced. It looks like the US is incapable to discern its friends from its enemies. This reminds one of the dubious US friendships with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
What strikes one in the Balkans first is that the Americans have no idea how compromises are made. As long as the US is supporting one faction one can be sure it won’t compromise, but somehow that doesn’t register in the US and they keep playing favorites. Even more amazing is that those favorites are largely historically determined and have little to do with present US interests. Yet they keep being promoted because somehow it is supposed to be humiliating for the US if a former ally suffered a defeat. Another US addiction is to borders. Partitioning of both Bosnia and Kosovo is taboo. Why? Because somewhere in the past the US committed itself to those borders. In the mean time it keep deceiving itself that within those borders the conditioned for a peaceful multi-ethnic society are present.
What brings me to Iraq. One of the hottest items it Kirkuk. Should it be controlled by the Arabs or the Kurds. Here too the taboos abound. Kirkuk is a province that should not be partitioned. Let alone that one should look for a comprehensive solution that concerns all the borders of Kurdistan. To make the discussion even more abstract the subject of ethnic cleansing by the Kurds is taboo. Just as in the Balkans the pretense must be maintained that no ethnic cleansing happens under US control. And so we see that the discussions about Kirkuk are about abstract voting rights instead of the real issues.
In Afghanistan the absurdity of US ethnic thinking becomes even more visible. Afghanistan is divided between the Pashtus who constitute some 43% of the population and have traditionally ruled Afghanistan and the other tribes who nearly all speak Dari, a Persian dialect. Afghanistan is relatively recent creation that comes from conquests by the Pashtu rulers. The other tribes have rather mixed feelings about Pashtu rule that has included ethnic cleansing and the Taliban.
The US conquered Afghanistan with the help of those other tribes, but then turned its back to them and offered the Pashtus the governance of Afghanistan. To add injury to insult they imposed a hugely centralized government system. This system was imposed by the American diplomat Khalilzad – himself of Pashtu descent. In its defense we are told that otherwise the Pasthus would become angry and not support us. But don’t expect the Pashtus to be grateful. Many of them sympathize with the Taliban and even president Karzai is pushing for negotiations with the Taliban. They know that Taliban rule means Pashtu rule.
A very basic strategy in Afghanistan would be to give the non-Pashtu provinces the tools to get rid of the Taliban. Many would jump at the chance. It would leave us with only the Pashtu provinces in the need of counterinsurgency. But it doesn’t fit in the US imposed system where only national institutions are reinforced. It looks like the US is incapable to discern its friends from its enemies. This reminds one of the dubious US friendships with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Thoughts on the release of Ejupi
On 13 march the internationalized trial chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court released Florim Ejupi. Just 9 months earlier he had been sentenced to 40 years prison for his role in the bombing of the Niš-Ekspress bus in 2001 that killed 12 Serbs. Amazingly - allthough many Serbs condemned the release - only the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade gave arguments for their condemnation. They argued that "It was more suitable, considering the gravity of the crime, for the Supreme Court to reverse the judgement and reopen the main hearing to directly adduce evidence, including the examination of witnesses, and thus prevent criticism and dissatisfaction of the victims’ families caused by the acquittal of a person who was previously sentenced to 40 years of imprisonment."
The argument for the release was a "lack of evidence". I suppose the court will later publish a more thorough verdict. The shortness of the publication leaves a bad taste. It gives the impression that the court ignores the severity of the case and the need of the public for clarity. One of the purposes of trials for ethnic crimes is to build inter-ethnic trust. With its attitude the court certainly does not contribute to that trust.
There is also the question whether there are other cases for which Ejupi could be prosecuted. In reaction to the release Serbian Interior minister Ivica Dačić said that "the Serbian police have information on Ejupi related to other crimes, as do their German counterparts, since some of those crimes were committed in Germany".
Having seen the indictment and the prior verdict I was left a bit puzzled. The case against Ejupi is based on two pieces of evidence: a fresh cigaret butt with his dna near the place from where the bomb was detonated and the testimony of "witness alpha" who had been with Ejupi in the prison of Mitrovica and Dubrava.
As I understand it the cigaret butt alone would be enough for condemning Ejupi for complicity. The butt was fresh, the place was remote and far from paths and it is very improbable that the bombers would have allowed an outsider close to them to witness their proceedings. Ejupi has no alibi or excuse. According to the verdict "The accused Florim Ejupi pleaded not guilty to all charges. He decided to defend himself in silence. He also refused to give a statement or answer questions during the investigation.". But that didn't stop his lawyers from making many points.
Witness alpha is more problematic. He had a few contradictions in his statement. The most important one concerns an article in a Serb newspaper that he says he saw first while in prison (and then discussed with Ejupi), but that was published 9 months before. I find the verdict in this respect very incoherent. The article in Blic the verdict refers to (of 9 june 2004) must have discussed the arrest of Ejupi at that time. It is hard to imagine Alpha to discuss that with Ejupi many months later as if it just happened.
Another incoherent part of the summary of Alpha's testimony in the verdict concerns his relation with Ejupi. At the beginning it is stated that "He testified that the first time he met Florim Ejupi was in 2004 in Mitrovica, near the park in the market. Then in the summer of 2005 they met again in Mitrovica Detention Center." Yet further in the report it appears that they took together part in the march 2004 riots and that Alpha gave testimony about that in which he gave incriminating evidence against Ejupi. It is rather crucial to know as much as possible about the relation between Ejupi and Alpha as it is one of the points of the defense their relation was not of a nature that one would have expected Ejupi to tell Alpha the details of his bus bombing exploits.
