The best way to explain the Irish crisis is to explain it in very simple terms.
Suppose the economy is divided in two groups: the haves and the don't-haves. The haves have big bank accounts, shares and other possessions; the don't-haves are dependent on their wages.
Now some big bank goes bust. The consequence is that as a country we are a bit poorer and the question is how this loss should be divided. The logical way to handle this is that the shareholders and the creditors of the bank should carry the burden. So only the haves would pay the bill. They still will be haves but they will just own a little bit less.
But that was not how it worked in the last crisis. Under the excuse that the stability of the financial system was threatened governments took much of the burden upon them. But as the government doesn't own much of itself this means that in the end everybody in the country - both the haves and the don't-haves - will have to pay the bill. But as the don't haves are financially weak and the haves have ways to evade taxes this brings the government soon in a very difficult position.
In Ireland the government had taken full responsibility for a bank that had lent much money to real estate developers and that fell into problems when real estate prices cratered.
Socialists like to scold the capitalist way of thinking as "privatize the profits, socialize the loses" and in this case this is exactly what we have done. The problem is that until we recognize what we have done and that it is unsustainable we will keep running into problems like Ireland has now.
As can be seen in this article ("IMF: Markets Significantly Overestimate Risk of Advanced Econ Default"), the IMF still hasn't gotten the idea when it states that the main problem is "primary fiscal deficit". That is not true. Those deficits are in most cases a direct consequence of governments taking on debts from the private sector.
Governments should not take on any debt from the private sector and if needed pressure for liquidation so that the property relations reflect the economic reality. In times of crisis it needs all the means it has to compensate for falling tax receipts and to stimulate the economy.
A similar reallity rule exists for wages. A country can not live above its means in the long term. This applies also to stimulation of the economy. Stimulation of the economy should concern things that add to the economy like new roads or product development. This disqualifies everything that does not add to the economy: too high wages, new roads that are not needed or bank rescues.
Monday, November 22, 2010
Friday, November 19, 2010
The precedent excuse against partition of Kosovo
Last week several reports appeared about the Western Balkans. See here for an overview.
It is good to see that after the International Crisis Group also an article in Survival, the journal of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies saw some merit in partition of Kosovo.
On the other hand however, Daniel Serwer of the USIP once again published a report and an article in which he attacks the option of partition as a way to settle conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia. He seems a bit confused about the subject sometimes - he falsely claims for example that the recent UN resolution on Kosovo asks for technical talks only - but as his institute is directly financed by the US Congress we have to take him seriously.
According to him if borders were changed in Kosovo this would "open up border questions" in Bosnia and Macedonia and likely also in Albanian inhabited areas in southern Serbia and Montenegro. It is a modern version of the Domino Theory and just as dubious when you have a closer look:
- when Kosovo declared independence there were also people who predicted that that would lead to the secession of the RS in Bosnia. Nothing happened as everyone knew that the Western countries wouldn't allow it. Similarly when Czechoslovakia split and there were some border changes between Czechia and Slovakia nobody even suggested that that would or should have consequences for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. So there is no reason to suppose that a border agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will have automatic influence on Bosnia and Macedonia.
- The solution in Bosnia has always been obvious: extend the principle of self-determination - on which Dayton is based - to the Croats. Unfortunately by pressing the other way the West has created a hostile stalemate. The longer this lasts the lesser the chance that Bosnia will survive as a state. This has nothing to do with Kosovo.
- A major factor in Albanian separatism in Macedonia is the belief that the US (and to a lesser degree the EU) is an ally of the Albanians against the Slavs. Both in Kosovo (1999) and in Macedonia (2001) the West intervened in a war started by the Albanians and then imposed major changes in favor of of the Albanians. A refusal to change borders in Kosovo - despite the sorry position of its minorities - only strengthens the impression that the West supports the Albanians no matter what they do. The recent weapon catches on the Kosovo-Macedonian border show that preparations for another war are already going on.
- not changing borders has consequences too. In Croatia not changing borders - and just as in Kosovo refusing to discuss real autonomy - led to a war and in the end some 400,000 permanent exiles. At the moment the position of Kosovo's minorities is so bad that it is generally expected that those remaining will gradually leave when the situation doesn't improve. This soft cleansing has an effect that is more destabilizing than border changes.
It is good to see that after the International Crisis Group also an article in Survival, the journal of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies saw some merit in partition of Kosovo.
On the other hand however, Daniel Serwer of the USIP once again published a report and an article in which he attacks the option of partition as a way to settle conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia. He seems a bit confused about the subject sometimes - he falsely claims for example that the recent UN resolution on Kosovo asks for technical talks only - but as his institute is directly financed by the US Congress we have to take him seriously.
