The NY Times had the last few days two very interesting articles about Pakistan.
One (Political Handouts Thrive in Pakistan) discusses the importance of patronage politics in Pakistan: Voters, particularly in rural areas, view their representatives in Parliament principally as big bosses who can deliver protection: influencing the police and dealing with aggressive, corrupt land officials, or working to route jobs or multimillion-dollar projects to their districts. [..] In fact, the practice is institutionalized: The government gives each Parliament member, no matter the party, about $200,000 a year to spend on “development” — effectively, a patronage slush fund. But few doubt that patronage is inefficient and unfair. Even while flashy infrastructure projects may create jobs, such projects are often accompanied by the mysterious enrichment of the politicians doling out the money. The writer is not very impressed with Mr. Khan who complains about the system but fields many of the same candidates who previously were parliamentarian for other parties.
The other article (Pakistan’s Tyrannical Majority)discusses Pakistan's systematic discrimination of religious minorities. Religious minorities are regularly target of violence while the state does very little to protect them. There are separate parliamentary seats for non-Muslims. One of the religious minorities - the Ahmadi - dispute their classification as non-Muslims and as a consequence don't vote.
If the West wants to do something about human rights it should sanction such discrimination. Unlike corruption and repression - that are often difficult to repair - these kinds of rules are clearly wrong.
Monday, May 13, 2013
Friday, May 10, 2013
America's fight against Al-Nusra
According to this article (America's hidden agenda in Syria's war) the US is pressuring Syria's rebels to turn against Al-Nusra and fight it.
The writer compares the Al-Nusra with the Taliban and claims that the US missed a chance to talk with the Taliban - something done now by Karzai - because it considered them the same as Al Qaeda and didn't recognize the differences. The same would now apply to Al Nusra. I am not so sure. It is well known that the popularity of the Taliban in Afghanistan is below 10% so they can expect little from elections. So it is unlikely that they will compromise unless they think it improbable that they can achieve better results with arms. The same applies to Al Nusra.
The writer compares the Al-Nusra with the Taliban and claims that the US missed a chance to talk with the Taliban - something done now by Karzai - because it considered them the same as Al Qaeda and didn't recognize the differences. The same would now apply to Al Nusra. I am not so sure. It is well known that the popularity of the Taliban in Afghanistan is below 10% so they can expect little from elections. So it is unlikely that they will compromise unless they think it improbable that they can achieve better results with arms. The same applies to Al Nusra.
Monday, May 06, 2013
The artificial state myth
It was a popular explanation for the breaking apart of Yugoslavia and now it is often used to explain the threatening break-down of Iraq and Syria: those states are artificial.
However, all states are artificial. If the borders aren't the product of some foreign dictate they are the limits of what some king long ago managed to conquer and hold. If you look long enough you will always find fissure lines along which a country could break apart. There are always regions that feel neglected, there are always rich regions that don't want to pay for poorer regions elsewhere and there are always regions that there local traditions are something special.
The "artificial state" myth assumes that countries come into existence from the bottom up. As a consequence its supporters assume that if you take the present central government away and empower regional forces they will recreate the central government. But it doesn't work that way. Once you empower regional forces they will want to keep that power and resist the central power.
If you wanted to keep Yugoslavia together you had to deal with Milosevic because he held the power. If you wanted to keep Iraq together you should have kept after the fall of Saddam the existing structures. If you want to keep Syria together you have to deal with Assad. Empowering local factions, even when they constitute the majority like the Shiites in Iraq and the Sunni in Syria, destroys the heart of the state.
However, all states are artificial. If the borders aren't the product of some foreign dictate they are the limits of what some king long ago managed to conquer and hold. If you look long enough you will always find fissure lines along which a country could break apart. There are always regions that feel neglected, there are always rich regions that don't want to pay for poorer regions elsewhere and there are always regions that there local traditions are something special.
The "artificial state" myth assumes that countries come into existence from the bottom up. As a consequence its supporters assume that if you take the present central government away and empower regional forces they will recreate the central government. But it doesn't work that way. Once you empower regional forces they will want to keep that power and resist the central power.
If you wanted to keep Yugoslavia together you had to deal with Milosevic because he held the power. If you wanted to keep Iraq together you should have kept after the fall of Saddam the existing structures. If you want to keep Syria together you have to deal with Assad. Empowering local factions, even when they constitute the majority like the Shiites in Iraq and the Sunni in Syria, destroys the heart of the state.
Friday, May 03, 2013
Most of the world opposes arming the Syrian rebels
The BBC reports (Little international support for arming Syria rebels) about the lack of international support for arming the Syrian rebels. Only in Jordan is there a majority in favor. In Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, France, the UK, the US and Germany a wide majority is against. Here is the article on the PEW website.
For the US see also this article: Modest Support for Military Force if Syria Used Chemical Weapons.
For the US see also this article: Modest Support for Military Force if Syria Used Chemical Weapons.
The stupid chemical weapons red line
John Mueller has written an article (Erase the Red Line: Why We Shouldn't Care About Syria's Chemical Weapons) in which he discusses how (not) dangerous chemical weapons really are.