Other question marks arise about another point of the defense: the car battery. The person who triggered the bomb did so by connecting the wire to the poles or some kind of battery. However, due to the long distance (1200 meter) a normal car battery would not have been sufficiently strong. You would have needed either a special device or a car battery with some extra electronics. As the battery hasn't been found we don't know what was used. But the defense is using it against Alpha that he reports that a car battery was used. I found this a rather weak argument: unless both were in love with technology it is very unlikely that Ejupi would have bragged about the advanced electronics that was used. And it is rather peculiar that the defense knows about these kinds of things. It raises the question who thought up that argument: someone involved with the crime?
All together this summary of Alpha's testimony in the verdict left me with a bad taste. It is rather incoherent and the inconsistencies in his statements are elaborately discussed in the middle of the main story. I got the impression that the summary of the testimony had been deliberately written to undermine the credibility of the testimony - possibly by some lower court house employee with sympathies for Ejupi. For the verdict in june it didn't make a difference as the judges had heared the testimony themselves and judged its credibility from that. However, the higher court probably relied on those summaries and probably didn't look at a tape of the testimonies (if there was a tape).
The argument for the release was a "lack of evidence". I suppose the court will later publish a more thorough verdict. The shortness of the publication leaves a bad taste. It gives the impression that the court ignores the severity of the case and the need of the public for clarity. One of the purposes of trials for ethnic crimes is to build inter-ethnic trust. With its attitude the court certainly does not contribute to that trust.
There is also the question whether there are other cases for which Ejupi could be prosecuted. In reaction to the release Serbian Interior minister Ivica Dačić said that "the Serbian police have information on Ejupi related to other crimes, as do their German counterparts, since some of those crimes were committed in Germany".
Having seen the indictment and the prior verdict I was left a bit puzzled. The case against Ejupi is based on two pieces of evidence: a fresh cigaret butt with his dna near the place from where the bomb was detonated and the testimony of "witness alpha" who had been with Ejupi in the prison of Mitrovica and Dubrava.
As I understand it the cigaret butt alone would be enough for condemning Ejupi for complicity. The butt was fresh, the place was remote and far from paths and it is very improbable that the bombers would have allowed an outsider close to them to witness their proceedings. Ejupi has no alibi or excuse. According to the verdict "The accused Florim Ejupi pleaded not guilty to all charges. He decided to defend himself in silence. He also refused to give a statement or answer questions during the investigation.". But that didn't stop his lawyers from making many points.
Witness alpha is more problematic. He had a few contradictions in his statement. The most important one concerns an article in a Serb newspaper that he says he saw first while in prison (and then discussed with Ejupi), but that was published 9 months before. I find the verdict in this respect very incoherent. The article in Blic the verdict refers to (of 9 june 2004) must have discussed the arrest of Ejupi at that time. It is hard to imagine Alpha to discuss that with Ejupi many months later as if it just happened.
Another incoherent part of the summary of Alpha's testimony in the verdict concerns his relation with Ejupi. At the beginning it is stated that "He testified that the first time he met Florim Ejupi was in 2004 in Mitrovica, near the park in the market. Then in the summer of 2005 they met again in Mitrovica Detention Center." Yet further in the report it appears that they took together part in the march 2004 riots and that Alpha gave testimony about that in which he gave incriminating evidence against Ejupi. It is rather crucial to know as much as possible about the relation between Ejupi and Alpha as it is one of the points of the defense their relation was not of a nature that one would have expected Ejupi to tell Alpha the details of his bus bombing exploits.
Other question marks arise about another point of the defense: the car battery. The person who triggered the bomb did so by connecting the wire to the poles or some kind of battery. However, due to the long distance (1200 meter) a normal car battery would not have been sufficiently strong. You would have needed either a special device or a car battery with some extra electronics. As the battery hasn't been found we don't know what was used. But the defense is using it against Alpha that he reports that a car battery was used. I found this a rather weak argument: unless both were in love with technology it is very unlikely that Ejupi would have bragged about the advanced electronics that was used. And it is rather peculiar that the defense knows about these kinds of things. It raises the question who thought up that argument: someone involved with the crime?
All together this summary of Alpha's testimony in the verdict left me with a bad taste. It is rather incoherent and the inconsistencies in his statements are elaborately discussed in the middle of the main story. I got the impression that the summary of the testimony had been deliberately written to undermine the credibility of the testimony - possibly by some lower court house employee with sympathies for Ejupi. For the verdict in june it didn't make a difference as the judges had heared the testimony themselves and judged its credibility from that. However, the higher court probably relied on those summaries and probably didn't look at a tape of the testimonies (if there was a tape).
Sunday, January 25, 2009
The roots of Ahtisaari's Kosovo mistake
The Financial Times had lunch with Ahtisaari. It didn't come cheap (€284.45 for two people), but it gives a nice view in the way Ahtisaari thinks.
Ahtisaari (1937) joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland at the age of 28. Before he had been involved in development aid. He made career and became Finland ambassador in Tanzania in 1973. Part of this job was keeping contact with liberation movements in southern Africa. This resulted in a UN job that made him responsible for Namibia in 1976. He stayed involved until Namibia's independence in 1989. Ahtisaari sees this as his greatest accomplishment and according to the article the Namibia agreement served as a model for South Africa later on.