According to him if borders were changed in Kosovo this would "open up border questions" in Bosnia and Macedonia and likely also in Albanian inhabited areas in southern Serbia and Montenegro. It is a modern version of the Domino Theory and just as dubious when you have a closer look:
- when Kosovo declared independence there were also people who predicted that that would lead to the secession of the RS in Bosnia. Nothing happened as everyone knew that the Western countries wouldn't allow it. Similarly when Czechoslovakia split and there were some border changes between Czechia and Slovakia nobody even suggested that that would or should have consequences for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. So there is no reason to suppose that a border agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will have automatic influence on Bosnia and Macedonia.
- The solution in Bosnia has always been obvious: extend the principle of self-determination - on which Dayton is based - to the Croats. Unfortunately by pressing the other way the West has created a hostile stalemate. The longer this lasts the lesser the chance that Bosnia will survive as a state. This has nothing to do with Kosovo.
- A major factor in Albanian separatism in Macedonia is the belief that the US (and to a lesser degree the EU) is an ally of the Albanians against the Slavs. Both in Kosovo (1999) and in Macedonia (2001) the West intervened in a war started by the Albanians and then imposed major changes in favor of of the Albanians. A refusal to change borders in Kosovo - despite the sorry position of its minorities - only strengthens the impression that the West supports the Albanians no matter what they do. The recent weapon catches on the Kosovo-Macedonian border show that preparations for another war are already going on.
- not changing borders has consequences too. In Croatia not changing borders - and just as in Kosovo refusing to discuss real autonomy - led to a war and in the end some 400,000 permanent exiles. At the moment the position of Kosovo's minorities is so bad that it is generally expected that those remaining will gradually leave when the situation doesn't improve. This soft cleansing has an effect that is more destabilizing than border changes.
The Poland-Lithuania conflict
The Economist had a little article about the recent diplomatic row between Poland and Lithuania. On the surface it is only about the right of the Lithuania's Polish minority to write their names with the Polish alphabet. But as can be seen by the enormous number of comments (326 at the time I write this) there must be a lot of underlying frustration.
Buying elections
As I mentioned in previous posts about the color revolutions, the US subsidizing parties in the former communist countries through its NED (National Endowment for Democracy). Other Western organizations (political parties, Soros, etc) are doing the same. Although there is nothing wrong with explaining to newly democratic countries how democracy is supposed to work in practice this means that "pro-Western" parties are supported while parties that are despised as "nationalist" or "pro-Russian" or "communist" are not. So in fact we are buying votes - exactly the reason why nearly all Western democracies frown upon or forbid foreign donations to their political parties.
Now it looks like the Russians are learning the game too. The following is a fragment from a story about Moldova:
There will be an election Nov. 28. The country has billboards with various candidates all around and rallies throughout the country. Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are there. Some are funded, we were told, by the American National Endowment for Democracy, others supported by NATO and so on. The Russians, too, have learned the NGO gambit from the West by watching the various color revolutions. Russian-supported NGOs are in the country, and as one journalist told me, they are serving wine and cheese to young people. That appears to be having an impact.
Postscript: another trick used in Russia is the use of opinion polls. Just like both democratic politicians worldwide and many dictators Russia's leaders look at opinion polls to look for clues on which which subjects they could increase their popularity. I gives me mixed feelings. On the one hand it is good that Russia's leaders are at least somewhat listening to the public. On the other hand it distracts from what really counts and it leads to people like Tony Blair and Obama where polls and power games seem more important than reaching political goals.
Now it looks like the Russians are learning the game too. The following is a fragment from a story about Moldova:
There will be an election Nov. 28. The country has billboards with various candidates all around and rallies throughout the country. Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are there. Some are funded, we were told, by the American National Endowment for Democracy, others supported by NATO and so on. The Russians, too, have learned the NGO gambit from the West by watching the various color revolutions. Russian-supported NGOs are in the country, and as one journalist told me, they are serving wine and cheese to young people. That appears to be having an impact.
Postscript: another trick used in Russia is the use of opinion polls. Just like both democratic politicians worldwide and many dictators Russia's leaders look at opinion polls to look for clues on which which subjects they could increase their popularity. I gives me mixed feelings. On the one hand it is good that Russia's leaders are at least somewhat listening to the public. On the other hand it distracts from what really counts and it leads to people like Tony Blair and Obama where polls and power games seem more important than reaching political goals.
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
The situation in Belgium
Mostovljanin asked me to write something about the situation in Belgium that held elections in June and still hasn't been able to form a government. I haven't followed the situation very closely but I hope to be able to provide some background. Warning: as a Dutch my point of view may be a bit colored.
The population of Belgium is divided in Flemish (Dutch speakers) and Walloons (French-speakers). There are also some 74,000 German speakers in the East but they don't play a role in the political conflict.
Some history
In the 1500s the Netherlands and Belgium were one and the whole was known as The Netherlands. The name Belgium dates from the independence in 1830. Before that the area was known as the Southern Netherlands. At that time the Netherlands were the richest area in the Western world.
