An article about the heritage of illegal garbage dumping of often very poisonous garbage by the mafia in Southern Italy ("A Mafia Legacy Taints the Earth in Southern Italy") contains one interesting twist:
General Costa, the environmental police commander, said the Camorra had stopped burying waste a few years ago and was now illegally shipping it to Eastern Europe or the Balkans.
I have yet to see the first report from those areas. Makes me curious how long it will take.
If anyone has concrete information on this subject please tell it me in a reaction to this article!
Thursday, January 30, 2014
Sunday, January 26, 2014
Why minorities are successful
The NY Times has an opinion article (What Drives Success?) that discusses why some minorities succeed and others not. It is a preview of a forthcoming book by Amy Chua and Jed Rubenfeld (“The Triple Package: How Three Unlikely Traits Explain the Rise and Fall of Cultural Groups in America.”).
Indian-Americans earn almost double the national figure (roughly $90,000 per year in median household income versus $50,000). Iranian-, Lebanese- and Chinese-Americans are also top-earners. In the last 30 years, Mormons have become leaders of corporate America, holding top positions in many of America’s most recognizable companies. [] Jewish success is the most historically fraught and the most broad-based. Although Jews make up only about 2 percent of the United States’ adult population, they account for a third of the current Supreme Court; over two-thirds of Tony Award-winning lyricists and composers; and about a third of American Nobel laureates.
However:
There are some black and Hispanic groups in America that far outperform some white and Asian groups. Immigrants from many West Indian and African countries, such as Jamaica, Ghana, and Haiti, are climbing America’s higher education ladder, but perhaps the most prominent are Nigerians. Nigerians make up less than 1 percent of the black population in the United States, yet in 2013 nearly one-quarter of the black students at Harvard Business School were of Nigerian ancestry; over a fourth of Nigerian-Americans have a graduate or professional degree, as compared with only about 11 percent of whites.
Cuban-Americans in Miami rose in one generation from widespread penury to relative affluence. By 1990, United States-born Cuban children — whose parents had arrived as exiles, many with practically nothing — were twice as likely as non-Hispanic whites to earn over $50,000 a year. All three Hispanic United States senators are Cuban-Americans.
Meanwhile, some Asian-American groups — Cambodian- and Hmong-Americans, for example — are among the poorest in the country, as are some predominantly white communities in central Appalachia.
According to the authors these advantages are not constant:
The fortunes of WASP elites have been declining for decades. In 1960, second-generation Greek-Americans reportedly had the second-highest income of any census-tracked group. Group success in America often tends to dissipate after two generations. Thus while Asian-American kids overall had SAT scores 143 points above average in 2012 — including a 63-point edge over whites — a 2005 study of over 20,000 adolescents found that third-generation Asian-American students performed no better academically than white students
The authors mention three factors that drive success:
- a superiority complex — a deep-seated belief in their exceptionality
- insecurity, a feeling that you or what you’ve done is not good enough
- impulse control
Indian-Americans earn almost double the national figure (roughly $90,000 per year in median household income versus $50,000). Iranian-, Lebanese- and Chinese-Americans are also top-earners. In the last 30 years, Mormons have become leaders of corporate America, holding top positions in many of America’s most recognizable companies. [] Jewish success is the most historically fraught and the most broad-based. Although Jews make up only about 2 percent of the United States’ adult population, they account for a third of the current Supreme Court; over two-thirds of Tony Award-winning lyricists and composers; and about a third of American Nobel laureates.
However:
There are some black and Hispanic groups in America that far outperform some white and Asian groups. Immigrants from many West Indian and African countries, such as Jamaica, Ghana, and Haiti, are climbing America’s higher education ladder, but perhaps the most prominent are Nigerians. Nigerians make up less than 1 percent of the black population in the United States, yet in 2013 nearly one-quarter of the black students at Harvard Business School were of Nigerian ancestry; over a fourth of Nigerian-Americans have a graduate or professional degree, as compared with only about 11 percent of whites.
Cuban-Americans in Miami rose in one generation from widespread penury to relative affluence. By 1990, United States-born Cuban children — whose parents had arrived as exiles, many with practically nothing — were twice as likely as non-Hispanic whites to earn over $50,000 a year. All three Hispanic United States senators are Cuban-Americans.