Ahtisaari has tried to apply the lessons he learned from Namibia elsewhere. The lesson that he explicitly mentions is "I don’t think you can get any solution without the Americans, in most of the conflicts". I beg to disagree. Sure, the US can spoil negotiations: for years it supported Apartheid in its battle against communism and recently it torpedoed negotiations between Israel and Syria. But the record of the US in positively influencing peace is rather poor. About every other year it has some peace initiative in the Middle East, yet the only time it achieved something were the Camp David agreements in 1978. Usually the US is too pro-Israelian to achieve anything, but this time it was strongly motivated to get Egypt in its sphere of influence and outside Russia's.
Namibia happened to be another case were the US position helped instead of obstructed. The US had become convinced that Apartheid was no longer defensible. Yet it was afraid of the pro-communist leanings of the liberation movements. So it pressed for a solution that stressed democracy and guaranteed free markets. This position fitted with that of Namibia's white rulers as it protected them against nationalizations, land redistribution and other redistributive policies. It was the kind of chance that would hurt the Whites the least and so was most acceptable to them.
Kosovo was more like the Middle East. Lacking strong interests for itself the US had adopted the Albanian position as its own. This bound it to such unfortunately strict ideas as "no border changes". By adopting this as his own position Ahtisaari made it very difficult for himself to find a solution.
Another point that Ahtisaari doesn't mention is "principles". In the case of Namibia the principle that Apartheid was no longer acceptable played a strong role. I suppose that Ahtisaari derived from this the idea that the Kosovo negotiations needed a principle too. This became the idea that Serbs should no longer rule over Kosovo. I think that this was a major blunder as it declared the Albanian bad experiences with Serb rule and their wish not to repeat it as fundamentally different from the Serb bad experiences with Albanian rule and their wishes in this regard.
A third lesson may have been that you can solve everything by just having the right laws. The Whites in Namibia were happy without much minority protection, so why shouldn't the Serbs be able to do the same. This ignored the fact while the Whites in Namibia negotiated from a position of power the Serbs negotiated as a persecuted minority, half of which lived in exile. Being in a much worse position they need much stronger guarantees that this position will be improved.
Finally there is Ahtisaari modus operandi. He is a typical networker whose strength is that he knows so many people who can help him to solve a problem. However, once seeing him in a lecture gave me the impression that he is not very fond of details. I couldn't find a sign that he has any idea what the situation on the ground in Kosovo looks like.
Ahtisaari has been asked to mediate in the Croatian-Slovenian border conflict. He would be part of a troika that might also include Badinter.
Ahtisaari (1937) joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland at the age of 28. Before he had been involved in development aid. He made career and became Finland ambassador in Tanzania in 1973. Part of this job was keeping contact with liberation movements in southern Africa. This resulted in a UN job that made him responsible for Namibia in 1976. He stayed involved until Namibia's independence in 1989. Ahtisaari sees this as his greatest accomplishment and according to the article the Namibia agreement served as a model for South Africa later on.
Ahtisaari has tried to apply the lessons he learned from Namibia elsewhere. The lesson that he explicitly mentions is "I don’t think you can get any solution without the Americans, in most of the conflicts". I beg to disagree. Sure, the US can spoil negotiations: for years it supported Apartheid in its battle against communism and recently it torpedoed negotiations between Israel and Syria. But the record of the US in positively influencing peace is rather poor. About every other year it has some peace initiative in the Middle East, yet the only time it achieved something were the Camp David agreements in 1978. Usually the US is too pro-Israelian to achieve anything, but this time it was strongly motivated to get Egypt in its sphere of influence and outside Russia's.
Namibia happened to be another case were the US position helped instead of obstructed. The US had become convinced that Apartheid was no longer defensible. Yet it was afraid of the pro-communist leanings of the liberation movements. So it pressed for a solution that stressed democracy and guaranteed free markets. This position fitted with that of Namibia's white rulers as it protected them against nationalizations, land redistribution and other redistributive policies. It was the kind of chance that would hurt the Whites the least and so was most acceptable to them.
Kosovo was more like the Middle East. Lacking strong interests for itself the US had adopted the Albanian position as its own. This bound it to such unfortunately strict ideas as "no border changes". By adopting this as his own position Ahtisaari made it very difficult for himself to find a solution.
Another point that Ahtisaari doesn't mention is "principles". In the case of Namibia the principle that Apartheid was no longer acceptable played a strong role. I suppose that Ahtisaari derived from this the idea that the Kosovo negotiations needed a principle too. This became the idea that Serbs should no longer rule over Kosovo. I think that this was a major blunder as it declared the Albanian bad experiences with Serb rule and their wish not to repeat it as fundamentally different from the Serb bad experiences with Albanian rule and their wishes in this regard.
A third lesson may have been that you can solve everything by just having the right laws. The Whites in Namibia were happy without much minority protection, so why shouldn't the Serbs be able to do the same. This ignored the fact while the Whites in Namibia negotiated from a position of power the Serbs negotiated as a persecuted minority, half of which lived in exile. Being in a much worse position they need much stronger guarantees that this position will be improved.
Finally there is Ahtisaari modus operandi. He is a typical networker whose strength is that he knows so many people who can help him to solve a problem. However, once seeing him in a lecture gave me the impression that he is not very fond of details. I couldn't find a sign that he has any idea what the situation on the ground in Kosovo looks like.
Ahtisaari has been asked to mediate in the Croatian-Slovenian border conflict. He would be part of a troika that might also include Badinter.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
Radical Islam in Kosovo
Only a small percentage of the Kosovars adhere to radical Islam. But that doesn't mean that is hasn't influence. Balkanalysis' Christopher Deliso has an article about it under the title Lingering Security Concerns in Kosovo, as Imam Attacked by Radical Islamists.
