I am getting more and more convinced that the EU needs to reformed - although I am still a bit puzzled whether and how that could work out.
The first problem of the EU is that the benefits flow to a small number of countries - the most important of which is Germany. Some other countries - such as Bulgaria - become more and more marginalized. The young emigrate and real development doesn't happen. The ideology of the EU used to be that just building infrastructure would be enough to modernize these countries, but it doesn't happen. Of course this is not only a problem of the EU: America has its "fly-over country" and in some of the richter countries of the EU you see areas too where people and companies are leaving.
The main cause is the present idea of capitalism that leaves national governments very little freedom to have an economic policy and that gives a lot of power to business interests. That will need to change. Government need a lot more freedom to set their own economic policies. And please save me the complaints about "unfair competition": the present system is unfair.
The second problem is what I consider Brusselian mobsterism. Brussel has a lot of power and it isn't shy of using that in the most brutal way. The first case was when it closed the banks in Cyprus to force the Cyprus government to do its bidding. The second case when it repeatedly threatened to do the same in Greece to force it to accept its solutions for the Greek debt crisis. And now we have Brexit and we see the same behavior. Now the threat is that there will be no agreement and that one day British companies will just lose their access to the EU market. Just as with Greece EU representatives regularly refuse to negotiate - using all kinds of excuses - the most common being now that first the financial aspect of Brexit needs to be settled. Of course that is nonsense - all things are related. But this mobster behavior - that makes one ashamed to be an European - is considered normal in Brussels.
This kind of behavior makes a farce of the right to leave the EU. It basically tells everyone to do what Brussels dictates - or else... I believe that the only solution is make "Europe a la carte" a much more explicit concept. Such a concept should explicitly leave countries free to choose whether they want to be part of the eurozone and should even impose on the obligation on the EU to help countries that want to leave the eurozone to do that with as little trouble as possible. Britain should have had the right to refuse refugees - what would have taken away the need for the Brexit.
The concept should also extend to the countries that are now outside the EU. The way that the EU now uses its economic power to force countries outside its borders to do its bidding is shameful. Instead countries should be able to become part of the EU for only some aspects.
Thoughts on ethnic and international conflicts and the democratic ideal. Content is shared by the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA 4.0 International license (creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0).
Saturday, November 18, 2017
Friday, November 17, 2017
The fear for democracy in former Yugoslavia
As I have defended before, the falling apart of Yugoslavia was a crime of the "international community", quasi legalized by the Badinter Commission that claimed that Yugoslavia was "falling apart". Under this pretext the Western countries interfered in the internal affairs of the Yugoslav state and encouraged its republics to secede. The following chaos was the perfect illustration why we have international laws that forbid interference in the internal affairs of other states and that give countries near absolute power to prevent parts of their territory to secede.
To summarize: civilized society is based on laws that can only be changed according to strict rules. Once you quit that principle arbitrariness appears. In that light it was no coincidence that after they illegally had seceded we saw the excesses of the "erased" in Slovenia and the efforts by Croatian nationalists to make life so hard for the Serbs that they would leave. With the secession changes in the law had become arbitrary and some people immediately exploited the opening to impose their rather unpleasant visions.
Of course around 1990 Yugoslavia was in a state of flux anyway with the disappearance of communism. The structure of Yugoslavia (and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) had always been that on paper the constituting republics had a lot of freedom, but that at the same you had the Communist Party that was quite centralized and formed a kind of counterbalance. When the Party fell away that structure no longer existed and you got some juggling for power. On the one hand you saw Slovenia and Croatia that wanted their quasi-independence to be permanent and on the other side you saw the central government and many of the other republics that had to conclude that the country was almost ungovernable and that something had to be done to replace the centralizing influence of the Party. As Slovenia and Croatia resisted national direct elections for the central government you saw in the end that Milosevic took the initiative by taking over the governments of some of the republics. I think it was the closest thing to lawful change that was possible at that moment in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately it was grabbed as an opportunity for sowing chaos.
Anyway, this is stuff for historians. What we now are facing is a deadlock in Kosovo and a situation in Bosnia where all the ethnic groups contest the present constitution. The question is how to solve this.
As I see it both are cases of a kind of colonialism. In both cases the present situation was imposed with a lot of violence by the countries that call themselves the "international community". That is not a solid basis. We need to go to a situation where the local actors feel and are responsible.
We know all the excuses. Border changes in Kosovo are unacceptable because that would set a precedent for elsewhere in former Yugoslavia - particularly Bosnia. And the only change that seems acceptable to the "internationals" in Bosnia is more centralization - what is fiercely resisted by the Serbs and Croats. I consider this an unstable situation. Sooner or later the international situation will change: other countries with other insights will become more influential and even the countries who created the present situation may change their vision.
The only thing what can bring a permanent solution is when the local powers work out some compromise. Of course violence is not acceptable and the present situation will be the starting point. But from there they should be free to work out the solution that they like the best.
To summarize: civilized society is based on laws that can only be changed according to strict rules. Once you quit that principle arbitrariness appears. In that light it was no coincidence that after they illegally had seceded we saw the excesses of the "erased" in Slovenia and the efforts by Croatian nationalists to make life so hard for the Serbs that they would leave. With the secession changes in the law had become arbitrary and some people immediately exploited the opening to impose their rather unpleasant visions.
Of course around 1990 Yugoslavia was in a state of flux anyway with the disappearance of communism. The structure of Yugoslavia (and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) had always been that on paper the constituting republics had a lot of freedom, but that at the same you had the Communist Party that was quite centralized and formed a kind of counterbalance. When the Party fell away that structure no longer existed and you got some juggling for power. On the one hand you saw Slovenia and Croatia that wanted their quasi-independence to be permanent and on the other side you saw the central government and many of the other republics that had to conclude that the country was almost ungovernable and that something had to be done to replace the centralizing influence of the Party. As Slovenia and Croatia resisted national direct elections for the central government you saw in the end that Milosevic took the initiative by taking over the governments of some of the republics. I think it was the closest thing to lawful change that was possible at that moment in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately it was grabbed as an opportunity for sowing chaos.