Meanwhile, some Asian-American groups — Cambodian- and Hmong-Americans, for example — are among the poorest in the country, as are some predominantly white communities in central Appalachia.
According to the authors these advantages are not constant:
The fortunes of WASP elites have been declining for decades. In 1960, second-generation Greek-Americans reportedly had the second-highest income of any census-tracked group. Group success in America often tends to dissipate after two generations. Thus while Asian-American kids overall had SAT scores 143 points above average in 2012 — including a 63-point edge over whites — a 2005 study of over 20,000 adolescents found that third-generation Asian-American students performed no better academically than white students
The authors mention three factors that drive success:
- a superiority complex — a deep-seated belief in their exceptionality
- insecurity, a feeling that you or what you’ve done is not good enough
- impulse control
Wednesday, January 22, 2014
Peace in Syria: give the Geneva II negotiations a chance
In a few days the Syria peace conference in Montreux will start. The expectations are low. Some of those invited won’t even bother to come. Yet – when conducted properly – the conference could become a first step towards peace.
The local truces
As experienced mediators know, it helps to start with some small and easy issue. Solving such an issue builds trust between the parties and increases the confidence that more intricate problems can be solved too. In the Syrian case the best issue to start with is probably the local truces.
At the moment there are many problems with local truces. The opposition complains that the government arrests and sometimes even executes people – in spite of prior agreements. They also complain that the government sometimes keeps blocking food supplies. The government complains about a divided opposition where people who oppose the armistice continue the violence.
Some of those transgressions may result from acting in bad faith but many are the result of miscommunication and lack of coordination. Much could be gained by changing from an ad hoc approach to a more structural approach in concluding and maintaining such truces. On the government side one could imagine one coordinator for each local truce. Those local coordinators would be overseen by a high level general in Damascus who is able to get things done across different army units. The UN would provide one or more special representatives for the truces who keep track of the developments and mediate when there are problems. The best way to deal with the divisions on the rebel side is to get things running well in those areas where they are not divided. That will make truces a more credible option and will put pressure on those rebels who oppose them. The UN representative should be an Arab general whose rank would enable him to solve problems with his Syrian counterpart. This should put him in a position to deal with spoilers on the government side.
As both the Syrian government and large segments of the opposition see the benefits of the truces it should be possible to solve the problems that arise.
It would be a pity if the mediators would aim an armistice for the whole of Syria. Such armistices didn't work before and they won't work now: there are too many people who oppose them. Aiming for such a national armistice would actually be harmful as the inevitable setback would damage the whole peace process. The only thing that can work is getting local armistices to work and to hope that their success will spread and encourage others to demand for a truce too.
There has been some discussion among the opposition about the merits of local armistices and also humanitarian aid. Opponents claim that local armistices allow Assad to send his soldiers elsewhere and that it diverts the attention from what they see as the core goal of the uprising: to get rid of Assad. Unfortunately they have forgotten the original goal of the uprising: to improve the life of the Syrian people. Correctly implemented those local armistices can serve as laboratory experiments on how Syrians can live together after the conflict.
The future of Syria
Focusing the negotiations on the departure of Assad in an early stage will nearly certain drive both parties into the trenches. People on both sides fear what would happen to them if the other side might win.
Neither elections nor a transitional government can solve this conflict. Just like in Northern Africa they will just create a new arena where the conflict is fought – while the demonstrations and armed attacks will continue. The conflict can only be solved with long and tough negotiations. The more the parties find common ground the less there is to fear.
On the other hand – once such negotiations decrease the tension – the question whether Assad should go will become less relevant. Many who hate him will see that improvements are possible while he is still there and many who see him as a guarantee for security will become less afraid of what will happen once he leaves.
Transitional governments have proved problematic in Northern Africa. As they are attacked by both sides they tend to be so weak that under their supervision the economic and security problems of the country steadily deteriorate. Neither are they capable of introducing the reforms that are necessary to really end the dictatorship. Transitional governments work best in situations with warlords who are respected by nobody. But in situations like Syria a large part of the population supports one of the sides. Instead of looking for the rare and often isolated figures who are acceptable to both sides it may be better to gradually introduce opposition people in the Assad government - while simultaneously removing its most controversial members.
So the talks about how the future of Syria should look need to happen in Montreux and Geneva. It is there that the parties should compose a new constitution and should find a way to end the war. These issues cannot be handed off to some transitional government.