Aprt from discussing a few incidents where Wahabists tried forcefully to influence imam election, the article also discusses the influence of muslim radicals on Kosovo's judiciary: "Most significant, however, was a report that mid- to upper-level judicial appointments in certain regions of Kosovo, as well as other civil sector positions, were being given to fundamentalist sympathizers.".
The article continues with discussing the continuing influx of foreign money to finance Wahabism and its effect. But it is rather vague on the exact source of the money or the quantity.
Aprt from discussing a few incidents where Wahabists tried forcefully to influence imam election, the article also discusses the influence of muslim radicals on Kosovo's judiciary: "Most significant, however, was a report that mid- to upper-level judicial appointments in certain regions of Kosovo, as well as other civil sector positions, were being given to fundamentalist sympathizers.".
The article continues with discussing the continuing influx of foreign money to finance Wahabism and its effect. But it is rather vague on the exact source of the money or the quantity.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Optimistic about Kosovo???
New Kosova Report has a report from a discussion in London. It has an upbeat tone about the situation in Kosovo. I quote:
However one refreshing theme emerged. Daut Dauti's final word on the subject was 'hope'; Tim Judah elaborated. He reminded his listeners of the dire forecasts made this time last year of what the world could expect as a result of a declaration of independence: lines of Kosovo's Serbs on tractors heading for the border, enclaves wiped out, churches destroyed, and Serbian politics dominated by the far right. It hasn't happened.
The upbeat tone surprised me. When I had read Judah's book Kosovo: war and revenge I had found it a bleak analysis of the cycles of Serb and Albanian ascendancy in Kosovo and the apparent inevitability of these cycles. This view is perhaps another way of articulating Anna Di Lellio's concept of Kosovo's 'permanent transition'. I hadn't wanted to believe that these cycles and transitions would repeat endlessly.
But how could the last 10 years be considered different from any other period of Kosovo's bloody history? My optimistic answer would be because of this and that. This, the internet. That, the debate at LSE and what it represents. Through electronic media, widely if not universally available, and through other contact with people from beyond the Balkans, today's Kosovars - Serb, Albanian, and others - are more aware than any generation before them, of the world outside Kosovo. Kosovo has witnessed an unprecedented exchange of peoples and ideas in this decade, through the international community which has come to Kosovo and the experience of Kosovars and the countries where they sought asylum.
I don't share this optimism. I never shared the the expectation that Kosovo's Serbs would leave en masse on tractors. It was based on the belief that Serbs had left the Krajna and Sarajevo in 1995 without reason. In my view that was simply wrong. The Croats had a long track record about how they treated the Serbs in the areas that they conquered and Krajna's Serbs had no reason to believe that they would be treated differently. Bosnia's Muslims used different methods to make the Serbs feel unwanted but they were just as effective. In Kosovo this scenario that the "others" would take over and change everything at once isn't possible. The international peacekeepers guarantee against sudden changes for the worse.
But all reports point to a worsening of the situation of Kosovo's Serbs. The number of departures is increasing. Interethnic tensions is rising. And with Albanian cops in Serb villages we have a scenario that doesn't fit basic minority rights. It looks like the go-slow ethnic cleansing is continuing.
The idea that it is now quiet because of the internet is a misperception about how we got the violence in the first place. It was because the international community seemed totally unaware of how revolutionary it is to declare provinces independent without negotiations. Giving one side everything in an ethnic conflict is a sure way to inflame a conflict - even more so when the other side has the military means to resist. (For me Badinter is still the greatest war criminal of all in former Yugoslavia.) Nowadays the international community is doing everything very slow while it keeps a small army ready for the case that something goes wrong.
The expectations about the rise of Serbia's extreme right is based on misperceptions too. Nikolic had built the Radicals from a small racist party into the main opposition party. He had done this by paying attention to populair social-economic themes like corruption and poverty. When he recently broke with the Radicals and founded his own party the "old" Radicals went back to the 10% of the electorate they had under Seselj. So the belief that 30% of the Serb voters supported Seselj's extreme ideas was simply a misconception about the functioning of politics in Serbia.
But is there reason to optimism? I doubt it. The slow exodus keeps going. With one Serb family leaving at a time it doesn't get the headlines. But in the end it is just as much ethnic cleansing as the queue of tractors. And it will have long term effects on the relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
How it works? I think this quote from a report by Victoria Hayes gives the best impression:
I would like to see Kosovo less as a national Kosovo-Albanian state, but I understand that given the country’s past it is difficult for people, Albanian, Serbian, and others both in and out of the region, to refrain from viewing it as such. It seems that it will be impossible to ever view Kosovo as anything but an Albanian nation, despite attempts to include minorities in the country’s activities. I think a lot of these attempts are nothing more than words; in general, it did not appear that anyone was truly interested in including Serbians, or the Romas, Ashkalis, Egyptians, or any other minority group. I say this because many people, who claimed that they would really like to see a better representations of the Serbian population in the government, police, etc., would attribute the lack of Serbians in these areas to laziness, stubbornness, or some other undesirable characteristic of the Serbians. There is so much underlying anger on each side that even people who I considered extremely intelligent would make ethnically-biased comments about the Serbian population in Kosovo.
However one refreshing theme emerged. Daut Dauti's final word on the subject was 'hope'; Tim Judah elaborated. He reminded his listeners of the dire forecasts made this time last year of what the world could expect as a result of a declaration of independence: lines of Kosovo's Serbs on tractors heading for the border, enclaves wiped out, churches destroyed, and Serbian politics dominated by the far right. It hasn't happened.
