Turkey burned its bridges to Syria

From the Guardian about Syria:

Sinan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Ankara's preferred option would be regional support for limited Nato operations, including a no-fly zone and humanitarian corridor. "Turkey is beyond the point of no return," he said. "It has burned its bridges. The longer Assad stays in Syria, the worse it is. Turkey has bet heavily on regime change."

That is how far we have sunk as Western world. Turkey has made unwise moves and now it wants others to follow it in its folly so that its foolishness becomes hidden. What happened to facing up to your mistakes? Turkey could fire its present foreign minister as a scapegoat and try again but it looks like it lacks the courage.

Another article describes how far Turkey has gone in burning its bridges:

Unmarked NATO warplanes are arriving at Turkish military bases close to Iskenderum on the Syrian border, delivering weapons from the late Muammar Gaddafi’s arsenals as well as volunteers from the Libyan Transitional National Council who are experienced in pitting local volunteers against trained soldiers, a skill they acquired confronting Gaddafi’s army. Iskenderum is also the seat of the Free Syrian Army, the armed wing of the Syrian National Council. French and British special forces trainers are on the ground, assisting the Syrian rebels while the CIA and U.S. Spec Ops are providing communications equipment and intelligence to assist the rebel cause, enabling the fighters to avoid concentrations of Syrian soldiers.

Yet it seems unlikely that Turkey will intervene in Syria as its Alevi community is fiercely opposed to that.

The only opinion poll availabe shows 55% of the Syrians want Assad to stay. It has rightly be criticized for its small sample size but there is no doubt that Assad has considerable support. And although according to Peter Harling of the International Crisis Group his support is decreasing there are also reports about former protesters who now support the government because they see no viable alternative at the moment. See also this link.

The report of the Arab League observation mission was mainly critical about the violence used by the opposition. Maybe that was the real reason they were withdrawn.

This article ("Rebels without a clue") describes the SNC: dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, disorganized, disconnected from the Syrians on the ground, and out of step with the broad spectrum of Syrian society. As a consequence their relation with the fighters and protesters in Syria is problematic. They are seen as trying to steal a part of the success of the protesters. It doesn't help either that many Syrian soldiers have been educated to see the Brotherhood as the main enemy.

This article describes how Assad behaves under the circumstances: "fully abreast of events on the ground - not the mere puppet of hardliners that some have portrayed - "relaxed and phlegmatic", and determined to see off the challenge, offering some reforms, strictly on his own terms."
Assad is described as holding back in his reaction to the uprising ("Eighty percent of the army is still in the barracks"), both because of the international reaction and because he doesn't want to give the army too much power.

A press overview on Syria can be found on Syria Comment. Other interesting sites: Brian Whitacre.

This article (Questioning the Syrian “Casualty List”) criticizes the death count as provided by SOHR, the UN and other organizations. It mentions examples of casualties on the list that shouldn't be there. As the SOHR website is in Arabic and refers to Facebook for English speakers one needs to understand Arabic to check it out.

Syria Witness is a very long page with many interviews with people who tend to be pro-opposition.

Erdogan and Assad

It is a common phenomena that when rulers rule too long they get bored with the internal affairs of their country and want to play on the international level. This happens not only with dictators but even more with democratic leaders who after some six year already will find that they are usually the most experienced among their international colleagues.

Often this results in rather embarrassing scenes. To make themselves internationally acceptable they blindly copy what the US is saying at the moment. And one gets the impression that they would do anything for a photo opportunity with the acting US president.

It looks like something like that is happening to Erdogan in Turkey too. While suppressing the press in his own country he enthusiastically embraced the Arab Spring. He pressured Mubarak to resign. He didn't utter one word of protest when the West initiated a civil war in Libya that killed 50,000, destroyed the country and brought it to near anarchy. And finally there was his "masterpiece": Assad in Syria.

And so we saw him going to Syria, having a long talk with Assad, coming back with the message that he had agreements with Assad for reform, feeling disappointed and deceived when Assad didn't deliver and then turning on Assad, calling for his resignation and introducing sanctions.

The list of misunderstandings here is almost too long to consider:
- It is very arrogant to think that as an outsider you can dictate how a country should be ruled. Even a dictator has his constituency that has to be consulted. And he has also to face practical difficulties that might have been ignored during the talks.
- Assad and his allies know the fate of Gadaffi and Mubarak and they will not be very eager to submit to the same treatment.
- Syria is a poor country and it is well known that poverty and democracy seldom go together. A regime change might very well end up as a Salafi dictatorship. Instead of democratization it might be a better strategy to aim for more freedom and less torture.
- Unlike his father Bashar al-Assad is not very political talented. International diplomats were already before the Arab Spring complaining that he seems out of touch with reality. He seems not to grasp basic concepts like that it is not wise to anger the US if it is not strictly necessary. In addition there is doubt how much power he really has and to what extent he is just a figurehead for other people.
- In this context one cannot expect that one day in Damascus will result in democratic change. Instead to achieve results some international diplomat or politician should take it upon him to serve as a kind of long term coach for Assad and other powerful people in his regime. That will be an unthankful job as the international media will likely discard him as defending the regime. Yet it is the only way to achieve peaceful change.

It is clear that Erdogan won't volunteer for this job. He wants to stand in the limelight and be praised and honored. For doing unpopular work with an uncertain outcome we will need someone else.