Euobserver has an article ("Mass unemployment in the Balkans – a need to act") by Kori Udovicki and Gerald Knaus.
It compares how in former Yugoslavia the textile industry has shrunk while in neighboring Bulgaria it has exploded. The difference: Bulgaria has an - EU supported - industrial policy that promotes this kind of industry by encouraging foreign investment, providing targeted education, etc.. In contrast in former Yugoslavia the anti-communist aversion against any kind of industrial policy still dominates.
Ideology is nice, but it shouldn't cloud common sense. Copying best practices from other countries should be standard routine.
Showing posts with label Yugoslavia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yugoslavia. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Sense and nonsense about reconciliation
Reconciliation is hot. Western NGOs have spent millions in former Yugoslavia to achieve it. Put some people from ethnic groups that used to right each other together in some course or project and you can get a lot of money because it is supposed to contribute to reconciliation. As the reasoning goes: these people didn't talk to each other and now they are talking again; this must the the first step towards reconciliation.
It doesn't work always. Many of those projects in Kosovo found their end in march 2004 when Serbs saw their "project-friends" in the mobs that attacked them. And one has to wonder whether it works better in other situations.
A related concept is that of justice. Many millions have been spent on the ICTY and other courts to condemn the war criminals. But the effect has been limited. On the one hand it is good to see that some consensus arises on the facts and that for example you don't hear anymore that people deny that mass killings happened in Srebrenica. But when you hear the comments from the different parties it looks like the courtroom has become the newest battlefield. Everyone wants crimes by the other side exposed and preferably provided with labels like "genocide". And with good reason: the conflict is going on. Serbia and Croatia are still involved in a genocide case at the ICJ and in Bosnia the statuses of the Republika Srpska and the Croat majority region are ongoing sources of conflict.
South Africa is often seen as an example how to solve conflicts. But the South Africans did it very different compared to former Yugoslavia. First they found a political solution that had wide support on all sides. Many in the West think that only apartheid was abolished but the whites negotiated a deal that gave the country a very capitalistic constitution that protects them from large scale expropriations.
Only when there was a solution in which every part felt safe did the South Africans proceed to the next step: the "truth and reconciliation commission". Because of this timing justice was no longer loaded with political consequences. A second step they made was to pardon most of the crimes. In the heat of a conflict people do things that they normally wouldn't do and this was an implicit recognition of that fact. Also, because the primary aim of the commission was not to get these people convicted there was much more attention to what they thought at that time and how they came to their acts. This is a climate that produces real reconciliation.
In contrast the Western approach to Yugoslavia has been counterproductive. There has been no commitment to solutions that are seen by all sides as fair. On the contrary: a formalistic approach was chosen - encouraged by the Badinter Commission - that gave Yugoslavia's republics independence without negotiations and discarded widely shared concerns amongst certain groups as "nationalistic". And while the West has been very helpful to help those "warlike" people of the Balkans to find reconciliation it has been very unwilling to investigate its own role.
It doesn't work always. Many of those projects in Kosovo found their end in march 2004 when Serbs saw their "project-friends" in the mobs that attacked them. And one has to wonder whether it works better in other situations.
A related concept is that of justice. Many millions have been spent on the ICTY and other courts to condemn the war criminals. But the effect has been limited. On the one hand it is good to see that some consensus arises on the facts and that for example you don't hear anymore that people deny that mass killings happened in Srebrenica. But when you hear the comments from the different parties it looks like the courtroom has become the newest battlefield. Everyone wants crimes by the other side exposed and preferably provided with labels like "genocide". And with good reason: the conflict is going on. Serbia and Croatia are still involved in a genocide case at the ICJ and in Bosnia the statuses of the Republika Srpska and the Croat majority region are ongoing sources of conflict.
South Africa is often seen as an example how to solve conflicts. But the South Africans did it very different compared to former Yugoslavia. First they found a political solution that had wide support on all sides. Many in the West think that only apartheid was abolished but the whites negotiated a deal that gave the country a very capitalistic constitution that protects them from large scale expropriations.
Only when there was a solution in which every part felt safe did the South Africans proceed to the next step: the "truth and reconciliation commission". Because of this timing justice was no longer loaded with political consequences. A second step they made was to pardon most of the crimes. In the heat of a conflict people do things that they normally wouldn't do and this was an implicit recognition of that fact. Also, because the primary aim of the commission was not to get these people convicted there was much more attention to what they thought at that time and how they came to their acts. This is a climate that produces real reconciliation.
