I find it frightening to see how closely the situation around Kosovo's independence resembles that around Croatia's independence in 1991/1992. Both then and now the US was pushing an independence that on itself was not very controversial. But by pushing it under controversial conditions the US creates a mess. Let's compare:
- Croatia's independence was not controversial. Neither is Kosovo's: older opinion polls show that the majority of the Serbs could live with a partition of Kosovo - what amounts to independent for the Albanian part. Serbia's objections are in both cases based on their claim that according to international law they have the power to dictate conditions and unilateral moves by the other side are not allowed.
More recently Serb politicians have spoken out against partition and opinion polls show less support for partition. I think this happened mainly because internationals and Albanians interpreted partition as giving up on the Serbs south of the Ibar. I believe these objections can be overcome with a good proposal.
- in both cases Serbia's main objections concern the fate of the Serb minority. With good reason: In 1991 large numbers of Serbs were leaving Croatia and the fate of Kosovo's Serbs is well known.
A recent opinion poll among Kosovo's Serbs showed that 30% plans to leave when Kosovo becomes independent and 60% plans to stay. The departures will likely be concentrated in the smaller settlements south of the Ibar where a clear majority will leave. Quite a few Serb villages may be emptied. Serbs elsewhere now feel still protected by numbers, parallel structures and peacekeepers. But when Kosovo's government will increase its grip and the peacekeepers start leaving they will feel the same pressure to leave.
- in both cases the West is playing down the security side of the problem. Yet there is for the Serb side the real problem:
In Croatia Western diplomats kept repeating that the Serbs didn't need to worry because Western pressure (and in the end EU admission) would sooner or later force Croatia to adopt better minority rights anyway. In the mean time the Serbs were leaving... Nowadays Croatia has 400,000 Serbs less and there is hardly anybody left to give autonomy to. And with the Serb population the Western pressure to give autonomy has evaporated.
The Ahtisaari proposal in Kosovo would be a quite decent proposal if autonomy was the only issue. But the main issue is security and Ahtisaari is very silent on that. I expect that in a couple of years when the great majority of Kosovo's Serbs has left Kosovo will silently revoke the autonomy.
But don't expect those Western diplomats and politicians to be repentent for what they have done. They will blame everything on Serb nationalists.
- in both cases it is the US that is pushing for independence. Yet they do not take the initiative but instead press other countries to do so. In 1991 it was Germany that did the dirty work for the US and it looks that Germany is prepared to do it again.
- in both cases the US is pushing for conditions that are seen in Serbia as extremely unfair. In the case of Croatia it insisted on Croatia's territorial integrity while it neglected to stress the right of the Serbs for autonomy and human rights. In the end it even helped Croatia to clean many of its remaining Serbs in Operation Storm. In Kosovo we see the same: the right for self-determination of the Albanians is stressed while they support the Ahtisaari plan that offers hardly any protection for the Serb minority. They may even try to help cleanse the Serbs. They tried it already once in 2001, when they searched Serb houses in northern Mitrovica for arms while the Albanians planned a violent demonstration in the south of the city that hoped to overrun the Serb dominated north side.
- in both cases the EU reacts puzzled and doesn't know what to do. This offers the possibility for the US to impose their solution by forming a "coalition of the willing" that then pressures the rest of the EU to follow their lead in the name of "unity".
- negotiations turn out to be fake as the secessionists (Croats and Kosovo) already have the assurance from Washington that they will be recognized. They don't see any need to do concessions.
- in the case of Croatia the EU created a legal excuse for their decision with the Badinter Commission. It looks we will now see a similar attempt for a legal excuse.
- The policy drives Serbia towards radical policies. But the countries that are favoured with these policies pay also a high price. Croatia and Bosnia saw several years of war. Even without war Kosovo may stay in legal limbo for many years.
- In both cases simple measures could have saved the situation. In the case of Croatia there were two points were the West could have done better. The first point was before the independence declarations when they could have explicitly declared that Yugoslavia's central government had the right to military intervention if the republics tried to secede with reaching agreement with Belgrade first. This would have forced Slovenia and Croatia to give up on independence. Most probably they would have soon afterwards consented to federal elections - something they had opposed until then. But a consensual secession would also have been possible. The West followed this course with the Soviet Union, but somehow failed to do it with Yugoslavia.
A second point was after the secession was more or less a fact and it came to recognising Slovenia and Croatia. The West could have demanded that certain minority rights problems were repaired before it granted recognition. As both had minority problems (Slovenia had its "erased") that would have been a strong signal towards these victorious nationalists that we would not accept them unless they behaved themselves.