The first step towards a common future will to restore believe that it is possible. This will involve both small successful steps and discussions about the big picture. The next step will be the discussion of concrete policies that should be changed: from security reforms to economic reforms. Only when in that area concrete results have been booked will it make sense to discuss political reforms and democratization beyond what is needed for the first two goals.
Given the workload it is unlikely that the negotiations will bring a solution within a few days. However, if the mediating countries can resist the temptation of quick fixes like a transitional government or a national truce, chances are good that the conference can bring hope that in the end a solution will be found. Let’s go for that.
The local truces
As experienced mediators know, it helps to start with some small and easy issue. Solving such an issue builds trust between the parties and increases the confidence that more intricate problems can be solved too. In the Syrian case the best issue to start with is probably the local truces.
At the moment there are many problems with local truces. The opposition complains that the government arrests and sometimes even executes people – in spite of prior agreements. They also complain that the government sometimes keeps blocking food supplies. The government complains about a divided opposition where people who oppose the armistice continue the violence.
Some of those transgressions may result from acting in bad faith but many are the result of miscommunication and lack of coordination. Much could be gained by changing from an ad hoc approach to a more structural approach in concluding and maintaining such truces. On the government side one could imagine one coordinator for each local truce. Those local coordinators would be overseen by a high level general in Damascus who is able to get things done across different army units. The UN would provide one or more special representatives for the truces who keep track of the developments and mediate when there are problems. The best way to deal with the divisions on the rebel side is to get things running well in those areas where they are not divided. That will make truces a more credible option and will put pressure on those rebels who oppose them. The UN representative should be an Arab general whose rank would enable him to solve problems with his Syrian counterpart. This should put him in a position to deal with spoilers on the government side.
As both the Syrian government and large segments of the opposition see the benefits of the truces it should be possible to solve the problems that arise.
It would be a pity if the mediators would aim an armistice for the whole of Syria. Such armistices didn't work before and they won't work now: there are too many people who oppose them. Aiming for such a national armistice would actually be harmful as the inevitable setback would damage the whole peace process. The only thing that can work is getting local armistices to work and to hope that their success will spread and encourage others to demand for a truce too.
There has been some discussion among the opposition about the merits of local armistices and also humanitarian aid. Opponents claim that local armistices allow Assad to send his soldiers elsewhere and that it diverts the attention from what they see as the core goal of the uprising: to get rid of Assad. Unfortunately they have forgotten the original goal of the uprising: to improve the life of the Syrian people. Correctly implemented those local armistices can serve as laboratory experiments on how Syrians can live together after the conflict.
The future of Syria
Focusing the negotiations on the departure of Assad in an early stage will nearly certain drive both parties into the trenches. People on both sides fear what would happen to them if the other side might win.
Neither elections nor a transitional government can solve this conflict. Just like in Northern Africa they will just create a new arena where the conflict is fought – while the demonstrations and armed attacks will continue. The conflict can only be solved with long and tough negotiations. The more the parties find common ground the less there is to fear.
On the other hand – once such negotiations decrease the tension – the question whether Assad should go will become less relevant. Many who hate him will see that improvements are possible while he is still there and many who see him as a guarantee for security will become less afraid of what will happen once he leaves.
Transitional governments have proved problematic in Northern Africa. As they are attacked by both sides they tend to be so weak that under their supervision the economic and security problems of the country steadily deteriorate. Neither are they capable of introducing the reforms that are necessary to really end the dictatorship. Transitional governments work best in situations with warlords who are respected by nobody. But in situations like Syria a large part of the population supports one of the sides. Instead of looking for the rare and often isolated figures who are acceptable to both sides it may be better to gradually introduce opposition people in the Assad government - while simultaneously removing its most controversial members.
So the talks about how the future of Syria should look need to happen in Montreux and Geneva. It is there that the parties should compose a new constitution and should find a way to end the war. These issues cannot be handed off to some transitional government.
The first step towards a common future will to restore believe that it is possible. This will involve both small successful steps and discussions about the big picture. The next step will be the discussion of concrete policies that should be changed: from security reforms to economic reforms. Only when in that area concrete results have been booked will it make sense to discuss political reforms and democratization beyond what is needed for the first two goals.