In contrast the Western approach to Yugoslavia has been counterproductive. There has been no commitment to solutions that are seen by all sides as fair. On the contrary: a formalistic approach was chosen - encouraged by the Badinter Commission - that gave Yugoslavia's republics independence without negotiations and discarded widely shared concerns amongst certain groups as "nationalistic". And while the West has been very helpful to help those "warlike" people of the Balkans to find reconciliation it has been very unwilling to investigate its own role.
Monday, December 21, 2009
The EU is making the same mistake twice
As they say, those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Once the EU drove Yugoslavia into a civil war with a divisive policy that sets up one ethnic group against the other.
In 1991 EU nations secretly supported separationist preparations in Croatia and Slovenia. Then they prematurely recognized them under the excuse that Yugoslavia had dissolved: a distortion of the situation and dangerous exploit in international law that could be used against any multi-ethnic country. But perhaps the most dangerous was that the EU adopted the self-delusion that everyone would follow them. In fact nothing changed on the ground in Yugoslavia except that one side had gotten an ally and the other an adversary.
Rich provinces all over the world try to secede in the knowledge that they will be even richer when they no longer have to subsidize the rest of the country. In the case of Croatia and Slovenia there was the additional appeal of a speedy EU membership. Given these circumstances the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was probably unavoidable unless the EU adopted an explicit policy that took attraction of a speedy EU membership away. Instead the EU fell for Croat and Slovene propaganda that tried to paint their secession in moral colors. Milosevic was painted as an extreme nationalist. He wasn't. He was just asking what most politicians representing an underrepresented large ethnic group that felt discriminated against would have asked. His political methods weren't always nice, but he was faced with political adversaries in other republics who had extended their power far beyond what had been intended in the Yugoslav constitution. His involvement in mass urder in Bosnia was still in the future: for the moment his policies in Kosovo were very similar to Croatia's policies towards its Serb minority.
A sound policy would have taken a distance and let both sides struggle it out in the political arena. It would have stressed that without an agreement the republics were still part of Yugoslavia, but it the same time it would have discouraged violence or rigorous steps by the central government. Instead the "moral" view of the EU led to immoral behavior. It now considered the rebellious Serbs in Croatia as insurrectionists instead of one side in a conflict. And it discarded Croat discrimination as primarily Croatia's "internal affairs". The result was predictable: Croatia didn't see anymore need for caution in its treatment of its Serb minority and the Serbs didn't see any other way than armed conflict to achieve their goals. Bosnia's war started in a similar way.
One would have supposed that more than a decade later the West would do better with Kosovo. Instead we see exactly the same pattern. The EU again couldn't resist the temptation to choose sides: this time by recognizing Kosovo. It could have chosen a neutral position and appointed a neutral mediator, but instead it appointed Ahtisaari whose misguided principles ("Kosovo should never again under Serbian rule") made any other outcome than unilateral independence impossible. A real neutral negotiator would asked the Albanians to convince Serbia that the rights of the Serb and other minorities were guaranteed.
Now too the real bad things happen afterwards when the EU has no longer the capability to see the behavior of both sides in the same light. Where in Croatia the EU crossed the line with its ignoring of the maltreatment of Croatia's Serbs, it seems now poised to cross the line with the privatization of Brezovica. Anyone can see that that will inevitably result in the end of the employment of many Serbs there. Past actions, like the evacuation of the court house, concerned symbols. Here it concerns directly the survival of Kosovo's Serb minority. And just as in the past the EU hid behind declarations about Croat "sovereignty" it now hides behind Kosovo sovereignty and the Ahtisaari Plan.
In 1991 EU nations secretly supported separationist preparations in Croatia and Slovenia. Then they prematurely recognized them under the excuse that Yugoslavia had dissolved: a distortion of the situation and dangerous exploit in international law that could be used against any multi-ethnic country. But perhaps the most dangerous was that the EU adopted the self-delusion that everyone would follow them. In fact nothing changed on the ground in Yugoslavia except that one side had gotten an ally and the other an adversary.
Rich provinces all over the world try to secede in the knowledge that they will be even richer when they no longer have to subsidize the rest of the country. In the case of Croatia and Slovenia there was the additional appeal of a speedy EU membership. Given these circumstances the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was probably unavoidable unless the EU adopted an explicit policy that took attraction of a speedy EU membership away. Instead the EU fell for Croat and Slovene propaganda that tried to paint their secession in moral colors. Milosevic was painted as an extreme nationalist. He wasn't. He was just asking what most politicians representing an underrepresented large ethnic group that felt discriminated against would have asked. His political methods weren't always nice, but he was faced with political adversaries in other republics who had extended their power far beyond what had been intended in the Yugoslav constitution. His involvement in mass urder in Bosnia was still in the future: for the moment his policies in Kosovo were very similar to Croatia's policies towards its Serb minority.