The upbeat tone surprised me. When I had read Judah's book Kosovo: war and revenge I had found it a bleak analysis of the cycles of Serb and Albanian ascendancy in Kosovo and the apparent inevitability of these cycles. This view is perhaps another way of articulating Anna Di Lellio's concept of Kosovo's 'permanent transition'. I hadn't wanted to believe that these cycles and transitions would repeat endlessly.
But how could the last 10 years be considered different from any other period of Kosovo's bloody history? My optimistic answer would be because of this and that. This, the internet. That, the debate at LSE and what it represents. Through electronic media, widely if not universally available, and through other contact with people from beyond the Balkans, today's Kosovars - Serb, Albanian, and others - are more aware than any generation before them, of the world outside Kosovo. Kosovo has witnessed an unprecedented exchange of peoples and ideas in this decade, through the international community which has come to Kosovo and the experience of Kosovars and the countries where they sought asylum.
I don't share this optimism. I never shared the the expectation that Kosovo's Serbs would leave en masse on tractors. It was based on the belief that Serbs had left the Krajna and Sarajevo in 1995 without reason. In my view that was simply wrong. The Croats had a long track record about how they treated the Serbs in the areas that they conquered and Krajna's Serbs had no reason to believe that they would be treated differently. Bosnia's Muslims used different methods to make the Serbs feel unwanted but they were just as effective. In Kosovo this scenario that the "others" would take over and change everything at once isn't possible. The international peacekeepers guarantee against sudden changes for the worse.
But all reports point to a worsening of the situation of Kosovo's Serbs. The number of departures is increasing. Interethnic tensions is rising. And with Albanian cops in Serb villages we have a scenario that doesn't fit basic minority rights. It looks like the go-slow ethnic cleansing is continuing.
The idea that it is now quiet because of the internet is a misperception about how we got the violence in the first place. It was because the international community seemed totally unaware of how revolutionary it is to declare provinces independent without negotiations. Giving one side everything in an ethnic conflict is a sure way to inflame a conflict - even more so when the other side has the military means to resist. (For me Badinter is still the greatest war criminal of all in former Yugoslavia.) Nowadays the international community is doing everything very slow while it keeps a small army ready for the case that something goes wrong.
The expectations about the rise of Serbia's extreme right is based on misperceptions too. Nikolic had built the Radicals from a small racist party into the main opposition party. He had done this by paying attention to populair social-economic themes like corruption and poverty. When he recently broke with the Radicals and founded his own party the "old" Radicals went back to the 10% of the electorate they had under Seselj. So the belief that 30% of the Serb voters supported Seselj's extreme ideas was simply a misconception about the functioning of politics in Serbia.
But is there reason to optimism? I doubt it. The slow exodus keeps going. With one Serb family leaving at a time it doesn't get the headlines. But in the end it is just as much ethnic cleansing as the queue of tractors. And it will have long term effects on the relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
How it works? I think this quote from a report by Victoria Hayes gives the best impression:
I would like to see Kosovo less as a national Kosovo-Albanian state, but I understand that given the country’s past it is difficult for people, Albanian, Serbian, and others both in and out of the region, to refrain from viewing it as such. It seems that it will be impossible to ever view Kosovo as anything but an Albanian nation, despite attempts to include minorities in the country’s activities. I think a lot of these attempts are nothing more than words; in general, it did not appear that anyone was truly interested in including Serbians, or the Romas, Ashkalis, Egyptians, or any other minority group. I say this because many people, who claimed that they would really like to see a better representations of the Serbian population in the government, police, etc., would attribute the lack of Serbians in these areas to laziness, stubbornness, or some other undesirable characteristic of the Serbians. There is so much underlying anger on each side that even people who I considered extremely intelligent would make ethnically-biased comments about the Serbian population in Kosovo.
Saturday, November 08, 2008
Corruption in Kosovo
The American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo has published a report about coruption in Kosovo and its impact of the busisness community. Unfortunately it is only the result of a questionnaire among businesses. It misses individual observations that would have given taste to the dry figures.
Most interesting I found the differences between Serb and Albanian businesses. Serb businesses have much more problems with the KEK (40%) and the Cadastre (30%), allthough the KEK is impopular with the Albanians too. But no institution get complaints of more than 15% of the Albanians.
Update: New Kosova Report has an elaborate interview with Avni Zogiani from the anti-corruption NGO COHU. He comments on the findings by saying that corruption is invisible because it is mainly in the political arena. All the checks and balances that should keep politics honest are simply not there.
Most interesting I found the differences between Serb and Albanian businesses. Serb businesses have much more problems with the KEK (40%) and the Cadastre (30%), allthough the KEK is impopular with the Albanians too. But no institution get complaints of more than 15% of the Albanians.
Update: New Kosova Report has an elaborate interview with Avni Zogiani from the anti-corruption NGO COHU. He comments on the findings by saying that corruption is invisible because it is mainly in the political arena. All the checks and balances that should keep politics honest are simply not there.
Saturday, October 18, 2008
HLC: 13500 deaths in Kosovo in period 1998-2000
The Humanitarian Law Center has published a list of victims of the Kosovo conflict between januari 1998 and december 2000. According to B92 they have so far registered 13,472 victims — 9,260 Albanians and 2,488 Serbs. I have to refer to B92 for these data because the data on the HLC website are very concise. HLC will publish their complete data in januari 2009.