In the mid-1500s the Dutch started an independence fight that was motivated both by religion (protestantism became popular in the Netherlands and the Spanish king tried to crush it with the Inquisition) and by complaints over too high taxation. This is the 80-years War (1568-1648). In the end the North became independent while the South stayed with Spain. Later it became ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs. It may be good to remember that in those times French was the language of the elite just as English is now, so in those times Belgium was ruled by a French speaking elite.
In 1795 Belgium was annexed by Napoleon. It stayed with France until 1815 when it became part of the Netherlands. However, in 1830 Belgium seceded and became independent.
Much has been written about why Belgium seceded at that moment. The Netherlands had at that time an activist king Willem I who did a lot for the economy but the rather backward Belgian areas felt that his policies favored the North. Then there was the language. The king established Dutch as the dominant language in Flanders and that was resisted by the French speaking elite at that time. Just as 200 years before religion was still important too and the Catholic Church was a major source of resistance (in the North at that time there was still a protestant state church, although religion was mostly free). Finally there was the support of France and from French immigrants who had settled during the Napoleonic times. France would have loved to annex Belgium again but Europe's other great powers resisted that at that time.
Belgium became now a country dominated by the French speaking. Despite a Dutch speaking majority French became the only language for the government and in education. It would take more than a century to turn that back and in fact the struggle is still going on.
The present conflicts:
- money
At the beginning of the 20th century Wallonia was by far the richest part of Belgium. It had a lot of coal mines and heavy industry and most government investment was there. But - just as elsewhere - the Steel Belt changed into a Rust Belt and after the closure of the mines and the modernization of the steel industry Wallonia became an area of high unemployment.
While Wallonia sank Flanders rose and modernized and it is now the richest part of Belgium. From the point of view of Flanders the Walloons now are aid addicts who refuse to take the painful steps to modernize their society. The Socialist Party is by far the biggest in Wallonia.
So Flemish politicians are now asking for more financial autonomy. When Wallonia would have to pay its own unemployment benefits - instead of getting them from Flanders - it might be more motivated to reform. Predictably Walloon politicians resist. They like to point to neighboring northern France where the situation is rather bad too.
- territory
French is one of the world's most important languages and was for centuries the language of diplomacy and the international lingua franca. Dutch is a regional language spoken by some 22 million people. Inside Belgium French was the language of the elite and you had to speak French for the better jobs. Add to that the nationalism promoted by the French government and you understand that it is for a French speaking Belgian a bigger step to learn Dutch than for a Dutch speaking Belgian to learn French.
This plays out when the two groups meet each other. Shopkeepers who don't hear you when you speak the wrong language, restaurants that won't serve you, etc. It is not violence, but it is pressure and the French speaking usually are pressing the hardest. As a consequence the French language slowly won territory.
In reaction the Flemish have demanded the language border - introduced in 1962. North of that border Dutch is the language and if you don't speak Dutch it is bad for you but you have to adapt.
But there are holes in the language border. One are the "facility municipalities". These are municipalities where there was a significant minority of the other language before the language border and they got special minority rights. The other was Brussels, that officially became bilingual.
Brussels was originally as Dutch speaking city that after the independence in 1830 slowly was frenchified. Nowadays only 7% of the the inhabitants of Brussels speak only Dutch. Another 9% is bilingual at home.
Due to better job opportunities the frenchification among native Belgians has largely stopped and an increasing number of French speaking Belgians is learning Dutch. However, at the same time immigration has increased and the immigrants overwhelmingly favor French. So the frenchification of the area around Brussels goes on.
As Brussels is thoroughly frenchified the real problems are now in the suburbs. The conflict about the BHV (Brussel-Halle_Vilvoorde) voting district is about this problem. At the moment the French speaking minority in the area around Brussels has the right to vote for French speaking politicians in the national elections. Flemish speakers don't have similar rights in the French speaking areas. So the Flemish want to have this right abolished.
This may seem like a rather arcane matter. But as the Flemish see it this is about the French speakers recognizing that they live in Flanders. At the moment some French politicians seem to aim to frenchify the region around Brussels and specially the area between Brussels and Wallonia so that when Belgium splits there will be a French-speaking corridor and Wallonia and Brussels can become independent as one country "Wallo-Brux".
The present crisis
The present problems started when the nationalistic N-VA got 28% of the Flemish vote. Near Brussels it got even 40%. The other Flemish parties saw this as a signal that they had to take the message of the N-VA seriously and they gave it a leading role in the government formation.
The question is why the support of this party increased so much. The issues of financial decentralization and BHV had been high in the news for some time but otherwise I don't see any special incident(s) that might have caused this. But I do see a similarity with the Dutch elections 4 days earlier. In the Dutch elections the PVV of Wilders, another nationalist party, got a record number of votes. And both in Flanders and the Netherlands the Christian Democrats scored very bad - lower than ever before. The N-VA is a much more mainstream party than the PVV, but it might be (partly) a kind of protest vote related to the economic crisis. Another factor may be the rise of national consciousness under influence of continuing immigration. This can also be seen in the increasing popularity of national symbols. For example: where in the past pictures of windmills and clogs were considered as kitsch for tourists they are becoming increasingly popular for normal use.
