The NY Times has an article ("Chinese Insider Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S.-China Frictions"). It is written by someone who has access to high circles in both China and the US. He sees in China an increasing attitude that their country should be the next number one in the world. America's antagonistic policy certainly hasn't contributed much.
What led to World Wars I and II was the British and French unease with the rise of Germany. As Germany had a bigger population and its economy was growing faster it was destined to become the most powerful. That led to containment policies that led to distrust, antagonism and in the end to war.
Now we see America making the same mistakes regarding the rise of China. Instead of stressing international law and cooperation - what would open the door for a peaceful transition - it is doing the opposite. In the case of Libya and Syria it is openly thrashing international law. There was nothing wrong with the US stationing a few soldiers in Australia. But there was a lot wrong with the way it was advertised as a containment policy towards China.
If the US wants to prevent China from becoming no.1 its priority should be to get united once again around a common goal. Unfortunately there is no sign of that. All the hate talk only serves to distract the population from the increasing inequality and dubious deregulation.
Tuesday, April 03, 2012
Libya's future
The NY Times has an article ("Libyan Militias Turn to Politics, a Volatile Mix") about Libya's doubtful future. Some hope elections will bring more stability but it seems likely that some militia's will put pressure on "their" citizens to vote a certain way.
Some quotes:
In a poll of Libyans conducted in December and January by a research arm of Oxford University, only 15 percent of the more than 2,000 respondents said they wanted some form of democracy within the next 12 months, while 42 percent said they hoped Libya would be governed by a new strongman. Perhaps most worrisome: a significant minority, about 16 percent, said they were ready to use violence for political ends.
[...]
When a peaceful demonstration in Benghazi urged federalism, the interior minister — a militia leader from Misurata — publicly threatened to lead an armed force from his hometown to fight what he called a threat to national unity.
[...]
Former Qaddafi officials, who are also talking about forming a political party, say they hear an echo of the past. “They are speaking the same language we did,” said one former Qaddafi adviser, speaking on condition of anonymity for his safety. “We used force. They are using force. Nothing has changed but the flag and the national anthem.”
The solution would be for the West and all the other countries that supported the revolution to advocate the interests of all the disadvantaged groups of the moment like the Bedouin, the Gaddafi supporters and the black. Unfortunately this seems very unlikely given how hate-driven Western politics is nowadays.
Some quotes:
In a poll of Libyans conducted in December and January by a research arm of Oxford University, only 15 percent of the more than 2,000 respondents said they wanted some form of democracy within the next 12 months, while 42 percent said they hoped Libya would be governed by a new strongman. Perhaps most worrisome: a significant minority, about 16 percent, said they were ready to use violence for political ends.
[...]
When a peaceful demonstration in Benghazi urged federalism, the interior minister — a militia leader from Misurata — publicly threatened to lead an armed force from his hometown to fight what he called a threat to national unity.
[...]
Former Qaddafi officials, who are also talking about forming a political party, say they hear an echo of the past. “They are speaking the same language we did,” said one former Qaddafi adviser, speaking on condition of anonymity for his safety. “We used force. They are using force. Nothing has changed but the flag and the national anthem.”
The solution would be for the West and all the other countries that supported the revolution to advocate the interests of all the disadvantaged groups of the moment like the Bedouin, the Gaddafi supporters and the black. Unfortunately this seems very unlikely given how hate-driven Western politics is nowadays.
Sunday, April 01, 2012
Syria's "peaceful" opposition
Spiegel online has an article ("The Burial Brigade of Homs: An Executioner for Syria's Rebels Tells His Story")that gives a disturbing picture how deadly Syria's revolutionaries really are. It tells how this rebel group alone has executed nearly 150 government supporters in addition to 200 to 250 "traitors" from their own ranks. And this is only Homs and concerns only those who had first been captured and were then killed after a "trial".
Of course they mention government violence as an excuse. They also say that Syria has a very violent culture. But however you take it, it is clear that the rebels are contributing to the spiral of increasing violence too. And in a my bigger way than most of their Western supporters would like to admit.
Syria's government has its own claims on how deadly the opposition is. It talks about "6, 143 Syrian citizens killed by the terrorist groups and 1, 590 citizens who were kidnapped, the fate of two thirds of whom remain unknown".
Postscript:
20 June 2012: This article (In rebel-held Syria, revolutionary courts decide matters of life, death) reports about a more peaceful revolutionary court.