A sound policy would have taken a distance and let both sides struggle it out in the political arena. It would have stressed that without an agreement the republics were still part of Yugoslavia, but it the same time it would have discouraged violence or rigorous steps by the central government. Instead the "moral" view of the EU led to immoral behavior. It now considered the rebellious Serbs in Croatia as insurrectionists instead of one side in a conflict. And it discarded Croat discrimination as primarily Croatia's "internal affairs". The result was predictable: Croatia didn't see anymore need for caution in its treatment of its Serb minority and the Serbs didn't see any other way than armed conflict to achieve their goals. Bosnia's war started in a similar way.
One would have supposed that more than a decade later the West would do better with Kosovo. Instead we see exactly the same pattern. The EU again couldn't resist the temptation to choose sides: this time by recognizing Kosovo. It could have chosen a neutral position and appointed a neutral mediator, but instead it appointed Ahtisaari whose misguided principles ("Kosovo should never again under Serbian rule") made any other outcome than unilateral independence impossible. A real neutral negotiator would asked the Albanians to convince Serbia that the rights of the Serb and other minorities were guaranteed.
Now too the real bad things happen afterwards when the EU has no longer the capability to see the behavior of both sides in the same light. Where in Croatia the EU crossed the line with its ignoring of the maltreatment of Croatia's Serbs, it seems now poised to cross the line with the privatization of Brezovica. Anyone can see that that will inevitably result in the end of the employment of many Serbs there. Past actions, like the evacuation of the court house, concerned symbols. Here it concerns directly the survival of Kosovo's Serb minority. And just as in the past the EU hid behind declarations about Croat "sovereignty" it now hides behind Kosovo sovereignty and the Ahtisaari Plan.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
The Capital issue
In my opinion it was a major mistake by Tito wto keep the capital in Belgrade. The city is in the center of Serbia but was far from the other Yugoslav republics. As a consequence the city stayed Serb instead of becoming a reflection of the diversity of Yugoslavia. This made it much easier for the other republics to secede as they saw Yugoslavia as the state of the Serbs. Just imagine how different it would have been if the capital had been moved to (for example) Tuzla. Would the Croats have thought just as easily about seceding when the capital had contained as much Croats as Serbs (for example 300,000)?
This is how the Swiss do it: the capital Bern is in the German speaking part (two thirds of the population speaks German). But it is very close to the French-speaking part. Together these two groups are more than 90% of the population.
I mention this because Bosnia and Kosovo are in a similar position. Both follow policies that have resulted in ethnically clean capitals - although Sarajevo still has some Serbs - and with that given up the idea that they are multi-ethnic states.
Yet the "international community" keeps up the appearance they are multi-ethnic. I think they should pay more attention to the attributes of multi-ethnicity. Either they should work on them or they should give up on their illusion.
This is how the Swiss do it: the capital Bern is in the German speaking part (two thirds of the population speaks German). But it is very close to the French-speaking part. Together these two groups are more than 90% of the population.
I mention this because Bosnia and Kosovo are in a similar position. Both follow policies that have resulted in ethnically clean capitals - although Sarajevo still has some Serbs - and with that given up the idea that they are multi-ethnic states.
Yet the "international community" keeps up the appearance they are multi-ethnic. I think they should pay more attention to the attributes of multi-ethnicity. Either they should work on them or they should give up on their illusion.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
The dirty effects of the white Schengen list
It has always been my position that the EU has played an important role in tearing Yugoslavia apart. And although the EU had its share of active harmful policies (for example the recognition of Croatia and the Bosnia "police reform") most of it was passive. If leaving Yugoslavia could bring you sooner in the EU: who could resist the temptation?
Now it looks like Schengen will have similar unintended harmful effects. People from Serbia will be allowed visa-free travel into the EU from 1 januari 2010 but people from Kosovo with a Serb passport not. But what will that mean for the refugees from Kosovo who live in Serbia? That they can better stay in Serbia? And what for the Serbs in Kosovo: that it is more profitable to take refuge into Serbia?