Anyway, the proposals sponsored by the N-VA were flatly refused by the PS, the biggest Walloon party and now there now seems to be an impasse. The PS didn't even show an openness to negotiate.
I get the impression that the PS and the Walloons hope that they can seduce the other Flemish parties to consider the N-VA as nationalist extremists whose proposals should be ignored. However, it is a risky play as it looks like the other Flemish parties feel insulted by the rude PS response to the proposals - that they support.
If the Flemish parties stick to their guns the Walloons have a problem as they will have to take the Flemish position seriously. The most logical response for them would be to do some concessions to placate the Flemish as they have most to loose when Belgium falls apart. The Flemish have a vibrant economy while they depend on money transferred from Flanders.
Belgium has been through a lot of struggles between the Flemish and the Walloons. This feels just like one more and no one seems to be too worried. There is the feeling of having a common culture and a common heritage so the situation isn't too antagonistic. At both sides there is a wide majority to keep Belgium together. That could change if the political conflict might somehow escalate but that seems improbable. What is worrying more Belgians is that with each constitutional reform the ties between the two parts become weaker. They wonder whether falling apart will be the logical last step.
After breaking up
A final question is what would happen if Belgium falls apart:
Will the Walloons join France and the Flemish the Netherlands? Both independence and joining have considerable support but most people don't seem to care very much at the moment. I think that the chance that the Walloons will join France is greater as that way its politicians might avoid painful budget cuts that would be necessary when it no longer receives money from Flanders. Wallonia has also a smaller population and is landlocked.
The fate of Brussels is also uncertain. Brussels is a mostly French speaking enclave inside Flanders and its economy is tightly integrated with that of Flanders (some 250.000 people from Flanders work there). Most people in Brussels would prefer to be independent but that brings its own problems as the Brussels population is rather poor.
Postscript: the Economist had a Charlemagne post about the situation in Belgium. The article itself is not very special but it has an elaborate discussion with 350 posts.
The population of Belgium is divided in Flemish (Dutch speakers) and Walloons (French-speakers). There are also some 74,000 German speakers in the East but they don't play a role in the political conflict.
Some history
In the 1500s the Netherlands and Belgium were one and the whole was known as The Netherlands. The name Belgium dates from the independence in 1830. Before that the area was known as the Southern Netherlands. At that time the Netherlands were the richest area in the Western world.
In the mid-1500s the Dutch started an independence fight that was motivated both by religion (protestantism became popular in the Netherlands and the Spanish king tried to crush it with the Inquisition) and by complaints over too high taxation. This is the 80-years War (1568-1648). In the end the North became independent while the South stayed with Spain. Later it became ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs. It may be good to remember that in those times French was the language of the elite just as English is now, so in those times Belgium was ruled by a French speaking elite.
In 1795 Belgium was annexed by Napoleon. It stayed with France until 1815 when it became part of the Netherlands. However, in 1830 Belgium seceded and became independent.
Much has been written about why Belgium seceded at that moment. The Netherlands had at that time an activist king Willem I who did a lot for the economy but the rather backward Belgian areas felt that his policies favored the North. Then there was the language. The king established Dutch as the dominant language in Flanders and that was resisted by the French speaking elite at that time. Just as 200 years before religion was still important too and the Catholic Church was a major source of resistance (in the North at that time there was still a protestant state church, although religion was mostly free). Finally there was the support of France and from French immigrants who had settled during the Napoleonic times. France would have loved to annex Belgium again but Europe's other great powers resisted that at that time.
Belgium became now a country dominated by the French speaking. Despite a Dutch speaking majority French became the only language for the government and in education. It would take more than a century to turn that back and in fact the struggle is still going on.
The present conflicts:
- money
At the beginning of the 20th century Wallonia was by far the richest part of Belgium. It had a lot of coal mines and heavy industry and most government investment was there. But - just as elsewhere - the Steel Belt changed into a Rust Belt and after the closure of the mines and the modernization of the steel industry Wallonia became an area of high unemployment.
While Wallonia sank Flanders rose and modernized and it is now the richest part of Belgium. From the point of view of Flanders the Walloons now are aid addicts who refuse to take the painful steps to modernize their society. The Socialist Party is by far the biggest in Wallonia.
So Flemish politicians are now asking for more financial autonomy. When Wallonia would have to pay its own unemployment benefits - instead of getting them from Flanders - it might be more motivated to reform. Predictably Walloon politicians resist. They like to point to neighboring northern France where the situation is rather bad too.
- territory
French is one of the world's most important languages and was for centuries the language of diplomacy and the international lingua franca. Dutch is a regional language spoken by some 22 million people. Inside Belgium French was the language of the elite and you had to speak French for the better jobs. Add to that the nationalism promoted by the French government and you understand that it is for a French speaking Belgian a bigger step to learn Dutch than for a Dutch speaking Belgian to learn French.