In Kosovo the most obvious holes in the Ahtisaari plan should be fixed:
1) Serb villages south of Ibar get local parttime policemen. Being in service for only one day a week they wouldn't cost much, but as trained policemen they would have the right to carry a gun and to arrest people outside their working hours this would mean that there would always be somebody to deter criminal attacks.
2) Serb municipalities get the right to appoint their own police chiefs. Of course there is a risk that some of them will appoint a radical. But theer is just as well a risk that Pristina appoints a police chief who is connected to radicals or organised crime. Trust should go both ways.
3) Serbs get control over their own economy. Privitisation and permits are major tools to discriminate minorities. Where possible it will be decentralised. Privatisation of Brezovica will become an affair of Kosovo's Serbs. They will decide whether to privitise and if they want to privitise they will select the buyer.
4) Kosovo's north tip and Strpce get a special status as Serb majority areas. They can decide over all developments in their area. This should give them the power to resist attempt by Pristina to Albanise those areas.
5) Introduce the (Ahtisaari and other) reforms now and let them be in effect for 6 months. If they work they will build trust for independence. If they don't work we will need additional reforms. This is also in line with the "standards before status" principle and with the principle that basic human rights should not be subject of negotiations.
The question is why the US is following this kind of catastrophic policy. I believe things went wrong around 1991-1993. The old guard of diplomats (like ambassadors Eagleburger and Scanlan) were business man diplomats who didn't have a clue what was happening and who advocated a wait-and-see attitude. But at the same time the cold warriors at the State Department were enthusiastic about Slovene and Croat elections and irritated by Yugoslavia's lack of "reform". When these cold warriors undermined Yugoslavia's stability and Yugoslavia descended in open war this old guard became incredible and had to give way in the end.
Since then traditional diplomats who value stability have been out of the loop and the policy towards ex-Yugoslavia has been determined by a coalition of non-Serb ethnic interest groups and self styled idealists for whom being anti-Serb is the politically correct attitude.
5 comments:
Um, there is one major difference between now and 1991: when Germany decided to force recognition (December '91), the Serbs and Croats were already at open war. Vukovar and Dubrovnik had already been destroyed, and the Serbs of Croatia had already declared the Republic of Serb Krajina and purged their ethnic Croats.
Also, it's not true that "in both cases Serbia's objections concern the fate of the Serb minority". In 1991, Milosevic wasn't concerned with the Serb minorities; he was interested in a Greater Serbia including half of Bosnia and the Krajina.
"In Croatia Western diplomats kept repeating that the Serbs didn't need to worry because for EU admission Croatia would have to adopt better minority rights anyway. In the mean time the Serbs were leaving..."
What? In 1991, EU membership for Croatia was not even a remote possibility. Remember, no former Communist country would join the EU until 2004.
And the Serbs weren't much leaving in 1991. Some left Zagreb, but the large populations in eastern and central Croatia stayed right where they were until 1995.
"negotiations turn out to be fake as the secessionists (Croats and Kosovo) already have the assurance from Washington that they will be recognized. They don't see any need to do concessions."
Well, that's just plain wrong. Sorry. But Croatia was already moving fast towards independence by late 1990 -- long before anyone was giving them "assurances". In fact, at the time of the independence referendum (May 1991), Tudjman and other nationalist leaders were seriously worried that nobody would ever recognize an independent Croatia. Recognition didn't even seem plausible until December, when the Germans surprised the world.
"Nowadays Croatia has 400,000 Serbs less and there is hardly anybody left to give autonomy to."
That's because they ethnically cleansed their Serbs in 1995, and have since been making it difficult for Serbs to return. But that has nothing to do with recognition in 1991.
"In the case of Croatia it insisted on Croatia's territorial integrity while it neglected to stress the right of the Serbs for autonomy and human rights."
Well, it didn't help that the Serbs of RSK began by cleansing all their ethnic Croats. Nor that their leaders were a bunch of dim-witted thugs and crooks. It's possible to feel some sympathy for the Serbs of Croatia, but really -- they had the worst, most crooked, stupid and incompetent leadership of any group in the former Yugoslavia. Which is really saying something.
Anyway, what you're saying here simply isn't true. Again, sorry, but you're missing a big piece of history. The US didn't "neglect... the right of the Serbs for autonomy and human rights". Quite the opposite.