As it happened, chemical weapons accounted for considerably less than one percent of the battle deaths in the [World War I], and, on average, it took over a ton of gas to produce a single fatality. Only about two or three percent of those gassed on the Western front died. However, the British government initially exaggerated its deadliness as that proved to be a good argument to draw the US into the war.
The article also discusses Halabja. It mentions that the people visiting the city after the gas attack saw only a few hundred dead. The number of 5000 that is commonly used comes from Iranian sources and very likely includes victims from attacks with conventional weapons at the same time.
The effectiveness of poison gasses as a weapon is low: According to Iranian reports, of the 27,000 Iranians gassed through March 1987, only 262 died.. After World War I some considered it even a humane weapon as it incapacitated so many soldiers while killing so few.
The term "weapons of mass destruction" comes from an American law from 1992 (expanded in 1994) that gives a very broad definition of the term that even includes some explosives.
As it happened, chemical weapons accounted for considerably less than one percent of the battle deaths in the [World War I], and, on average, it took over a ton of gas to produce a single fatality. Only about two or three percent of those gassed on the Western front died. However, the British government initially exaggerated its deadliness as that proved to be a good argument to draw the US into the war.
The article also discusses Halabja. It mentions that the people visiting the city after the gas attack saw only a few hundred dead. The number of 5000 that is commonly used comes from Iranian sources and very likely includes victims from attacks with conventional weapons at the same time.
The effectiveness of poison gasses as a weapon is low: According to Iranian reports, of the 27,000 Iranians gassed through March 1987, only 262 died.. After World War I some considered it even a humane weapon as it incapacitated so many soldiers while killing so few.
The term "weapons of mass destruction" comes from an American law from 1992 (expanded in 1994) that gives a very broad definition of the term that even includes some explosives.
Wednesday, May 01, 2013
Spain as a model for the Arab countries
The New York Times had an article (Libya Looks to Spain as Model for State-Building)about the visit of a Libyan delegation to study Spain's experiences in the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
Spain did it remarkably different from the Arabs. It forgave the supporters of Franco and allowed them to form a political party. It had for a full year a reformist government while the old parliament stayed in place - forcing it to compromise and to convince supporters of the old regime that the country wouldn't be handed over to radicals. After that year there were elections. Following the elections the government, political parties, employers and trade unions made an agreement on the economy: the Moncloa Pact. Later they also wrote a constitution.
Spain had to reconcile because it had a strong army that was sympathetic to the dictatorship. However, the good results - a sound democracy with a sound economy - show that this was the right thing to do. On closer consideration this is logical: many people who served the dictatorship - and even some who tortured - did this from the genuine belief that they were acting in the interest of their country. It is a good strategy to convince these people that the new freedom is at least as good as the old order and to have them cooperate in shaping the reforms.
Spain did it remarkably different from the Arabs. It forgave the supporters of Franco and allowed them to form a political party. It had for a full year a reformist government while the old parliament stayed in place - forcing it to compromise and to convince supporters of the old regime that the country wouldn't be handed over to radicals. After that year there were elections. Following the elections the government, political parties, employers and trade unions made an agreement on the economy: the Moncloa Pact. Later they also wrote a constitution.
Spain had to reconcile because it had a strong army that was sympathetic to the dictatorship. However, the good results - a sound democracy with a sound economy - show that this was the right thing to do. On closer consideration this is logical: many people who served the dictatorship - and even some who tortured - did this from the genuine belief that they were acting in the interest of their country. It is a good strategy to convince these people that the new freedom is at least as good as the old order and to have them cooperate in shaping the reforms.
Sunday, April 28, 2013
The radicalisation of Syria's rebels
Nowhere in rebel-controlled Syria is there a secular fighting force to speak of.
That is how the NY Times describes Syria's present situation. Even the Supreme Military Council, the umbrella rebel organization whose formation the West had hoped would sideline radical groups, is stocked with commanders who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government.
For Obama this seems to cause at least some hesitation to intensify his support.
However, the NYT analysis of the situation is rather weak. They describe the uprising as an uprising of the "Sunni Muslim majority". This is not only wrong - it comes straight from the rebel propaganda. The initial cores of the uprising were in conservative Sunni areas - mostly the same areas that had participated in the 1981 Muslim Brotherhood uprising and later had provided fighters for Al Qaeda in Iraq. The uprising became broader when television preachers like Arour reframed it as an uprising of "the" Sunni against Alawite suppression and discrimination. Doing so they appealed to old prejudices about Alawites being not Muslims and second rate citizens.
The idea that you can build democracy on the basis of such undemocratic sentiments is ridiculous.
That is how the NY Times describes Syria's present situation. Even the Supreme Military Council, the umbrella rebel organization whose formation the West had hoped would sideline radical groups, is stocked with commanders who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government.
For Obama this seems to cause at least some hesitation to intensify his support.