This plays out when the two groups meet each other. Shopkeepers who don't hear you when you speak the wrong language, restaurants that won't serve you, etc. It is not violence, but it is pressure and the French speaking usually are pressing the hardest. As a consequence the French language slowly won territory.
In reaction the Flemish have demanded the language border - introduced in 1962. North of that border Dutch is the language and if you don't speak Dutch it is bad for you but you have to adapt.
But there are holes in the language border. One are the "facility municipalities". These are municipalities where there was a significant minority of the other language before the language border and they got special minority rights. The other was Brussels, that officially became bilingual.
Brussels was originally as Dutch speaking city that after the independence in 1830 slowly was frenchified. Nowadays only 7% of the the inhabitants of Brussels speak only Dutch. Another 9% is bilingual at home.
Due to better job opportunities the frenchification among native Belgians has largely stopped and an increasing number of French speaking Belgians is learning Dutch. However, at the same time immigration has increased and the immigrants overwhelmingly favor French. So the frenchification of the area around Brussels goes on.
As Brussels is thoroughly frenchified the real problems are now in the suburbs. The conflict about the BHV (Brussel-Halle_Vilvoorde) voting district is about this problem. At the moment the French speaking minority in the area around Brussels has the right to vote for French speaking politicians in the national elections. Flemish speakers don't have similar rights in the French speaking areas. So the Flemish want to have this right abolished.
This may seem like a rather arcane matter. But as the Flemish see it this is about the French speakers recognizing that they live in Flanders. At the moment some French politicians seem to aim to frenchify the region around Brussels and specially the area between Brussels and Wallonia so that when Belgium splits there will be a French-speaking corridor and Wallonia and Brussels can become independent as one country "Wallo-Brux".
The present crisis
The present problems started when the nationalistic N-VA got 28% of the Flemish vote. Near Brussels it got even 40%. The other Flemish parties saw this as a signal that they had to take the message of the N-VA seriously and they gave it a leading role in the government formation.
The question is why the support of this party increased so much. The issues of financial decentralization and BHV had been high in the news for some time but otherwise I don't see any special incident(s) that might have caused this. But I do see a similarity with the Dutch elections 4 days earlier. In the Dutch elections the PVV of Wilders, another nationalist party, got a record number of votes. And both in Flanders and the Netherlands the Christian Democrats scored very bad - lower than ever before. The N-VA is a much more mainstream party than the PVV, but it might be (partly) a kind of protest vote related to the economic crisis. Another factor may be the rise of national consciousness under influence of continuing immigration. This can also be seen in the increasing popularity of national symbols. For example: where in the past pictures of windmills and clogs were considered as kitsch for tourists they are becoming increasingly popular for normal use.
Anyway, the proposals sponsored by the N-VA were flatly refused by the PS, the biggest Walloon party and now there now seems to be an impasse. The PS didn't even show an openness to negotiate.
I get the impression that the PS and the Walloons hope that they can seduce the other Flemish parties to consider the N-VA as nationalist extremists whose proposals should be ignored. However, it is a risky play as it looks like the other Flemish parties feel insulted by the rude PS response to the proposals - that they support.
If the Flemish parties stick to their guns the Walloons have a problem as they will have to take the Flemish position seriously. The most logical response for them would be to do some concessions to placate the Flemish as they have most to loose when Belgium falls apart. The Flemish have a vibrant economy while they depend on money transferred from Flanders.
Belgium has been through a lot of struggles between the Flemish and the Walloons. This feels just like one more and no one seems to be too worried. There is the feeling of having a common culture and a common heritage so the situation isn't too antagonistic. At both sides there is a wide majority to keep Belgium together. That could change if the political conflict might somehow escalate but that seems improbable. What is worrying more Belgians is that with each constitutional reform the ties between the two parts become weaker. They wonder whether falling apart will be the logical last step.
After breaking up
A final question is what would happen if Belgium falls apart:
Will the Walloons join France and the Flemish the Netherlands? Both independence and joining have considerable support but most people don't seem to care very much at the moment. I think that the chance that the Walloons will join France is greater as that way its politicians might avoid painful budget cuts that would be necessary when it no longer receives money from Flanders. Wallonia has also a smaller population and is landlocked.
The fate of Brussels is also uncertain. Brussels is a mostly French speaking enclave inside Flanders and its economy is tightly integrated with that of Flanders (some 250.000 people from Flanders work there). Most people in Brussels would prefer to be independent but that brings its own problems as the Brussels population is rather poor.
Postscript: the Economist had a Charlemagne post about the situation in Belgium. The article itself is not very special but it has an elaborate discussion with 350 posts.
Friday, October 22, 2010
Why the US is so religious
The economist has a short article explaining why the US is so religious. Very short: it was a deliberate policy of the Eisenhower administration to push religion as an antidote against communism.