Anyway, this is stuff for historians. What we now are facing is a deadlock in Kosovo and a situation in Bosnia where all the ethnic groups contest the present constitution. The question is how to solve this.
As I see it both are cases of a kind of colonialism. In both cases the present situation was imposed with a lot of violence by the countries that call themselves the "international community". That is not a solid basis. We need to go to a situation where the local actors feel and are responsible.
We know all the excuses. Border changes in Kosovo are unacceptable because that would set a precedent for elsewhere in former Yugoslavia - particularly Bosnia. And the only change that seems acceptable to the "internationals" in Bosnia is more centralization - what is fiercely resisted by the Serbs and Croats. I consider this an unstable situation. Sooner or later the international situation will change: other countries with other insights will become more influential and even the countries who created the present situation may change their vision.
The only thing what can bring a permanent solution is when the local powers work out some compromise. Of course violence is not acceptable and the present situation will be the starting point. But from there they should be free to work out the solution that they like the best.
Wednesday, November 01, 2017
The Manafort indictment
Al Capone was caught for tax evasion. A variation on this theme is to catch some minor cog in an organization and to accuse him of anything that you can think of. And then to offer him as way out if he provides evidence against his boss.
Such tactics have been used against the mafia and such fraudulent organizations as Enron. The big question of course is: what happens if the target really is innocent? In that case both the cogs and the prosecutor will be seduced to blow things out of proportion in order to achieve a guilty verdict. Monicagate was a good example of how - when there is no real accusation - the "suspect" can still be condemned.
And let's not forget the sorry state of American justice. In this "plea bargain" paradise the chances of being acquitted are comparable to those once in the Soviet Union.
We don't know what Mueller knows. But the facts that until now have come out about Trump and Russia do in my opinion not justify the means that Mueller is now using with the Manafort indictment.
Such tactics have been used against the mafia and such fraudulent organizations as Enron. The big question of course is: what happens if the target really is innocent? In that case both the cogs and the prosecutor will be seduced to blow things out of proportion in order to achieve a guilty verdict. Monicagate was a good example of how - when there is no real accusation - the "suspect" can still be condemned.
And let's not forget the sorry state of American justice. In this "plea bargain" paradise the chances of being acquitted are comparable to those once in the Soviet Union.
We don't know what Mueller knows. But the facts that until now have come out about Trump and Russia do in my opinion not justify the means that Mueller is now using with the Manafort indictment.
Two failing independence referendums
There are remarkable similarities between the independence referendums in Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan. And those don't bode very well for their success.
In both cases the local governments acted out of a kind of despair. The Catalan case is the most obvious. Its government had lived above its means. So it would soon need to apply budget cuts. And usually translates in losses at the ballot box. And given its thin majority in parliament that would be the end of Puigdemont's rule. In Kurdistan the oil price crash was still hurting. And soon the Iraqi army would be free to confront the Kurds.
In their hurry - and arrogance - both made also the same mistake of antagonizing the other ethnic groups. The Kurds have gotten a rather bad reputation for sidelining other ethnic groups. Puigdemont's disregard for parliamentary rules and the fake history that he has gotten taught in Catalan schools are lighter problems but point in the same direction. In both cases the way people try to achieve independence suggests that life will get tough for other ethnic groups if they win.
The best strategy to get independence isn't rocket science: Make your effort when your economy is flourishing and the prospects are still good. That position will allow you to be generous to the country you want to leave. Be nice to other ethnic groups: you don't want to antagonize them. If you play it smart you can even get their support: they too will profit when your rich province becomes independent. And most important: be patient. There are lots of small steps that you can take until one day the stars are aligned in the right way for your big move.
Maybe one day the Catalans and the Kurds will have independence. But we can only be glad that the rather nasty characters of Puigdemont and Barzani didn't succeed. They would very likely do a lot of harm before the situation stabilized. The independence process of Slovenia and Croatia offered frightening examples of what happens when you give in to nasty politicians who want to steal independence.
In both cases the local governments acted out of a kind of despair. The Catalan case is the most obvious. Its government had lived above its means. So it would soon need to apply budget cuts. And usually translates in losses at the ballot box. And given its thin majority in parliament that would be the end of Puigdemont's rule. In Kurdistan the oil price crash was still hurting. And soon the Iraqi army would be free to confront the Kurds.
In their hurry - and arrogance - both made also the same mistake of antagonizing the other ethnic groups. The Kurds have gotten a rather bad reputation for sidelining other ethnic groups. Puigdemont's disregard for parliamentary rules and the fake history that he has gotten taught in Catalan schools are lighter problems but point in the same direction. In both cases the way people try to achieve independence suggests that life will get tough for other ethnic groups if they win.
The best strategy to get independence isn't rocket science: Make your effort when your economy is flourishing and the prospects are still good. That position will allow you to be generous to the country you want to leave. Be nice to other ethnic groups: you don't want to antagonize them. If you play it smart you can even get their support: they too will profit when your rich province becomes independent. And most important: be patient. There are lots of small steps that you can take until one day the stars are aligned in the right way for your big move.
Maybe one day the Catalans and the Kurds will have independence. But we can only be glad that the rather nasty characters of Puigdemont and Barzani didn't succeed. They would very likely do a lot of harm before the situation stabilized. The independence process of Slovenia and Croatia offered frightening examples of what happens when you give in to nasty politicians who want to steal independence.
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