Excavations after the war brought about 3000 bodies and about 2000 more are reported missing by the Red Cross. Admiitedly that is for the war only while the HLC list spans a 3 year period and it is not yet clear how many of them were killed in the war. But it stills brings us thousands of names of people whose family for some reason didn't bother to report their death of disappearance. This raises important questions about the reliability of the Red Cross missing list. It raises also the question how complete the HLC list is: even in 2007 they added 3193 names. And what kind of methods do they use to find so many new names?
Postscript 2: I encountered an article on the Slobodan Milosevic website that claims that most victims were killed by NATO or the KLA.
Excavations after the war brought about 3000 bodies and about 2000 more are reported missing by the Red Cross. Admiitedly that is for the war only while the HLC list spans a 3 year period and it is not yet clear how many of them were killed in the war. But it stills brings us thousands of names of people whose family for some reason didn't bother to report their death of disappearance. This raises important questions about the reliability of the Red Cross missing list. It raises also the question how complete the HLC list is: even in 2007 they added 3193 names. And what kind of methods do they use to find so many new names?
Postscript 2: I encountered an article on the Slobodan Milosevic website that claims that most victims were killed by NATO or the KLA.
Monday, October 13, 2008
Ahtisaari wins the Nobel prize
Ahtisaari won the Nobel prize. I have written previously about him and I won't repeat that. Here is a good article about his "result-oriented" style of negotiating.
I think that this result-oriented style has been his undoing in Kosovo. His main strength is that he is well-connected in international diplomacy and is in a position to assure himself of support from the main powers in the world. But this diplomatic orientation has a price in that those powers may pose their own demands. In the case of Namibia and Atjeh this didn't provide problems as those countries weren't very interested in the subject. In the case of Kosovo because of the Kosovo War some countries were more or less parties in the conflict and as consequence very partial pro-Albanian.
In previous conflicts Ahtisaari had had a very open style of negotiation. "nothing is decided until everything is decided" was one of his slogans to discourage the parties from claiming partial victories in the negotiations. This flexibility was absent in his Kosovo negotiations where he immediately went to Belgrade to tell Serbia that it wouldn't get control back over Kosovo and could only negotiate about minority rights for Kosovo's Serbs.
It looks like in Kosovo Ahtisaari had become somewhat lazy after his earlier diplomatic successes. I saw him in a meeting answering questions and I got the strong impression that he had never really studied the position of Kosovo's Serbs. His proposals for autonomy totally ignored the specific problem of refugees who hadn't been able to return for many years and the continuing unsafety.
I think that this result-oriented style has been his undoing in Kosovo. His main strength is that he is well-connected in international diplomacy and is in a position to assure himself of support from the main powers in the world. But this diplomatic orientation has a price in that those powers may pose their own demands. In the case of Namibia and Atjeh this didn't provide problems as those countries weren't very interested in the subject. In the case of Kosovo because of the Kosovo War some countries were more or less parties in the conflict and as consequence very partial pro-Albanian.
In previous conflicts Ahtisaari had had a very open style of negotiation. "nothing is decided until everything is decided" was one of his slogans to discourage the parties from claiming partial victories in the negotiations. This flexibility was absent in his Kosovo negotiations where he immediately went to Belgrade to tell Serbia that it wouldn't get control back over Kosovo and could only negotiate about minority rights for Kosovo's Serbs.
It looks like in Kosovo Ahtisaari had become somewhat lazy after his earlier diplomatic successes. I saw him in a meeting answering questions and I got the strong impression that he had never really studied the position of Kosovo's Serbs. His proposals for autonomy totally ignored the specific problem of refugees who hadn't been able to return for many years and the continuing unsafety.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Burrel family denies organ harvesting allegations
As mentioned before, Carla del Ponte wrote in her book the accusation that kidnapped Serbs from Kosovo had been transported to Albania where they had been killed and their organs sold.
Now the Spiegel has gone to Albania to have a look for themselves. They describe the house in Rribe near Burrel (and show a picture) and talked to the owner and his children. The family denied everything and complained that they had had to sleep outside for two nights (in februari!!) when Del Ponte came investigating. The Spiegel notes some inconsistencies in their story. But they also note that the witnesses from 2004 have disappeared and that at that time nothing had been done to safeguard evidence.
It should be noted that organ trade is nothing new to Albania: see these reports. So if Serbs were transported to Albania for using their organs there would be networks ready to "process" them. Very probably those networks are still there and connected at a very high level in Albania's establishment.
Postscript (6 nov 2008): Several media report that two Kosovar doctors have been arrested for organ trade. The name of the doctors had also been mentioned in the case of the abducted Serbs.
Postscript (15 nov 2008): B92 is doing some investigations now. There are also investigations for Serb patients from a Kosovo psychiatric hospial who went missing and the story that UNMIK will investigate the Burrell house.
Postscript (25 nov 2008): The Guardian went to the Burrel house with a camera. The article shows a 3 minute interview with the Katuci familt who lives in the house.
Now the Spiegel has gone to Albania to have a look for themselves. They describe the house in Rribe near Burrel (and show a picture) and talked to the owner and his children. The family denied everything and complained that they had had to sleep outside for two nights (in februari!!) when Del Ponte came investigating. The Spiegel notes some inconsistencies in their story. But they also note that the witnesses from 2004 have disappeared and that at that time nothing had been done to safeguard evidence.
It should be noted that organ trade is nothing new to Albania: see these reports. So if Serbs were transported to Albania for using their organs there would be networks ready to "process" them. Very probably those networks are still there and connected at a very high level in Albania's establishment.
Postscript (6 nov 2008): Several media report that two Kosovar doctors have been arrested for organ trade. The name of the doctors had also been mentioned in the case of the abducted Serbs.