Of course they mention government violence as an excuse. They also say that Syria has a very violent culture. But however you take it, it is clear that the rebels are contributing to the spiral of increasing violence too. And in a my bigger way than most of their Western supporters would like to admit.
Syria's government has its own claims on how deadly the opposition is. It talks about "6, 143 Syrian citizens killed by the terrorist groups and 1, 590 citizens who were kidnapped, the fate of two thirds of whom remain unknown".
Postscript:
20 June 2012: This article (In rebel-held Syria, revolutionary courts decide matters of life, death) reports about a more peaceful revolutionary court.
The carousel of elites in Egypt
An interesting article from the Egypt Independent ("The Brotherhood's businessmen") discusses the candidacy for the presidential elections of one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khairat al-Shater.
The Brotherhood hails free-market capitalism; wealthy businessmen whose economic agenda embraces privatization and foreign investment, the writer said, lead its party. The Brotherhood does not espouse the idea of redistribution of wealth, preferring charity instead as a means of combating poverty.
The article adds that Khairat al-Shater, arguably the most powerful man in the Muslim Brotherhood, is a multimillionaire tycoon whose financial interests extend into several fields of business. “A strong advocate of privatization, Al-Shater is one of a cadre of Muslim Brotherhood businessmen who helped finance the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party’s impressive electoral victory this winter and is now crafting the FJP's economic agenda,” the article reads.
After Egypt got rid of the National Democratic Party’s cabinet of businessmen, it seems we are currently witnessing another illegitimate marriage between capital and power. Paradoxically, Mubarak’s son Gamal — who is currently facing trial over several charges, including corruption — and Shater were both bankers in the past.
In fact, the military trial of Brotherhood members in 2006 to 2007 was only the result of underlying competition between two groups that controlled capital in Egypt, namely between Gamal’s group and the Brotherhood. All of those who stood trial were leading businessmen in the Brotherhood, the most important of whom was Khairat al-Shater.
Consequently, more than 70 companies owned by the Brotherhood were shut down. The trial was in fact a settlement of accounts between two capitalist rivals, one of whom was forced to leave power only to be replaced by the other.
[...]
The Brotherhood’s projects and the extent to which it has penetrated Egypt’s economic structure remains a secret, like much of the Brotherhood’s affairs. It is impossible to determine the number of companies it owns or how much the group makes every year. We have, however, a list of its companies that were confiscated during the 2007 military trial. A quick look at the trial gives us much insight into the Brotherhood’s business.
Seventy-two Brotherhood-owned companies were confiscated as a result of the trials. They were rentier-based and primarily produced consumer products that targeted upper and middle classes.
This is the least beneficial form of economic activity as opposed to building factories or inventing computer software.
Like the NDP’s businessmen, the Brotherhood’s businessmen registered their projects under the names of their wives or sons-in-law so they would be hard to track down. Shater is one example. The branches of the Shater’s shops are located in the most luxurious shopping malls in Cairo. One of the most famous stores is a furniture shop named Istiqbal, which sells couches for around LE6000, when many young men need a similar amount to finance their marriage. This probably explains the Brotherhood’s uneasiness when dealing with the revolution’s socio-economic demands.
It looks like Egypt is one of those classical cases where one part of the elite is replaced by another part while for much of the rest of the population there isn't much change. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose or as it was expressed in Il Gattopardo: If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.
But Washington gets what it wants: a consistent sticking to the free market dogma no matter how harmful it is for the country.
The Brotherhood hails free-market capitalism; wealthy businessmen whose economic agenda embraces privatization and foreign investment, the writer said, lead its party. The Brotherhood does not espouse the idea of redistribution of wealth, preferring charity instead as a means of combating poverty.
The article adds that Khairat al-Shater, arguably the most powerful man in the Muslim Brotherhood, is a multimillionaire tycoon whose financial interests extend into several fields of business. “A strong advocate of privatization, Al-Shater is one of a cadre of Muslim Brotherhood businessmen who helped finance the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party’s impressive electoral victory this winter and is now crafting the FJP's economic agenda,” the article reads.
After Egypt got rid of the National Democratic Party’s cabinet of businessmen, it seems we are currently witnessing another illegitimate marriage between capital and power. Paradoxically, Mubarak’s son Gamal — who is currently facing trial over several charges, including corruption — and Shater were both bankers in the past.