Given the workload it is unlikely that the negotiations will bring a solution within a few days. However, if the mediating countries can resist the temptation of quick fixes like a transitional government or a national truce, chances are good that the conference can bring hope that in the end a solution will be found. Let’s go for that.
Wednesday, January 08, 2014
Syria and the transition to democracy
The uprisings of the Arab Spring have largely failed to bring democracy to the Arab World. This was predictable. Previous revolutionary waves had similar disappointing results. Building democracy involves more than getting rid of bad dictators and revolutions tend to harm some of those other requirements. Syria is a good illustration of that process.
In my previous article Peace in Syria starts by building trust from a year ago the focus was on reconciliation. In this article the focus is on the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
Disappointing results
1848 was Europe’s revolution year. A few years later all the revolutions had been turned back. Only in the Netherlands where the king had prevented a revolution by forging an early compromise some of the revolutionary achievements remained. Compromise proved more effective than revolution in achieving more democracy.
The Color Revolutions of the 1990s were rather disappointing too. They replaced many dictators but the results were dubious. Kirgizstan became unstable. In Serbia and Ukraine the new leadership soon scored single digit approval rates. A revolution can change the people at the top but it changes very little in the way people think their country should work.
Both violent and non-violent revolutions force the government and the opposition to focus on power instead of common goals. So when they fail – as they do in most cases – they may leave behind a less free country. When they succeed they risk seeing either stagnation under divided leadership or - like France (1789) , Mexico (1910), Russia (1917), Cuba (1961) and Iran (1979) – long lasting dictatorship.
The democratic attitude
Democracy works much better in societies where people believe that they work for a common goal than in zero-sum societies where people believe that someone else’s gain will be their loss.
Democracy is closely related to advanced economies where the government provides services like education, roads, health care, electricity and drinking water. Such societies value people who want to “serve their country”. As in such societies everyone is richer they have more to lose and are less likely to support violent uprisings.
Poor countries can have democracy too. But its main focus will be the distribution of power and its spoils. It is much less about how the country should be run. As a consequence this kind of democracy is brittle.
Another essential element of democracy is respect for the other and letting him or her live as much as possible according to his own principles. This is a logical consequence of cooperating for the benefit of the country.
From the Arab states Tunisia now seems closest to democracy. What helped was that the parties saw a common goal: avoiding another dictatorship and violence. That made them more flexible in zero-sum goals like sharia law.
As democracy is collaboration it works best in countries where people have experience collaborating in private organizations like chess clubs, agricultural cooperatives and businesses. This is often called “civil society”. Foreign sponsored pro-democracy organizations are rather useless in promoting this aspect of democracy: they cover only a small section of the population and they don’t face many of the zero-sum questions that real cooperation faces.
The laws of dictatorship
For many centuries kingdoms were the dominant form of government. In countries were the population has no democratic attitude authoritarian rule is the form that still comes the most natural. In such societies the primary task of government is maintaining peace and order.
Many dictatorships rely on a small trusted section of the population – usually from the region where they were born or the tribe they are from. For example: Saddam relied on his fellow Tikriti’s and Assad on his fellow coastal Alawites. This favoritism is part of the dictatorial system and contributes to its stability. Quite often the ruling class comes from a minority: in fissiparous societies despised minorities tend to be the most coherent. Protests against dictators often focus on the favoritism. However, many of those protesters just want their own group to be the favored one.
Dictatorships have other peculiarities that are logical from their perspective. They use crony capitalism to prevent the development of independent power centers. They see repression as the lesser evil in an environment where there is always the threat of uprisings and civil war. Tolerating corruption can keep civil servants loyal. And just like many long serving democratic politicians dictators tend to develop a sense of entitlement.
Insurgents often attack dictators for these traits. But from the point of view of the dictatorship such attacks are just power struggles by people who would do the same if they were in their shoes. Unlike a genuine appeal to common values such attacks are unlikely to result in a change of behavior.
Islamists in opposition
Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood have a lot in common with the communists of yore. Both claim to have the absolute truth about how human society should be organized. Both attract lots of idealist people. Both lead in the end to intolerant totalitarian states.
Such ideologies are most attractive in times of turbulence as they bring strict codes of conduct. In times of modernization when many people stay behind while others get rich quickly in dubious ways their strict justice is appreciated. In the Syrian civil war it is mainly the corruption of many rebel leaders that has led to demand for more principled leadership.