Postscript (15 nov 2008): B92 is doing some investigations now. There are also investigations for Serb patients from a Kosovo psychiatric hospial who went missing and the story that UNMIK will investigate the Burrell house.
Postscript (25 nov 2008): The Guardian went to the Burrel house with a camera. The article shows a 3 minute interview with the Katuci familt who lives in the house.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Harassment, departures and defiance in Gracanica
Below the translation from an article in a Dutch newspaper with the title "Pas op, fout nummerbord" about Gracanica.
Take care! Wrong number plate
By: Mitra Nazar
Date: tuesday 16 september 2008 22:12
Inhabitants of the Serb enclave Gracanica try to find their place in the new, independent Kosovo. That is not easy.
If it wasn't so serious you would almost maugh. Ethnic violence in Kosovo, between Albanians and Serbs, doesn't happen often anymore. But the populations are still involved in a number plate war. "Driving with a wrong number plate can cost you your life" tells the Serb Viktor from Gracanica.
In 2006 a British couple who had rented a car in Belgrade drove alongside an Albanian wedding in Kosovo. The celebrators recognized the BG on the number plate and started to shoot. The Brits escaped unharmed. But because of this danger nearly all Serbs in Kosovo have a second number plate in their trunk. A KS sign guarantees a safe journey. Victor however refuses: "I don't recognize the independence so I don't drive with a Kosovar license". His license starts with NP: "Novi Pazar is a city in Southern Serbia were both Albanians and Serbs live. So nobody knows my real parentage."
More than a half year ago Kosovo became independent from Serbia. Unilateral independent, because Belgrade opposed it. The few Serbs who still live in Kosovo still don't resign. The new constitution makes the Albanians stronger than ever before. "They have everything, we have nothing. Now they want to Kosovise us, but we don't want forced integration". Victor is quiet, but in his heart a patriot. "I will tell my children later where the real borders of Serbia are. This is Serb territory."
Greetings from Serbia
Gracanica, where Viktor lives, isclose to the capital Pristina. The Serb village counts about 13.000 inhabitants. Billboards With decayed election posters and the blue-white Serbian flag dominate the scenery. The cyrillic characters on the billboards are clear enough too: Gracanica ís Serbia. Exchange offices change eu'ro's into dinars and the Serbian provider Telenor makes good business. With a Kosovar provider the signal is weak.
A small shop sells Serbian memorabilia. But there is not much demand for coffee mugs with "greetings from Serbia" and T-shirts of famous Serb basketball players, tells the owners. "KFOR-soldiers are our only customers." These NATO troops try already since 1999 to maintain peace in Kosovo.
Gracanica is almost dead. Many Serbs had already left after the 1999 war when the Albanian refugees returned. Since the independence declaration in 17 februari again a large exodus of Serbs has started. It has been forcasted that within ten years not a single Serb will be left in the enclave. For young people there is no future. They go en masse to North Kosovo or Serbia for education and work.
No power
Igor Popovic is founder of a local Serb NGO. The battle he wages for the recognition of the Serb community in Kosovo becomes increasingly difficult. "We can't count on the protection of the police anymore". After 17 februari the Serb policemen resigned en mass in protest against the independence. The KPS (Kosovo Police Service) in Gracanica is nowmostly composed by Albanian cops. "They arrest Serbs without reason, just to provocate", tells Igor. He isn't very happy with the international presence either: "We didn't notice anything of NATO protection. UNMIK too never cared about us."
Specially power is a big problem. Allthough it is a problem for the whole of Kosovo, in the enclave it is even more so.
In the Sportska Kafé it is rather dark, on the toilet there is a lonely candle. The coffee machine doesn't work and the beer is warm. "Since februari is has become worse and worse" tells owner Uros. "Today I am already five hours without power". According to the entrepreneur the Serb power plant just outside Gracanica has been under construction for months. "The Kosovo government wants the Serbs to pay six years arrears of electicity bills."
Uros however stays where he is. "I was born here and I will enter here my grave. This is my country. I won't flee." Recently the pub owner was arrested by the police. "They took the number plate from my car and threw it away", he tells angrily. "They told me to take a Kosovar license".
For other reports from the enclaves see here, here, here or this 6 part BBC series. Here is a report about Velika Hoca near Prizren.
Take care! Wrong number plate
By: Mitra Nazar
Date: tuesday 16 september 2008 22:12
Inhabitants of the Serb enclave Gracanica try to find their place in the new, independent Kosovo. That is not easy.
If it wasn't so serious you would almost maugh. Ethnic violence in Kosovo, between Albanians and Serbs, doesn't happen often anymore. But the populations are still involved in a number plate war. "Driving with a wrong number plate can cost you your life" tells the Serb Viktor from Gracanica.
In 2006 a British couple who had rented a car in Belgrade drove alongside an Albanian wedding in Kosovo. The celebrators recognized the BG on the number plate and started to shoot. The Brits escaped unharmed. But because of this danger nearly all Serbs in Kosovo have a second number plate in their trunk. A KS sign guarantees a safe journey. Victor however refuses: "I don't recognize the independence so I don't drive with a Kosovar license". His license starts with NP: "Novi Pazar is a city in Southern Serbia were both Albanians and Serbs live. So nobody knows my real parentage."
More than a half year ago Kosovo became independent from Serbia. Unilateral independent, because Belgrade opposed it. The few Serbs who still live in Kosovo still don't resign. The new constitution makes the Albanians stronger than ever before. "They have everything, we have nothing. Now they want to Kosovise us, but we don't want forced integration". Victor is quiet, but in his heart a patriot. "I will tell my children later where the real borders of Serbia are. This is Serb territory."