In fact, the military trial of Brotherhood members in 2006 to 2007 was only the result of underlying competition between two groups that controlled capital in Egypt, namely between Gamal’s group and the Brotherhood. All of those who stood trial were leading businessmen in the Brotherhood, the most important of whom was Khairat al-Shater.
Consequently, more than 70 companies owned by the Brotherhood were shut down. The trial was in fact a settlement of accounts between two capitalist rivals, one of whom was forced to leave power only to be replaced by the other.
[...]
The Brotherhood’s projects and the extent to which it has penetrated Egypt’s economic structure remains a secret, like much of the Brotherhood’s affairs. It is impossible to determine the number of companies it owns or how much the group makes every year. We have, however, a list of its companies that were confiscated during the 2007 military trial. A quick look at the trial gives us much insight into the Brotherhood’s business.
Seventy-two Brotherhood-owned companies were confiscated as a result of the trials. They were rentier-based and primarily produced consumer products that targeted upper and middle classes.
This is the least beneficial form of economic activity as opposed to building factories or inventing computer software.
Like the NDP’s businessmen, the Brotherhood’s businessmen registered their projects under the names of their wives or sons-in-law so they would be hard to track down. Shater is one example. The branches of the Shater’s shops are located in the most luxurious shopping malls in Cairo. One of the most famous stores is a furniture shop named Istiqbal, which sells couches for around LE6000, when many young men need a similar amount to finance their marriage. This probably explains the Brotherhood’s uneasiness when dealing with the revolution’s socio-economic demands.
It looks like Egypt is one of those classical cases where one part of the elite is replaced by another part while for much of the rest of the population there isn't much change. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose or as it was expressed in Il Gattopardo: If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.
But Washington gets what it wants: a consistent sticking to the free market dogma no matter how harmful it is for the country.
Friday, March 30, 2012
How the US deals with a popular uprising
We know what happened in Iraq but the US is also heavily involved in the fighting against a popular uprising in Colombia. The country - with about twice the population of Syria - has 5 million internally displaced.
I couldn't find number of casualties but those must be thousands a year.
I couldn't find number of casualties but those must be thousands a year.
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Syrians fleeing for whom?
The Media Line has an interesting look on the increase of the number of Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries:
“The West wants to punish Al-Assad by imposing sanctions on his regime, but they are also punishing the people. Citizens are suffering as a result of the sanctions and uncertainty in the pound value,” says activist Islam Abdullah from the Syrian Media Center.
He says hundreds of Syrian families have chosen to flee to Jordan and other neighboring countries in search of food rather than for safety. In Jordan, they receive aid from non-government organizations and ordinary Jordanian citizens.
According to this article ("Exclusive: Syria buys grain via Lebanon to beat sanctions"): Growing numbers of Syrians are struggling to obtain food, with prices of staples more than doubling.. This may have been caused by the fact that the exchange rate of the Syrian currency has fallen to half.
There is also a shortage of LPG gas that is mainly used for cooking and hearing.
Here is an article in Spiegel and here the German original about war profiteers in Syria. Just like in any other sanctioned country those connected to the regime profit from the sanctions while the common man suffers.
“The West wants to punish Al-Assad by imposing sanctions on his regime, but they are also punishing the people. Citizens are suffering as a result of the sanctions and uncertainty in the pound value,” says activist Islam Abdullah from the Syrian Media Center.
He says hundreds of Syrian families have chosen to flee to Jordan and other neighboring countries in search of food rather than for safety. In Jordan, they receive aid from non-government organizations and ordinary Jordanian citizens.
According to this article ("Exclusive: Syria buys grain via Lebanon to beat sanctions"): Growing numbers of Syrians are struggling to obtain food, with prices of staples more than doubling.. This may have been caused by the fact that the exchange rate of the Syrian currency has fallen to half.
There is also a shortage of LPG gas that is mainly used for cooking and hearing.
Here is an article in Spiegel and here the German original about war profiteers in Syria. Just like in any other sanctioned country those connected to the regime profit from the sanctions while the common man suffers.
Citizen journalism
Business Week / GigaOm has an article ("Syria, Citizen Journalism, and the Capital 'T' Truth") on citizen journalism. It discusses both the advantages (more news) and the disadvantages (partial and embellished stories) and how professional journalist react (shifting through and selecting citizen stories - sometimes on Twitter).