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Louise Arbour on self-determination
Louise Arbour, formerly Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and nowadays head of the International Crisis Group, has given a speech on when secession should be allowed. It is an effort to derive general rules from the ICG's support for independence of some groups (Kosovo, Montenegro, South Sudan) and its opposition to others (the Tamils on Sri Lanka, Iraqi Kurdistan).
According to her secession is allowed, except in the few cases where the security council has explicitly forbidden it (Southern Rhodesia in 1965, Northern Cyprus in 1983 and of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia in 1992) because of other violations of international law. She claims that "when a state is unable or unwilling to provide for the internal fulfillment of the right to self-determination" "a people" has a right to secede. She denies that right to the Tamils because they treat their minorities badly.
It strikes me as a highly theoretical exercise that misses all the delicate issues:
- first there is the territorial delimitation. Which territory has the right to secede? Should existing provincial borders be respected - even when that brings in considerable minorities who don't want to secede? But that would mean that Milosevic could have split up Kosovo among Serbia's provinces so that there was no province left with an Albanian majority and that then nobody would have the right to secede. It strikes me as absurd that a state - by giving a minority local autonomy in a territory where they are the majority - would strengthen their rights to secede.
- Arbour defines "self determination" in a very legalistic abstract way. In her view when a minority is represented in parliament is has its rights. It looks like a convoluted way to approve Kosovo's treatment of its minorities.
If she would be honest and define "self determination" like control over your own fate she would have to admit that the minorities in Kosovo's parliament are powerless figureheads and that in fact Kosovo's minorities are subject to heavy discrimination and that it is nearly impossible for them to make a living in Kosovo. The logic conclusion would be that Kosovo's minorities are in worse position and have more right to secede from Kosovo than the Albanians in 1999 had to secede from Serbia.
- Arbour somehow misses the fact that secession is usually about money. Usually it are the rich provinces that want to secede - believing that they will be richer when they no longer have to subsidize their poorer countrymen. Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia, the Basques and Catalans in Spain and the North Italians are all good examples. Southern Sudan would be less enthusiastic to secede when it wouldn't have the oil. Kosovo's Albanians' enthusiasm for independence would have been considerably reduced without the Trepca mines.
So the dynamics of deteriorating ethnic relations that usually precede secessions are often not caused by maltreatment by the majority but by the greed of the minority.
- Arbour misses also the dynamics of a fight in which sub-minorities tend to get trampled. There is great similarity between the fate of minorities in Kosovo and that of the minorities in the Tamil controlled areas in Sri Lanka. From this point of view it is hard to defend to support one and reject the other.
- Arbour ignores the question of how secession should proceed. In order to succeed secession nearly always needs external support. But that makes those external forces also responsible for how secession happens. It looks like the US doesn't understand this as a responsibility and only uses it as opportunity for macho politics.
In my view there can be only one criteria: a minimum of damage. This should take into account that secessions tend to be costly in terms of human rights - even when they are peaceful. The fates of the minorities in the former Soviet Union and Slovakia are good examples.
According to her secession is allowed, except in the few cases where the security council has explicitly forbidden it (Southern Rhodesia in 1965, Northern Cyprus in 1983 and of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia in 1992) because of other violations of international law. She claims that "when a state is unable or unwilling to provide for the internal fulfillment of the right to self-determination" "a people" has a right to secede. She denies that right to the Tamils because they treat their minorities badly.
It strikes me as a highly theoretical exercise that misses all the delicate issues:
- first there is the territorial delimitation. Which territory has the right to secede? Should existing provincial borders be respected - even when that brings in considerable minorities who don't want to secede? But that would mean that Milosevic could have split up Kosovo among Serbia's provinces so that there was no province left with an Albanian majority and that then nobody would have the right to secede. It strikes me as absurd that a state - by giving a minority local autonomy in a territory where they are the majority - would strengthen their rights to secede.
- Arbour defines "self determination" in a very legalistic abstract way. In her view when a minority is represented in parliament is has its rights. It looks like a convoluted way to approve Kosovo's treatment of its minorities.
If she would be honest and define "self determination" like control over your own fate she would have to admit that the minorities in Kosovo's parliament are powerless figureheads and that in fact Kosovo's minorities are subject to heavy discrimination and that it is nearly impossible for them to make a living in Kosovo. The logic conclusion would be that Kosovo's minorities are in worse position and have more right to secede from Kosovo than the Albanians in 1999 had to secede from Serbia.
- Arbour somehow misses the fact that secession is usually about money. Usually it are the rich provinces that want to secede - believing that they will be richer when they no longer have to subsidize their poorer countrymen. Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia, the Basques and Catalans in Spain and the North Italians are all good examples. Southern Sudan would be less enthusiastic to secede when it wouldn't have the oil. Kosovo's Albanians' enthusiasm for independence would have been considerably reduced without the Trepca mines.