Greetings from Serbia
Gracanica, where Viktor lives, isclose to the capital Pristina. The Serb village counts about 13.000 inhabitants. Billboards With decayed election posters and the blue-white Serbian flag dominate the scenery. The cyrillic characters on the billboards are clear enough too: Gracanica ís Serbia. Exchange offices change eu'ro's into dinars and the Serbian provider Telenor makes good business. With a Kosovar provider the signal is weak.
A small shop sells Serbian memorabilia. But there is not much demand for coffee mugs with "greetings from Serbia" and T-shirts of famous Serb basketball players, tells the owners. "KFOR-soldiers are our only customers." These NATO troops try already since 1999 to maintain peace in Kosovo.
Gracanica is almost dead. Many Serbs had already left after the 1999 war when the Albanian refugees returned. Since the independence declaration in 17 februari again a large exodus of Serbs has started. It has been forcasted that within ten years not a single Serb will be left in the enclave. For young people there is no future. They go en masse to North Kosovo or Serbia for education and work.
No power
Igor Popovic is founder of a local Serb NGO. The battle he wages for the recognition of the Serb community in Kosovo becomes increasingly difficult. "We can't count on the protection of the police anymore". After 17 februari the Serb policemen resigned en mass in protest against the independence. The KPS (Kosovo Police Service) in Gracanica is nowmostly composed by Albanian cops. "They arrest Serbs without reason, just to provocate", tells Igor. He isn't very happy with the international presence either: "We didn't notice anything of NATO protection. UNMIK too never cared about us."
Specially power is a big problem. Allthough it is a problem for the whole of Kosovo, in the enclave it is even more so.
In the Sportska Kafé it is rather dark, on the toilet there is a lonely candle. The coffee machine doesn't work and the beer is warm. "Since februari is has become worse and worse" tells owner Uros. "Today I am already five hours without power". According to the entrepreneur the Serb power plant just outside Gracanica has been under construction for months. "The Kosovo government wants the Serbs to pay six years arrears of electicity bills."
Uros however stays where he is. "I was born here and I will enter here my grave. This is my country. I won't flee." Recently the pub owner was arrested by the police. "They took the number plate from my car and threw it away", he tells angrily. "They told me to take a Kosovar license".
For other reports from the enclaves see here, here, here or this 6 part BBC series. Here is a report about Velika Hoca near Prizren.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
Georgia, Kosovo and sugardaddies
Tara Bahrampour wrote in the Washington Post an article about her experiences in Georgia. One part of the article deals with the political culture in Georgia:
The Georgians are afraid of [the Russians], but they are also intertwined with them. Russia has been Georgia's savior and tormenter, its subjugator and protector. The Soviet Union kept them in bondage, but it also supplied them with food, jobs, education, a market for their goods. And it freed them from responsibility.
"We always had sugar daddies," my colleague Giorgi said as we sipped strong Turkish coffee one spring day in the school cafeteria. "They would come, kill, rape, take over the land, but you always had a shepherd, always had an overseer, someone who decided for you. So in a way we're not grown up. We are like 17-year-olds who cannot operate in real-life settings -- you know, you move out, and you find that life is not fair, the outside world doesn't necessarily love you the way your family does. So what's the solution? As soon as we lost one shepherd, we started looking for another. So the U.S. is like a substitute for Moscow."
It could have been about Kosovo.
This dependent behavior works very well in Washington as both Kosovo and Georgia get loads of aid (Georgia already under Shevardnadze). Both have also been very active (and successfull) in lobbying the US government. But the price of the aid is keeping the conflict with the big neighbor going. People like Saakashvili and Thaci understand very well that if you are out of the news your aid package will shrink very fast. So they keep finding excuses to keep the conflict going. This is not in the long term interest of their citizens as it precludes normal development.
In both areas politics is in essence clan-based. As a consequence they are highly corrupt (Saakashvivli reduced this somewhat). In Georgia (under Shevarnadze) only 10% of the population paid for its electricity. This was even worse than Kosovo.
The Georgians are afraid of [the Russians], but they are also intertwined with them. Russia has been Georgia's savior and tormenter, its subjugator and protector. The Soviet Union kept them in bondage, but it also supplied them with food, jobs, education, a market for their goods. And it freed them from responsibility.
"We always had sugar daddies," my colleague Giorgi said as we sipped strong Turkish coffee one spring day in the school cafeteria. "They would come, kill, rape, take over the land, but you always had a shepherd, always had an overseer, someone who decided for you. So in a way we're not grown up. We are like 17-year-olds who cannot operate in real-life settings -- you know, you move out, and you find that life is not fair, the outside world doesn't necessarily love you the way your family does. So what's the solution? As soon as we lost one shepherd, we started looking for another. So the U.S. is like a substitute for Moscow."
It could have been about Kosovo.
This dependent behavior works very well in Washington as both Kosovo and Georgia get loads of aid (Georgia already under Shevardnadze). Both have also been very active (and successfull) in lobbying the US government. But the price of the aid is keeping the conflict with the big neighbor going. People like Saakashvili and Thaci understand very well that if you are out of the news your aid package will shrink very fast. So they keep finding excuses to keep the conflict going. This is not in the long term interest of their citizens as it precludes normal development.
In both areas politics is in essence clan-based. As a consequence they are highly corrupt (Saakashvivli reduced this somewhat). In Georgia (under Shevarnadze) only 10% of the population paid for its electricity. This was even worse than Kosovo.
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