Thursday, March 22, 2012
Some tips for Annan on Syria
The Security Council just adopted a resolution of Syria after a report from Annan who proposed a six-point peace proposal.
Here some thoughts on how I would approach negotiating the Syrian conflict. This is a blog and I am not a diplomat so I will use a style that stresses clarity over diplomatic niceness.
Vs Assad:
- stress the need to discipline his troops. Torture and unnecessary destruction may work in the short term to relieve the stress from the troops and to intimidate the enemy. But it makes him a loser in the fight for hearts and minds.
- encourage him to make local compromises. Building trust with the opposition will take time so cherish small compromises.
- tell him that he is the president of all Syrians and that he should show that. One can discuss whether the devastation in Baba Amr was necessary or not. But one should feel sorry for the population that now has to live in devastated houses and may have lost relatives.
- ask him to make openings for the opposition to come back.
- stress that he cannot ignore the Muslim Brotherhood. He must find a way to engage them.
- discuss local leaders who keep their community together in the present climate. Stress that such behavior should be encouraged and copied.
- tell him that we no longer live in 1982. With internet, easy money transfers, cheap telephone and travel and widespread car possession the world is now much more connected and he needs to reach out.
- Assad has shown himself prepared to negotiate and has introduced some reforms and released many prisoners. Discuss with him a road forward.
- tell him that if he doesn't play his cards well there is a real chance that he will lose power in a revolutionary way. So he should do better to prevent unnecessary polarization between Alawites and Sunnites as that might backfire later on.
- tell him that one day Syria will be a prosperous democratic country and that he should work towards that goal. Ethnic polarization will harm the progress towards that goal and may also harm the long term position of Syria's minorities.
Vs the opposition:
- Talk with many different opposition leaders. Be prepared to form a "coalition of the willing".
- Stress the costs of revolution. Let them have a look at the devastation and human costs of the revolution in Libya and ask them is them if this is really what they want.
- condemn their offensive at the end of January for destroying chances for peace.
- challenge the exiles and emigrants. It is very comfortable to be radical from your arm chair in Los Angeles. It were the exiles who destroyed Yugoslavia and the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka with their support for radicals. Don't give them a chance here.
- challenge the revengeful: some who lost relatives in 1982 or recently may just be filled with hatred against the Assad government. But such an attitude does not offer hope for finding a compromise between Syria's many different political groups.
- Tell them that a peaceful transition with compromise offers a much better long term chance for democracy than a revolution. Compromise is the heart of democracy. With a zero-sum winner-takes-it-all mentality democracy is doomed and you are on your road to the next dictatorship.
- Stress that any compromise will contain a clause to reintegrate opposition fighters. Many of the young fighters have the feeling that they have burned the bridges behind them and that they have no choice but to fight till the bitter end.
- stress that "Assad must go" demonstrations are revolutionary and not democratic. This is not how peaceful opposition should look.
- tell them to focus on content and not on people. The primary goal should be more freedom and prosperity for the Syrians - not having some other people in the power seats. The task of the government is to serve the population and if Assad is prepared to do that it is ok. And it is much better than some revolutionary place holder who thinks he entitled to a high position because of what he did in the revolution. They will notice that once this mentality change happens the step towards democracy will become much smaller.
- tell them that a revolution always brings a backlash against the former rulers and their supporters. This applies the more as Syria's opposition lacks any leader of the stature of Mandela who might be able to impose his own vision. Tell them that for that reason you think it very unlikely that Syria after a revolution will be democratic and tolerant - no matter how well the intentions of some insurgents may be - and that you see an real need for a negotiated solution.
Vs the US:
- see also opposition part
- talk with Obama about how disgusting you find his behavior in Libya where the Western resistance to compromise led to a protracted civil war, many unnecessary deaths, a devastated country, anarchy and needless polarization.
- stress that the policy of regime change results in a world where everybody feels bullied not to speak out against the US but where at the same time there a great resentment against it.
- discuss how America's previous democratization project - the color revolutions - ended. Stress that the sorry results were not coincidental but a logic consequence of revolutionary change.
- Stress the value of negotiations in democracy and how undemocratic America's refusal to talk with Assad is.
- condemn hypocrite US behavior such as demanding Assad to withdraw his troops from the cities while at the same time encouraging and equipping the rebels to enter there.
- discuss the issue of Syria's "support for terrorists". Talk about how real this still is and suggest other solutions.