You want to look up the Z-4 plan. That gave the Krajina Serbs huge autonomy -- their own police, local taxes, ability to make their own laws, you name it -- effectively making them a state within a state. And it was the US' idea.
And Tudjman accepted it! Grudgingly and reluctantly, but after almost four years he had come to doubt if he could crush the Serbs through force.
And then the Krajina Serbs rejected it! Because, as noted above, their leaders were a bunch of idiots.
And then the Croats rolled the dice on Operations Lightning and Storm. And, to their amazement, the Serbs just collapsed and run and the RSK disappeared in one week.
"in both cases it is the US that is pushing for independence. Yet they do not take the initiative but instead press other countries to do so."
Actually the US takes the initiative /and/ encourages other countries to do so. They're not mutually exclusive.
Note also that the US has been moving pretty slowly. Independence was supposed to come in April, after the Ahtisaari plan had been presented and the first round of negotiations had failed. When Russia objected, and the EU agreed to more talks, the US shrugged and went along. Not exactly high pressure arm-twisting.
I could go on, but you get the idea. Croatia in 1991 was pretty different than Kosovo today. There are a lot of arguments you can make against Kosovar independence, but "it's just like 1991" is not one.
cheers,
Doug M.
Hi Doug,
Thank you for your reply. It is difficult to answer so many arguments but I will give it a try.
"Vukovar and Dubrovnik had already been destroyed, and the Serbs of Croatia had already declared the Republic of Serb Krajina and purged their ethnic Croats."
"And the Serbs weren't much leaving in 1991. Some left Zagreb, but the large populations in eastern and central Croatia stayed right where they were until 1995."
Dubrovnik destroyed? You must be joking. Lightly damaged would be a better description.
120 Serb civilians killed in Gospic in september 1991 - to name just one incident. Your image of the peaceful Croats and the cleansing Serbs just doesn't fit. And those large populations stayed where they were because they lived in Serb-controlled areas.
My impression is rather the opposite: Tudjman deliberately provoked the Serbs. Somehow he was confident that they were no danger for the independence and he believed escalation worked to his advantage.
"Also, it's not true that "in both cases Serbia's objections concern the fate of the Serb minority". In 1991, Milosevic wasn't concerned with the Serb minorities; he was interested in a Greater Serbia including half of Bosnia and the Krajina."
Ah, the old "great Serbia" myth. Milosevic took the falling apart of Yugoslavia as a splitup along ethnic lines - just as Tudjman and other Yugoslav leaders did when they thought it in their advantage. The only one who didn't was the crazy mr. Badinter - who unfortunately had the last word.
In the course of time Milosevic supported different options. All Serbs in one Serbia seemed the most natural to him but if that was not achievable he was also prepared to accept regional autonomy. But except for maybe Kosovo during the war I can't see him aiming for solutions where Serbs took much more than their share - what is more or less implied in the "great Serbia" label.
"What? In 1991, EU membership for Croatia was not even a remote possibility. Remember, no former Communist country would join the EU until 2004."
No, but the bait of Western aid and later EU membership was clearly an important aspect in the secessions - just as more recently with Montenegro. Aspirant EU membership brings lots of money too.
""negotiations turn out to be fake as the secessionists (Croats and Kosovo) already have the assurance from Washington that they will be recognized. They don't see any need to do concessions.""
"In fact, at the time of the independence referendum (May 1991), Tudjman and other nationalist leaders were seriously worried that nobody would ever recognize an independent Croatia. Recognition didn't even seem plausible until December, when the Germans surprised the world."
Germany surprised the world? I don’t think so. Just as now with Kosovo it was clear where the sympathies of the Americans and much of the Europeans were. The problem was just that there was no legal framework – and for that reason the EU had created the Badinter Commission. The Badinter Commission gave its first opinion in November 1991. According to them Yugoslavia was a state in dissolution. The German recognition came one month later and it would amaze me if they hadn’t secretly conferred with the US. On 11 januari the Badinter Commission came with its remaning recommendations that were clearly in favor of recognition.
""Nowadays Croatia has 400,000 Serbs less and there is hardly anybody left to give autonomy to.""
"That's because they ethnically cleansed their Serbs in 1995, and have since been making it difficult for Serbs to return. But that has nothing to do with recognition in 1991."
One of the most central complaints of Croatia’s Serbs in 1991 was that they weren’t included as a constituent nation in the constitution and that they got no special rights as minority. The fact that the Americans and the EU did not pressure Croatia on this point was a major factor in the escalation of the war.
""In the case of Croatia it insisted on Croatia's territorial integrity while it neglected to stress the right of the Serbs for autonomy and human rights.""