Unfortunately such ideologies are a straightjacket. They may be right on a lot of points and sometimes their initial rule is quite effective. But there are always problems that the ideology cannot solve and these grow as time passes.
Such ideologies suffocate the intellectual debate already when haven’t won yet. Under their influence the public debate becomes focused on the merits of the ideology instead of concrete reforms. After they win things become even worse as they tend to suppress open debate.
The tragedy of the uprisings in the Arab world is that the opposition doesn’t understand the power of ideas. Both the “liberals” who would like to impose Western models, and Islamists who would like to impose their vision of sharia, prefer their ideological blueprint over detailed discussions about the needs of their country. Yet concrete ideas for improvement are the most likely to be copied by the government.
Transition
The transition from a traditional authoritarian regime to a democracy is a tricky one. Both the government and its subjects need to change their attitude. If the government adopts too soon a democratic attitude it will create opportunities for a coup – and the turbulence will hurt the country. If it waits too long it hinders the development of the country into a more complex society.
The main justification for dictatorship is that they maintain order and peace. When people get used to peace this is no longer enough and people start asking for the government to do more to develop their country. The average dictator – who cares about his reputation – will react to this with reforms. As the ruler and his subjects get used to “serving” their country the step towards democracy becomes easier. “Non-violent” revolutions abuse this process by pretending to be more peaceful and mature than they really are.
It may seem absurd to negotiate with perverse brutes like Saddam. But although one may despise them as a person one should still respect them for their role. Democracy is formalistic system and not respecting a sitting president will translate itself later on in a lack of respect for democratic rules. Such negotiations force the opposition to control its hunger for power and revenge and to focus on reforms. Revenge like we see in Libya is not “understandable” as many journalists and politicians claim. It painfully shows people who don’t respect authority and don’t believe in building their country together and as a consequence are not ready for democracy.
Traditionally democracy developed when kings gradually and reluctantly gave up their power as their country developed. In some countries – like Morocco – it still works this way. A modern variety is the “guided democracy” where some power - usually the military - keeps a check on the democratic leaders and takes power back when it thinks they no longer serve the interests of the country. This often means steady negotiations between the old and the new order.
Countries like Belgium and Switzerland show that you can have a democracy in an ethnically diverse country. They do have ethnic disputes but they keep them largely separate from the discussions on the common interests. For countries in transition it can take considerable effort to achieve this attitude.
If the West wants to help the Arab countries to become more democratic it should focus on democratic values like tolerance and commitment to a common good. It should encourage the opposition to negotiate with the government and to focus on concrete measures that improve the life of the average citizen. That will create trust between government and opposition and lay the basis for further reforms later on.
Syria
Before Hafez Assad grabbed power in 1970 Syria was an instable country where loose coalitions of politicians and military officers grabbed power in a rapid succession. Many Syrians initially valued the stability brought by Assad. Unfortunately parts of the opposition tried to exploit prejudices against Alawites.
The Syrian opposition likes to claim that its initial protests in 2011 were peaceful. Yet the protesters indulged from the very beginning in destroying Baath Party offices and other Assad related buildings. Their focus was on getting rid of Assad – not on negotiations and gradual improvements.
In Syria support for the government and the opposition is about equal. Not only minorities but also many Sunni’s prefer Assad over the rebels. In this light the refusal of the rebels to negotiate showed little respect for democracy. Rebels often claimed that they only want to talk with people without “blood on their hands”. But nearly everyone has blood on his hands in a war. What they want is a kind of victor’s justice. We can see in Libya what happens when such triumphalism is indulged: discrimination and harassment of many people and a sense of entitlement among the victors.
It is often claimed that the radicalization of the Syrian opposition would not have happened if the West had given more support to the moderate faction. However, a tendency to radicalize is inherent to revolutions and that tendency continues after the initial revolution has succeeded. Revolution is the imposition of your ideas with extralegal means. Doing so legalizes similar attempts by more radical groups.
If discussions about the position of Assad and other people dominate the coming Geneva conference it is doomed to fail. It is hard to find a compromise in zero-sum power discussions. Instead the talks should focus on Syria’s national interest with subjects like economic reform and restructuring of the security apparatus. That is an area where the parties can find common ground. It is to the international mediators to sell this to the opposition and the Gulf States. This will not be an easy sell after we indulged their zero-sum power thinking for so long. Yet it is the only way.