Vs Saudi Arabia:
- see also the US part
- ask them what they really want. As stricter dictatorships than Syria they can't be really interested in democratization.
- discuss the Saudi Iran obsession. Mention that secular Syria is not a natural ally for fundamentalist Iran and that Saudi policies have driven them in each others arms.
What not to do:
- don't ask for regime change. How Syria should be governed in the future should be the subject of negotiations and not be predetermined.
- don't ask for surrender. Asking the government troops to withdraw from the cities means that the government should surrender the cities - including their pro-Assad areas - to the rebels. This is not a realistic demand. As the rebels lack a central command the only way to arrange for armistices is to have local negotiations where both sides commit to specific rules that prevent one side to draw disproportional advantage from an armistice.
Here some thoughts on how I would approach negotiating the Syrian conflict. This is a blog and I am not a diplomat so I will use a style that stresses clarity over diplomatic niceness.
Vs Assad:
- stress the need to discipline his troops. Torture and unnecessary destruction may work in the short term to relieve the stress from the troops and to intimidate the enemy. But it makes him a loser in the fight for hearts and minds.
- encourage him to make local compromises. Building trust with the opposition will take time so cherish small compromises.
- tell him that he is the president of all Syrians and that he should show that. One can discuss whether the devastation in Baba Amr was necessary or not. But one should feel sorry for the population that now has to live in devastated houses and may have lost relatives.
- ask him to make openings for the opposition to come back.
- stress that he cannot ignore the Muslim Brotherhood. He must find a way to engage them.
- discuss local leaders who keep their community together in the present climate. Stress that such behavior should be encouraged and copied.
- tell him that we no longer live in 1982. With internet, easy money transfers, cheap telephone and travel and widespread car possession the world is now much more connected and he needs to reach out.
- Assad has shown himself prepared to negotiate and has introduced some reforms and released many prisoners. Discuss with him a road forward.
- tell him that if he doesn't play his cards well there is a real chance that he will lose power in a revolutionary way. So he should do better to prevent unnecessary polarization between Alawites and Sunnites as that might backfire later on.
- tell him that one day Syria will be a prosperous democratic country and that he should work towards that goal. Ethnic polarization will harm the progress towards that goal and may also harm the long term position of Syria's minorities.
Vs the opposition:
- Talk with many different opposition leaders. Be prepared to form a "coalition of the willing".
- Stress the costs of revolution. Let them have a look at the devastation and human costs of the revolution in Libya and ask them is them if this is really what they want.
- condemn their offensive at the end of January for destroying chances for peace.
- challenge the exiles and emigrants. It is very comfortable to be radical from your arm chair in Los Angeles. It were the exiles who destroyed Yugoslavia and the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka with their support for radicals. Don't give them a chance here.
- challenge the revengeful: some who lost relatives in 1982 or recently may just be filled with hatred against the Assad government. But such an attitude does not offer hope for finding a compromise between Syria's many different political groups.
- Tell them that a peaceful transition with compromise offers a much better long term chance for democracy than a revolution. Compromise is the heart of democracy. With a zero-sum winner-takes-it-all mentality democracy is doomed and you are on your road to the next dictatorship.
- Stress that any compromise will contain a clause to reintegrate opposition fighters. Many of the young fighters have the feeling that they have burned the bridges behind them and that they have no choice but to fight till the bitter end.
- stress that "Assad must go" demonstrations are revolutionary and not democratic. This is not how peaceful opposition should look.
- tell them to focus on content and not on people. The primary goal should be more freedom and prosperity for the Syrians - not having some other people in the power seats. The task of the government is to serve the population and if Assad is prepared to do that it is ok. And it is much better than some revolutionary place holder who thinks he entitled to a high position because of what he did in the revolution. They will notice that once this mentality change happens the step towards democracy will become much smaller.
- tell them that a revolution always brings a backlash against the former rulers and their supporters. This applies the more as Syria's opposition lacks any leader of the stature of Mandela who might be able to impose his own vision. Tell them that for that reason you think it very unlikely that Syria after a revolution will be democratic and tolerant - no matter how well the intentions of some insurgents may be - and that you see an real need for a negotiated solution.
Vs the US:
- see also opposition part
- talk with Obama about how disgusting you find his behavior in Libya where the Western resistance to compromise led to a protracted civil war, many unnecessary deaths, a devastated country, anarchy and needless polarization.