"Well, it didn't help that the Serbs of RSK began by cleansing all their ethnic Croats. Nor that their leaders were a bunch of dim-witted thugs and crooks. It's possible to feel some sympathy for the Serbs of Croatia, but really -- they had the worst, most crooked, stupid and incompetent leadership of any group in the former Yugoslavia. Which is really saying something."
"Anyway, what you're saying here simply isn't true. Again, sorry, but you're missing a big piece of history. The US didn't "neglect... the right of the Serbs for autonomy and human rights". Quite the opposite."
"You want to look up the Z-4 plan. That gave the Krajina Serbs huge autonomy -- their own police, local taxes, ability to make their own laws, you name it -- effectively making them a state within a state. And it was the US' idea."
"And Tudjman accepted it! Grudgingly and reluctantly, but after almost four years he had come to doubt if he could crush the Serbs through force."
"And then the Krajina Serbs rejected it! Because, as noted above, their leaders were a bunch of idiots."
"And then the Croats rolled the dice on Operations Lightning and Storm. And, to their amazement, the Serbs just collapsed and run and the RSK disappeared in one week."
Croatia never accepted the plan. It only accepted it as basis for negotiations - objecting to many parts. By doing this they managed to look better than the Krajna Serbs who flatly rejected it. But this was the PR side: in reality they were just as stubborn. And when the Krajna finally accepted a later version of the plan in august 1995 Croatia dismissed this acceptance and attacked a day later in Operation Storm.
As for the US: they played some – stil mysterous - role in Operation Storm. I read somewhere that an important factor in the Serb collapse in Krajna was that their counterattack had been betrayed by US spionage satellites. The US had also a role in the armament and training of the Croat army.
Besides that: both West Slavonia and the Krajna were supposed to be protected by UN peacekeepers. On that promise the Serb Army had withdrawn. But the US broke its promise – just as it would later break their promise to give Russia a role in the peacekeeping of Kosovo.
""in both cases it is the US that is pushing for independence. Yet they do not take the initiative but instead press other countries to do so.""
"Actually the US takes the initiative /and/ encourages other countries to do so. They're not mutually exclusive."
"Note also that the US has been moving pretty slowly. Independence was supposed to come in April, after the Ahtisaari plan had been presented and the first round of
negotiations had failed. When Russia objected, and the EU agreed to more talks, the US shrugged and went along. Not exactly high pressure arm-twisting."
I see that the same as with the “coalition of the willing” for the Iraq war. The US is well aware that when they operate alone they risk to be figured out as the world bully. That would make them some sort of pariah state and would cost them much diplomatic credit.
Cheers,
Wim
Dubrovnik lightly damaged: I'd say more than lightly, but okay -- "destroyed" was too strong. But that doesn't affect my point, which was that the war had been raging for months already when recognition began.
"Your image of the peaceful Croats and the cleansing Serbs just doesn't fit"
-- what image? I said that the RSK cleansed all its Croats, and that's true. Elsewhere, Croats cleansed Serbs, Serbs cleansed Bosniaks, whatever. But there were basically no Croats left on RSK territory by early 1992.
"Tudjman deliberately provoked the Serbs"
-- both sides were being pretty provocative. I don't see how the Croats were worse, though. Certainly they didn't (for instance) steal a billion marks from the Yugoslav treasury, nor did they try to co-opt JNA into being a tool of local nationalism.
"Great Serbia myth"
-- Um, no. Greater Serbia was Serbia's policy from 1991 until 1994 or so, when it became obvious it was impossible. If you think it's a "myth" then you're going to have trouble understanding this period.
You know about the Karadjordjevo and Graz agreements, right? Karadjordjevo was in March 1991 -- before independence had been declared or shots fired.
"the bait of Western aid and later EU membership was clearly an important aspect in the secessions"
-- I'm sorry, but that's 180 degrees wrong.
The 12 EU foreign ministers met in Luxembourg on June 23 1991 and agree that *only a unified Yugoslavia could be a plausible EU member*. This was an attempt to /stop/ the secessions.
Of course, it was about a year too late. And the consensus fell apart within months -- by September, Germany, Austria and Denmark were starting to talk openly about recognition. But the EU's first response to the secessions was not encouragement! Quite the opposite. Up until August 1991, the EU's position was "don't secede or you'll be sorry".
As for aid, no -- in 1991, Western aid was not on the table. The US had already cut off aid to all of Yugoslavia. European aid to the post-Communist world was just getting started anyhow -- organizations like PHARE were founded right around this time.