For Kosovo similar harmful effects apply. One of the reproaches is that Kosovo doesn't control its borders well enough. It sounds like the Kosovo version of the Bosnian police reform. Bosnia itself gets the same treatment: a dispute between the entities about issuing passports is one of the reasons for not allowing on the white Schengen list. In my opinion the EU is behaving in these cases as a manipulative third world dictator. It should allow the ethnic groups in those countries to find solutions for their own problems. The EU should offer a bit of flexibility in solving those problems. Take Bosnia: as long as it provides adequate procedures, what is the problem with two entities proving passports? This is just the EU doing the kind of grandstanding that made the Yugoslav conflicts so difficult to solve.
It is still a proposal and the final approval will only be in november. But I am curious how much the EU will be able to avoid of those pitfalls.
Now it looks like Schengen will have similar unintended harmful effects. People from Serbia will be allowed visa-free travel into the EU from 1 januari 2010 but people from Kosovo with a Serb passport not. But what will that mean for the refugees from Kosovo who live in Serbia? That they can better stay in Serbia? And what for the Serbs in Kosovo: that it is more profitable to take refuge into Serbia?
For Kosovo similar harmful effects apply. One of the reproaches is that Kosovo doesn't control its borders well enough. It sounds like the Kosovo version of the Bosnian police reform. Bosnia itself gets the same treatment: a dispute between the entities about issuing passports is one of the reasons for not allowing on the white Schengen list. In my opinion the EU is behaving in these cases as a manipulative third world dictator. It should allow the ethnic groups in those countries to find solutions for their own problems. The EU should offer a bit of flexibility in solving those problems. Take Bosnia: as long as it provides adequate procedures, what is the problem with two entities proving passports? This is just the EU doing the kind of grandstanding that made the Yugoslav conflicts so difficult to solve.
It is still a proposal and the final approval will only be in november. But I am curious how much the EU will be able to avoid of those pitfalls.
Thursday, February 05, 2009
Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union
Today I attended a lecture from an Ethiopian exile who is worried about the future of his country. He fears that it may fall apart with the present legistlation. Ethiopia is a country where no ethnic group has the majority and the largest group (the Oromo) is not the dominant group. However, the country has a very long history.
Ethiopia is at the moment a one-party state. This party was originally marxist, but in its economic policies it has given up on communism. However, its minority policy is a carbon copy of how the communists treated minorities in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
On paper it looks all very nice: lots of minority rights (including the right to secession). Many Western activists love it as the right way to treat minorities. However, it is a kind of Macchiavellian divide-and-rule strategy that cuts the country up in a multitude of rivalling ethnic groups. It leaves an empty center that is only filled by the party. Nothing else is left on that level to challenge the domination of the party.
Countries pay a heavy price for such a policy:
- on the short term there are increasing tensions and low scale violence between ethnic groups. In Ethiopia this is visible in increasing number of deaths. Problematic is that often the local authorities are not neutral and the central government refuses to interfere.
- things become critical when the party falls apart. Then there is nothing left to keep the country together as the communists have removed many of the central institutions. In this situation Czecheslovakia, Russia and Yugoslavia have fallen apart. And even Ethiopia with its long history is at risk. People wonder whether the party would survive its present leader.
One can only wonder whether the West will take the lessons from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to heart: That the absence of credible central institutions doesn't mean that people don't believe in the state any more. Holding national elections and creating new central institutions should get priority above breaking up yet another state.
Ethiopia is at the moment a one-party state. This party was originally marxist, but in its economic policies it has given up on communism. However, its minority policy is a carbon copy of how the communists treated minorities in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
On paper it looks all very nice: lots of minority rights (including the right to secession). Many Western activists love it as the right way to treat minorities. However, it is a kind of Macchiavellian divide-and-rule strategy that cuts the country up in a multitude of rivalling ethnic groups. It leaves an empty center that is only filled by the party. Nothing else is left on that level to challenge the domination of the party.
Countries pay a heavy price for such a policy:
- on the short term there are increasing tensions and low scale violence between ethnic groups. In Ethiopia this is visible in increasing number of deaths. Problematic is that often the local authorities are not neutral and the central government refuses to interfere.
- things become critical when the party falls apart. Then there is nothing left to keep the country together as the communists have removed many of the central institutions. In this situation Czecheslovakia, Russia and Yugoslavia have fallen apart. And even Ethiopia with its long history is at risk. People wonder whether the party would survive its present leader.
One can only wonder whether the West will take the lessons from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to heart: That the absence of credible central institutions doesn't mean that people don't believe in the state any more. Holding national elections and creating new central institutions should get priority above breaking up yet another state.
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