- stress that the policy of regime change results in a world where everybody feels bullied not to speak out against the US but where at the same time there a great resentment against it.
- discuss how America's previous democratization project - the color revolutions - ended. Stress that the sorry results were not coincidental but a logic consequence of revolutionary change.
- Stress the value of negotiations in democracy and how undemocratic America's refusal to talk with Assad is.
- condemn hypocrite US behavior such as demanding Assad to withdraw his troops from the cities while at the same time encouraging and equipping the rebels to enter there.
- discuss the issue of Syria's "support for terrorists". Talk about how real this still is and suggest other solutions.
Vs Saudi Arabia:
- see also the US part
- ask them what they really want. As stricter dictatorships than Syria they can't be really interested in democratization.
- discuss the Saudi Iran obsession. Mention that secular Syria is not a natural ally for fundamentalist Iran and that Saudi policies have driven them in each others arms.
What not to do:
- don't ask for regime change. How Syria should be governed in the future should be the subject of negotiations and not be predetermined.
- don't ask for surrender. Asking the government troops to withdraw from the cities means that the government should surrender the cities - including their pro-Assad areas - to the rebels. This is not a realistic demand. As the rebels lack a central command the only way to arrange for armistices is to have local negotiations where both sides commit to specific rules that prevent one side to draw disproportional advantage from an armistice.
Saturday, March 10, 2012
How (not) to negotiate on Kosovo
In its heart the problem of Kosovo is rather simple. Serbia wants better living conditions for Kosovo's Serb minority - and to a lesser extent also for its other minorities - and the Kosovo's Albanians want international recognition of their independence. The balance of power is rather in the middle and a solution should be easy to reach. But such negotiations have never been held.
After the 1999 War the West blocked all negotiations for the first five years claiming that Kosovo was not ready. In the later years this was called "standards before status". After the march 2004 riots this policy was given up. Not only were standards no longer needed for negotiations: the West stopped asking for compliance to standards at all. The Ahtisaari negotiations were clearly fake: the Albanians knew they would get their state no matter what so they didn't see any need to placate the Serbs with concessions. And now we have the "technical dialogue" facilitated by the EU.
There have now been 9 rounds of talks. The result of the latest round of talks was that Serbia allowed Kosovo greater representation at international meetings and consented in some border procedures. In exchange it got candidate membership for the EU. So basically these are negotiations between the EU and Serbia. It is the EU and not Kosovo that makes concessions to Serbia. Sure, the Kosovo government has to agree and sometimes it or Albin Kurti protests. But that is always about wanting bigger steps towards full recognition. Not about Serbia's demands on minority rights, refugee returns and monument protection. These are not even discussed.
So one can conclude that these technical talks are not real negotiations but just serve to placate those in the EU who have tied their political fate to the independence of Kosovo. They do this by using blackmail - what unfortunately has become an accepted feature of our supposedly superior Western civilization. This way these "negotiations" do nothing to build trust between Serbs and Albanians and they do nothing to achieve a negotiated solution. On the contrary, by giving the Albanians the feeling that what they do won't influence the process it seduces them to anti-Serb policies.
The Serbian government has been reproached for not having more concrete demands regarding Kosovo. But the problem is that agreements tend to stay on paper. What is the use of talking about improvements to the Ahtisaari Plan when the plan is just a cover-up for a reality where 200,000 refugees cannot return home? The only thing that might achieve some results is setting concrete numerical targets. But after the failure of "standards before status" it is doubtful whether the EU is prepared to support once again concrete targets.
It is doubtful whether it was a good idea to have the EU as mediator (see "Belgrade cannot control political will of northern Kosovo" as to many of its members have - by supporting Kosovo's independence against international law and public opinion - have tied their own reputation to the success of Kosovo.
In fact Albanians and Serbs might achieve a solution rather soon when left alone. But when some time ago Albanian intellectuals started discussing deals with Serbia - including the possibility of border changes this was interrupted by the US that flew in its highest diplomat to warn that this was not acceptable.
I am afraid the Serbs and Albanians will have to muddle through until the West gets finally tired of the Balkans.
History
Some people like to argue to the period before 1999 as a proof that Serbs and Albanians cannot be trusted to settle the subject among themselves. But until Milosevic introduced his discriminatory policies around 1990 the Kosovo Albanians did have adequate rights.