As for aspirant EU membership bringing lots of money... good grief. Large-scale financial support for candidacy didn't begin until 1997. In 1991 it wasn't even on the table. Nobody even became a candidate until 1993! And, again, at the time of formal secession (August 1991), the EU was still taking the position that only Yugoslavia could be a candidate, not Croatia.
The Croats didn't secede because evil westerners seduced them to. They seceded for their own reasons -- some good, most stupid. Outside influences (with the partial exception of the Vatican and the Croat Diaspora) had very little to do with it.
"The problem was just that there was no legal framework"
For recognizing a new state? I beg to differ.
" – and for that reason the EU had created the Badinter Commission."
No, the Commission had been created in August -- not to provide a legal framework, but to answer questions *within the existing legal framework* of international law.
"According to them Yugoslavia was a state in dissolution."
As of November 1991, that was exactly and precisely correct. Yugoslavia was already dead by then, and had been for months.
"The German recognition came one month later and it would amaze me if they hadn’t secretly conferred with the US."
Umm. The Germans OPENLY conferred with their EU colleagues in November and December 1991 before announcing on December 15 that they would recognize in January.
N.B., the Germans got very annoyed afterwards because they said they had told their EU fellows that they were planning to recognize. By going first (they said) they made themselves the "lightning rod". Perhaps. But it's clear that while Germany's declaration was a surprise, by December everybody knew that they were thinking about it and discussing it openly.
As for the US, this was still the Bush 41 administration, which was very very cautious about encouraging change in the post-Communist world. (Google the "Chicken Kiev" speech.) The Europeans were out in front at this point. The Americans didn't start leading until the Clinton administration's second year in office.
"One of the most central complaints of Croatia’s Serbs in 1991 was that they weren’t included as a constituent nation in the constitution and that they got no special rights as minority."
True, and a real concern.
"The fact that the Americans and the EU did not pressure Croatia on this point was a major factor in the escalation of the war."
No. No amount of pressure would have convinced the Tudjman government to give formal special rights to the Serbs. Croat supremacy was, for the nationalists, the whole point of independence.
Note, BTW, that the EU *formally* insisted that Croatia give minority rights to its Serbs. That was one of the questions asked of Badinter, and they responded that the Serbs were entitled to full minority rights and that any Croatian government should, you know, do something about that. But nobody was in a hurry to put pressure on Croatia.
(Or on Serbia, either. In 1991, Serbia was busy ethnically cleansing its Croats and Bosniaks out of Belgrade and Vojvodina, and imposing a brutal apartheid regime on Kosovo. Europe was just as silent about that as they were about Zagreb's refusal to grant minority rights to Croatia's Serbs.)
Z-4 Plan: The Croat side accepted most of the provisions of the plan, claiming they rejected only those "inconsistent with the Constitution". It's clear they were close to caving; Tudjman was having a serious attack of nerves about Operations Lightning and Storm. Although Croatia had grown much stronger since 1991, there was zero popular support for a long war; if the conflict dragged on more than a week or two, or if casualties were high, Tudjman would have been in serious trouble.
"West Slavonia and the Krajna were supposed to be protected by UN peacekeepers."
Um, what? UNCRO was present in Krajina -- 6,500 troops and 300 police.
Unfortunately for the Serbs, UNCRO weren't allowed to do anything. (Which, in those days, was pretty typical for UN peacekeepers.) They were supposed to "show the flag", but couldn't shoot unless attacked first.
So Operation Storm just flowed around them. In fact, the Croats informed them of the attack an hour in advance (although there were a few casualties anyway).
"On that promise the Serb Army had withdrawn."
Do what?
JNA -- not "the Serb Army" -- never had significant forces in the Krajina. The few troops they did have left in 1992 and never came back -- not because of promises of UN troops, but because they were wanted in Bosnia.
From then on, Krajina's defense was in the hands of local militia, albeit with guns and supplies from Belgrade and the Diaspora.
"But the US broke its promise"
Wait, you just said it was the UN. UN or US? Did the US support UNCRO or not?
You seem to be casting the US as the villain of the play. That's silly. US policy in the former Yugoslavia varied a lot over time; it was sometimes distant (1991) and sometimes very engaged (1999), sometimes biased and sometimes more neutral, sometimes foolish and sometimes wise. And for the first part of the 1990s, European policy was much more important than US.
Doug M.
"But there were basically no Croats left on RSK territory by early 1992."