So the dynamics of deteriorating ethnic relations that usually precede secessions are often not caused by maltreatment by the majority but by the greed of the minority.
- Arbour misses also the dynamics of a fight in which sub-minorities tend to get trampled. There is great similarity between the fate of minorities in Kosovo and that of the minorities in the Tamil controlled areas in Sri Lanka. From this point of view it is hard to defend to support one and reject the other.
- Arbour ignores the question of how secession should proceed. In order to succeed secession nearly always needs external support. But that makes those external forces also responsible for how secession happens. It looks like the US doesn't understand this as a responsibility and only uses it as opportunity for macho politics.
In my view there can be only one criteria: a minimum of damage. This should take into account that secessions tend to be costly in terms of human rights - even when they are peaceful. The fates of the minorities in the former Soviet Union and Slovakia are good examples.
Thursday, October 07, 2010
Vietnam redone?
When the US withdrew from Vietnam after 1972 it implemented a policy of Vietnamization. This worked reasonable well, but failed when Congress cut the US funding of those Vietnamese troops. Now US Congress is following a similar policy in Iraq where it has cut the funding for civilian support. Doing so they may take away the leverage the US has to influence policy in Iraq.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
The Afghanistan strategy
With Woodward's new book about the discussions in the Obama administration it is good to list the facts amid the many myths.
Myth 1 concerns the Taliban. Many people claim that as it is a strong factor in Afghanistan we should negotiate with them. This is based on the old notion that a guerrilla movement is rooted in the population and a such involving them is kind of democratic. Problem is that this does not apply to the Taliban: in opinion polls it comes below 10%. The Taliban does not represent the opinion of a considerable part of the Afghan population: it is just the creation of the Pakistan's intelligence service ISI. And the ISI has repeatedly killed Taliban leaders that it believed too soft.
This brings me to myth 2 that we can work with Pakistan to fight the Taliban. Pakistan's trauma is the 1971 independence of Bangladesh. It is fearful that a similar split will happen at its west side. It has good reasons to do so because the Indus in the heart of Pakistan is often seen as the border between the Persian and the Indian worlds. West of the Indus are the Beluchi and the Pashtun who just as nearly all Afghans speak Persian languages. Pakistan has adopted two strategies to compensate for that. It's first strategy is stressing the Islam: the only thing its citizens have in common. The second is to keep those Persian speakers - both in Pakistan and Afghanistan - poor and backwards. The Taliban - both the Afghan and the Pakistani - is serving those goals.
This fear is heigthened by fear that India might help such a splitup - just as it once helped Bangladesh to become independent.
Myth 3 is that we need a strong administration in Afghanistan to take over when we leave. This has brought us to impose on Afghanistan an extremely centralized constitution and - except for some grumbling - to ignore the corruption of its government. Both have proved ineffective against the Taliban but a major obstacle to a more effective government.
Behind this desire for a strong administration is the desire to keep strong American influence. Provincial governors with strong local support would be much less sensitive to American desires than Karzai, the corrupt "major of Kabul".
Myth 4 is that Al Qaeda is gone from Afghanistan and that we are now fighting only the Taliban. So if they win it will be just a problem for the Afghans. In fact recent reports mention that there are many foreigners fighting among the Taliban. It can be expected that when the Taliban wins many of them will move to other countries to fight there. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan look very vulnerable at the moment.
So what lessons can we draw:
- ad 1: forget about negotiating with the Taliban. They will only accept the kind of outcome that will enable them later on to take over all power. If the Taliban was a real political movement some compromise would be possible that gave government jobs and political concessions to the Taliban. But while we can co-opt individual Taliban leaders we will never be able to do so with the Taliban as an organization; Pakistan will sabotage such an effort.
Forget also about winning this guerrilla war. As long as Pakistan is spending money there will be Afghans who are prepared to fight for the Taliban.
- ad 2: We have to address the root of Pakistan's behavior and force it to accept development of both its western regions and Afghanistan. This means abolishment of the agencies - that remainder of colonial rule in Pakistan's west side. It also means more local autonomy. To achieve this the US has to become involved in internal discussion in Pakistan: this is something you can't just impose. The US should address Pakistan's fears and ambitions: it is stupid for Pakistan to think that it should be India's equal. Instead it should strive for cooperation. And the best way to improve life for India's Kashmiri's is to stop supporting guerrilla fighters there.
For a long time the US has considered Pakistan as a counterbalance to India. This made sense in the time of the Cold War when India was considered an ally of the USSR. But the Cold War has been over for 20 years now and the real dichotomy in Asia is nowadays between India and China. The balance is in favor of China and that is generally considered to be not in the US interest. Yet Pakistan is serving as a pawn for China and the US is supporting that. This policy doesn't make sense neither from a regional nor from a geopolitical perspective.