Western politicians now like to stress how bad Serbia treated Kosovo's Albanians in the 1990s. But they forget that many of those discriminatory policies were copies of similar measures that Croatia had taken against its Serbs - with silent support of the Western countries. This one of the things the West likes to forget: how it contributed to the poisoning of inter-ethnic relations by the condoning and encouragement of unilateral measures.
Even if he had wanted later in the 1990s Milosevic was politically too weak to take measures to improve the fate of Kosovo's Albanians - measures that certainly would have been unpopular in Serbia. Some Western pressure could have helped here. But the West was not interested in improving the fate of the Albanians: they only wanted to overthrow Milosevic. And so - instead of exercising just enough pressure to get Milosevic to introduce better rights for the Albanians - the West supported an Albanian guerrilla war and then held a "peace conference" at Rambouillet where it made proposal that it knew would be unacceptable to Serbia so that it had an excuse to start a war.
After the 1999 War the West blocked all negotiations for the first five years claiming that Kosovo was not ready. In the later years this was called "standards before status". After the march 2004 riots this policy was given up. Not only were standards no longer needed for negotiations: the West stopped asking for compliance to standards at all. The Ahtisaari negotiations were clearly fake: the Albanians knew they would get their state no matter what so they didn't see any need to placate the Serbs with concessions. And now we have the "technical dialogue" facilitated by the EU.
There have now been 9 rounds of talks. The result of the latest round of talks was that Serbia allowed Kosovo greater representation at international meetings and consented in some border procedures. In exchange it got candidate membership for the EU. So basically these are negotiations between the EU and Serbia. It is the EU and not Kosovo that makes concessions to Serbia. Sure, the Kosovo government has to agree and sometimes it or Albin Kurti protests. But that is always about wanting bigger steps towards full recognition. Not about Serbia's demands on minority rights, refugee returns and monument protection. These are not even discussed.
So one can conclude that these technical talks are not real negotiations but just serve to placate those in the EU who have tied their political fate to the independence of Kosovo. They do this by using blackmail - what unfortunately has become an accepted feature of our supposedly superior Western civilization. This way these "negotiations" do nothing to build trust between Serbs and Albanians and they do nothing to achieve a negotiated solution. On the contrary, by giving the Albanians the feeling that what they do won't influence the process it seduces them to anti-Serb policies.
The Serbian government has been reproached for not having more concrete demands regarding Kosovo. But the problem is that agreements tend to stay on paper. What is the use of talking about improvements to the Ahtisaari Plan when the plan is just a cover-up for a reality where 200,000 refugees cannot return home? The only thing that might achieve some results is setting concrete numerical targets. But after the failure of "standards before status" it is doubtful whether the EU is prepared to support once again concrete targets.
It is doubtful whether it was a good idea to have the EU as mediator (see "Belgrade cannot control political will of northern Kosovo" as to many of its members have - by supporting Kosovo's independence against international law and public opinion - have tied their own reputation to the success of Kosovo.
In fact Albanians and Serbs might achieve a solution rather soon when left alone. But when some time ago Albanian intellectuals started discussing deals with Serbia - including the possibility of border changes this was interrupted by the US that flew in its highest diplomat to warn that this was not acceptable.
I am afraid the Serbs and Albanians will have to muddle through until the West gets finally tired of the Balkans.
History
Some people like to argue to the period before 1999 as a proof that Serbs and Albanians cannot be trusted to settle the subject among themselves. But until Milosevic introduced his discriminatory policies around 1990 the Kosovo Albanians did have adequate rights.
Western politicians now like to stress how bad Serbia treated Kosovo's Albanians in the 1990s. But they forget that many of those discriminatory policies were copies of similar measures that Croatia had taken against its Serbs - with silent support of the Western countries. This one of the things the West likes to forget: how it contributed to the poisoning of inter-ethnic relations by the condoning and encouragement of unilateral measures.
Even if he had wanted later in the 1990s Milosevic was politically too weak to take measures to improve the fate of Kosovo's Albanians - measures that certainly would have been unpopular in Serbia. Some Western pressure could have helped here. But the West was not interested in improving the fate of the Albanians: they only wanted to overthrow Milosevic. And so - instead of exercising just enough pressure to get Milosevic to introduce better rights for the Albanians - the West supported an Albanian guerrilla war and then held a "peace conference" at Rambouillet where it made proposal that it knew would be unacceptable to Serbia so that it had an excuse to start a war.
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