As far as I know the number of Serb refugees was often larger as that of the Croat refugees. But I don't have exact figures at hand.
"Certainly they didn't (for instance) steal a billion marks from the Yugoslav treasury"
Yugoslavia was under an IMF cure that the Markovic government "solved" by not transfering money to the republics - so they couldn't pay their salaries and others expenses. Croatia and Slovenia solved this by holding back the custom duties that they collected at the border. Serbia solved it in its own way. Not nice, but not as rude as you make it look. And they paid most of it back later.
"Karađorđevo and Graz agreements"
That is exactly what I mean when I write that all the main players tended to see it as an ethnic splitup rather than a splitup of republics. There was a huge gray area due to the mixed population and everyone tried to explain it to his own advantage. Bosnia's Muslims weren't better as the conceived Bosnia as a kind of Great Bosniakia.
"Western aid was not on the table. The US had already cut off aid to all of Yugoslavia."
The second statement contradicts the first. By cutting off the aid to Yugoslavia the US gave the republics the implicit message that if the wanted aid they would have to get out of Yugoslavia.
"Up until August 1991, the EU's position was "don't secede or you'll be sorry"."
The message "don't secede" was indeed there. But the "you'll be sorry" part lacked. The implicit message was rather the opposite: The republics were treated like independent states and any kind of force from the central government was condemned. So there were no roadblocks on the road the independence and they just had to play it right.
If on the contrary the EU had explicitly said that if Slovenia or Croatia declared independence the Yugoslav army would be fully in its right to interfere they very probably wouldn't have even tried. But we denied those powers to Yugoslavia while we allowed them later to the seceding republics. It was this lack of clarity and consistence that created the war more than anything else.
"No, the Commission had been created in August -- not to provide a legal framework, but to answer questions *within the existing legal framework* of international law."
If they wanted a solution within international law: why did they appoint a bunch of constitutional lawyers who didn't know a thing about international law? And why an activist lawyer like Badinter?
"the US, this was still the Bush 41 administration, which was very very cautious about encouraging change in the post-Communist world. (Google the "Chicken Kiev" speech.)"
I think Bush was right with his Chicken Kiev speech. I wish they had been just as cautious in
Yugoslavia as he was with the Soviet Union.
"Croat supremacy was, for the nationalists, the whole point of independence."
That is exactly the reason why I believe that the international community should be very conservative in recognising new states and should put strong conditions on how they treat they
minorities. New independece will almost always drive intolerant people to the top.
If you are not prepared to say no to nationalist they will clean their minorities. We have seen it in Croatia and we will see it in Kosovo.
"Did the US support UNCRO or not?"
The US supported actions that went against the armistice that UNCRO was supposed to guarantee. So they undermined it.
"The Croat side accepted most of the provisions of the plan, claiming they rejected only those "inconsistent with the Constitution"."
Actually the Croats were angry about the plan and as a retaliation refused to extend the UNPROFOR mandate (what came back in a reduced form as UNCRO). The refusal to discuss their constitution was an indirect refusal to allow much autonomy.
The Serbs were in a different position as the Croats: accepting Z4 as a basis for negotiation would mean a major consession (accepting re-integration as an option) while for Croatia it meant nothing.
I had left one item unanswered last time:
"You seem to be casting the US as the villain of the play. That's silly. US policy in the former Yugoslavia varied a lot over time; it was sometimes distant (1991) and sometimes very engaged (1999), sometimes biased and sometimes more neutral, sometimes foolish and sometimes wise. And for the first part of the 1990s, European policy was much more important than US."
I don't see some big conspiracy from the US. I rather see a kind of racism - a constant emotional undertone that determines the behaviour and is strongest when it is not noticed. It started as anti-communist/anti-Russian and it gradually got anti-Serb aspects too.
The only time that the US government was really involved (Dayton) they produced a quite decent outcome (that since then they have tried to undermine), but when bureaucrats set the tone and the politicians were only marginally involved the results tended to be very partial.
When Croats and Albanians say that something is unacceptable that is usually accepted by the US as such, while when Serbia says the same thing that is discarded.
You say that US involvement was marginal in the early 1990s. I beg to disagree. Around 1990 the US was putting a lot of pressure on Yugoslavia to "reform". They saw it as the last European hold-out of communism (it was slower to embrace reform as other countries) and they had a lot of sympathy for fast reforming Slovenia and Croatia. So - allthough they left the handling of the secessions largely to Europe - they certainly had an active policy for Yugoslavia. and they were well aware of its effects on the ethnic relations.
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