- ad 3: we should aim for a decentralized Afghanistan. And forget about US influence: truly democratic leaders will be focused on their voters - not on US interests. The US should encourage that, take a servile role and keep in mind that this is a necessary step if it wants to leave Afghanistan with a strong governmental system.
- ad 4: as long as Pakistan keeps up training Muslim extremists and keeps up allowing training camps of Muslim extremist organizations it will be a source of danger for the world and the next 9/11 may be just a matter of time. There is no clear boundary between Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Postscript: readers of this post may also like the article Allies in War, but the Goals Clash in the NY Times. According to the article Pakistan prefers to have Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan while the northern tribes are India's traditional allies. Unfortunately the article describes the Pakistan-India conflict as nearly unsolvable and completely ignores the role the US has played in antagonizing the two.
Myth 1 concerns the Taliban. Many people claim that as it is a strong factor in Afghanistan we should negotiate with them. This is based on the old notion that a guerrilla movement is rooted in the population and a such involving them is kind of democratic. Problem is that this does not apply to the Taliban: in opinion polls it comes below 10%. The Taliban does not represent the opinion of a considerable part of the Afghan population: it is just the creation of the Pakistan's intelligence service ISI. And the ISI has repeatedly killed Taliban leaders that it believed too soft.
This brings me to myth 2 that we can work with Pakistan to fight the Taliban. Pakistan's trauma is the 1971 independence of Bangladesh. It is fearful that a similar split will happen at its west side. It has good reasons to do so because the Indus in the heart of Pakistan is often seen as the border between the Persian and the Indian worlds. West of the Indus are the Beluchi and the Pashtun who just as nearly all Afghans speak Persian languages. Pakistan has adopted two strategies to compensate for that. It's first strategy is stressing the Islam: the only thing its citizens have in common. The second is to keep those Persian speakers - both in Pakistan and Afghanistan - poor and backwards. The Taliban - both the Afghan and the Pakistani - is serving those goals.
This fear is heigthened by fear that India might help such a splitup - just as it once helped Bangladesh to become independent.
Myth 3 is that we need a strong administration in Afghanistan to take over when we leave. This has brought us to impose on Afghanistan an extremely centralized constitution and - except for some grumbling - to ignore the corruption of its government. Both have proved ineffective against the Taliban but a major obstacle to a more effective government.
Behind this desire for a strong administration is the desire to keep strong American influence. Provincial governors with strong local support would be much less sensitive to American desires than Karzai, the corrupt "major of Kabul".
Myth 4 is that Al Qaeda is gone from Afghanistan and that we are now fighting only the Taliban. So if they win it will be just a problem for the Afghans. In fact recent reports mention that there are many foreigners fighting among the Taliban. It can be expected that when the Taliban wins many of them will move to other countries to fight there. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan look very vulnerable at the moment.
So what lessons can we draw:
- ad 1: forget about negotiating with the Taliban. They will only accept the kind of outcome that will enable them later on to take over all power. If the Taliban was a real political movement some compromise would be possible that gave government jobs and political concessions to the Taliban. But while we can co-opt individual Taliban leaders we will never be able to do so with the Taliban as an organization; Pakistan will sabotage such an effort.
Forget also about winning this guerrilla war. As long as Pakistan is spending money there will be Afghans who are prepared to fight for the Taliban.
- ad 2: We have to address the root of Pakistan's behavior and force it to accept development of both its western regions and Afghanistan. This means abolishment of the agencies - that remainder of colonial rule in Pakistan's west side. It also means more local autonomy. To achieve this the US has to become involved in internal discussion in Pakistan: this is something you can't just impose. The US should address Pakistan's fears and ambitions: it is stupid for Pakistan to think that it should be India's equal. Instead it should strive for cooperation. And the best way to improve life for India's Kashmiri's is to stop supporting guerrilla fighters there.
For a long time the US has considered Pakistan as a counterbalance to India. This made sense in the time of the Cold War when India was considered an ally of the USSR. But the Cold War has been over for 20 years now and the real dichotomy in Asia is nowadays between India and China. The balance is in favor of China and that is generally considered to be not in the US interest. Yet Pakistan is serving as a pawn for China and the US is supporting that. This policy doesn't make sense neither from a regional nor from a geopolitical perspective.
- ad 3: we should aim for a decentralized Afghanistan. And forget about US influence: truly democratic leaders will be focused on their voters - not on US interests. The US should encourage that, take a servile role and keep in mind that this is a necessary step if it wants to leave Afghanistan with a strong governmental system.
- ad 4: as long as Pakistan keeps up training Muslim extremists and keeps up allowing training camps of Muslim extremist organizations it will be a source of danger for the world and the next 9/11 may be just a matter of time. There is no clear boundary between Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Postscript: readers of this post may also like the article Allies in War, but the Goals Clash in the NY Times. According to the article Pakistan prefers to have Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan while the northern tribes are India's traditional allies. Unfortunately the article describes the Pakistan-India conflict as nearly unsolvable and completely ignores the role the US has played in antagonizing the two.
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