However, the NYT analysis of the situation is rather weak. They describe the uprising as an uprising of the "Sunni Muslim majority". This is not only wrong - it comes straight from the rebel propaganda. The initial cores of the uprising were in conservative Sunni areas - mostly the same areas that had participated in the 1981 Muslim Brotherhood uprising and later had provided fighters for Al Qaeda in Iraq. The uprising became broader when television preachers like Arour reframed it as an uprising of "the" Sunni against Alawite suppression and discrimination. Doing so they appealed to old prejudices about Alawites being not Muslims and second rate citizens.
The idea that you can build democracy on the basis of such undemocratic sentiments is ridiculous.
Friday, April 26, 2013
Syria and chemical arms
Obama has declared that Syrian use of chemical arms is for him a red line. I have always distrusted that statement. To me it has always suggested that Obama is biding his time before he will interfere in Syria and that at that time he will use the chemical weapons claim as his WMD excuse.
As recently the US has upgraded its station in Jordan to a level that is capable of organizing military attacks I am not amazed that now suddenly Obama is claiming chemical weapons have been used in Syria. As usual with media master Obama things have been well orchestrated with first some NATO allies and Israel making the claims so that the public is prepared. Not surprisingly there is no evidence for us to see.
In the case of the UN chemical arms investigation Western diplomacy has once again shown itself from its worst side. First they agreed to an investigation of one specific case. And then they changed their mind, claimed that it might be used as propaganda by Assad and demanded an investigation of all accusations - what Syria and Russia predictably refused.
They may have had serious fears that it might turn out that the rebels were responsible for this incident. Obviously that would be embarrassing for politicians who are committed to regime change in Syria.
The claim that the investigation would be propaganda for Assad sounds hollow to me. A well accomplished investigation would build trust and open the door to other investigations.
As recently the US has upgraded its station in Jordan to a level that is capable of organizing military attacks I am not amazed that now suddenly Obama is claiming chemical weapons have been used in Syria. As usual with media master Obama things have been well orchestrated with first some NATO allies and Israel making the claims so that the public is prepared. Not surprisingly there is no evidence for us to see.
In the case of the UN chemical arms investigation Western diplomacy has once again shown itself from its worst side. First they agreed to an investigation of one specific case. And then they changed their mind, claimed that it might be used as propaganda by Assad and demanded an investigation of all accusations - what Syria and Russia predictably refused.
They may have had serious fears that it might turn out that the rebels were responsible for this incident. Obviously that would be embarrassing for politicians who are committed to regime change in Syria.
The claim that the investigation would be propaganda for Assad sounds hollow to me. A well accomplished investigation would build trust and open the door to other investigations.
Thursday, April 25, 2013
The internationalization of the Syrian conflict
The Obama administration keeps warning about the internationalization of the Syrian conflict. But it keeps predictably mum about being specific. For good reasons - because the side it supports is the main one involved in this internationalization.
We had the patriots in Turkey because of a few shells that fell on the wrong side of the border, and now occassionally shells are falling in Lebanon. But that is about Assad's part. But consider the other side:
Lebanon was the first country destabilized. From the early stages of the uprising Lebanon was a major supplier of arms and support for the uprising in Homs, Qusair and other cities in the region - support that was funded by Saudi Arabia and organized by Lebanon's Sunni controlled secret services. This soon led to tensions in Tripoli. The tensions only increased when it became clear that Saudi Arabia intends to target Hezbollah next when it has finished with Assad.
Next there was Jordan. Already destabilized by the return of Jordanian Jihadi's fighting in Syria the problem was worsened because the Gulf States stopped the financial support they used to give Jordan. Recently it became clear why: when Jordan allowed its territory as a base for massive support for the Syrian uprising the financial support was resumed. But it may be only a matter of time before the Gulf States order their Brotherhood minions to organize an "Arab Spring" in Jordan too.
Then there is Iraq where the tensions between Sunni and Shiites are increasing. Although prime minister has followed a rather confrontational policies this doesn't explain the systematic nature of the Sunni protests. The daily protests point to a solid organization and it is generally assumed that Saudi Arabia is organizing and financing this uprising.
We had the patriots in Turkey because of a few shells that fell on the wrong side of the border, and now occassionally shells are falling in Lebanon. But that is about Assad's part. But consider the other side:
Lebanon was the first country destabilized. From the early stages of the uprising Lebanon was a major supplier of arms and support for the uprising in Homs, Qusair and other cities in the region - support that was funded by Saudi Arabia and organized by Lebanon's Sunni controlled secret services. This soon led to tensions in Tripoli. The tensions only increased when it became clear that Saudi Arabia intends to target Hezbollah next when it has finished with Assad.
Next there was Jordan. Already destabilized by the return of Jordanian Jihadi's fighting in Syria the problem was worsened because the Gulf States stopped the financial support they used to give Jordan. Recently it became clear why: when Jordan allowed its territory as a base for massive support for the Syrian uprising the financial support was resumed. But it may be only a matter of time before the Gulf States order their Brotherhood minions to organize an "Arab Spring" in Jordan too.
Then there is Iraq where the tensions between Sunni and Shiites are increasing. Although prime minister has followed a rather confrontational policies this doesn't explain the systematic nature of the Sunni protests. The daily protests point to a solid organization and it is generally assumed that Saudi Arabia is organizing and financing this uprising.
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