The Geneva conference has committed to a transitional government. However, experience in Northern Africa learns that such governments tend to be weak as neither side trusts them. As a consequence they can’t act at a time when there is a huge demand for reform and restoring order. The result is anarchy and a rise of radicals.
It would be better to apply in Syria the same method as was used in a.o. South Africa and El Salvador. There the old government stayed in place and implemented the agreed on reforms while the negotiations went on. In the Syrian case one could imagine a solution where Assad’s side keeps the security related positions and the opposition gets some of the other positions like housing and healthcare. In the meantime the rebels would keep control of their territories. Their integration into the government controlled part would be subject to local negotiations.
Instead of getting rid of Assad the accent should be on getting rid of the presidential system. You cannot rule a divided country like Syria with a “winner takes it all” presidential system. Diminishing the power of Assad would make the question whether he should leave less important.
Rather than taking over Assad’s security apparatus the negotiations should focus on reforming them into a streamlined organization. At the moment there are seventeen security services and some other security related organizations who not always work in tandem. This makes concluding agreements with the Assad side and checking that they are followed up very difficult.
Conclusion
In this article I have tried to sketch the position of both sides in the Arab Spring and specially Syria. In a climate where both sides are often demonized my goal has been to paint them as human beings who behave quite rational when one considers the context. I have tried to paint both their delusions and their valid demands and worries. Seeing the human being on the other side is the first step towards peace. I hope that the Geneva negotiations will be able to set that first step.
In my previous article Peace in Syria starts by building trust from a year ago the focus was on reconciliation. In this article the focus is on the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
Disappointing results
1848 was Europe’s revolution year. A few years later all the revolutions had been turned back. Only in the Netherlands where the king had prevented a revolution by forging an early compromise some of the revolutionary achievements remained. Compromise proved more effective than revolution in achieving more democracy.
The Color Revolutions of the 1990s were rather disappointing too. They replaced many dictators but the results were dubious. Kirgizstan became unstable. In Serbia and Ukraine the new leadership soon scored single digit approval rates. A revolution can change the people at the top but it changes very little in the way people think their country should work.
Both violent and non-violent revolutions force the government and the opposition to focus on power instead of common goals. So when they fail – as they do in most cases – they may leave behind a less free country. When they succeed they risk seeing either stagnation under divided leadership or - like France (1789) , Mexico (1910), Russia (1917), Cuba (1961) and Iran (1979) – long lasting dictatorship.
The democratic attitude
Democracy works much better in societies where people believe that they work for a common goal than in zero-sum societies where people believe that someone else’s gain will be their loss.
Democracy is closely related to advanced economies where the government provides services like education, roads, health care, electricity and drinking water. Such societies value people who want to “serve their country”. As in such societies everyone is richer they have more to lose and are less likely to support violent uprisings.
Poor countries can have democracy too. But its main focus will be the distribution of power and its spoils. It is much less about how the country should be run. As a consequence this kind of democracy is brittle.
Another essential element of democracy is respect for the other and letting him or her live as much as possible according to his own principles. This is a logical consequence of cooperating for the benefit of the country.
From the Arab states Tunisia now seems closest to democracy. What helped was that the parties saw a common goal: avoiding another dictatorship and violence. That made them more flexible in zero-sum goals like sharia law.
As democracy is collaboration it works best in countries where people have experience collaborating in private organizations like chess clubs, agricultural cooperatives and businesses. This is often called “civil society”. Foreign sponsored pro-democracy organizations are rather useless in promoting this aspect of democracy: they cover only a small section of the population and they don’t face many of the zero-sum questions that real cooperation faces.
The laws of dictatorship
For many centuries kingdoms were the dominant form of government. In countries were the population has no democratic attitude authoritarian rule is the form that still comes the most natural. In such societies the primary task of government is maintaining peace and order.
Many dictatorships rely on a small trusted section of the population – usually from the region where they were born or the tribe they are from. For example: Saddam relied on his fellow Tikriti’s and Assad on his fellow coastal Alawites. This favoritism is part of the dictatorial system and contributes to its stability. Quite often the ruling class comes from a minority: in fissiparous societies despised minorities tend to be the most coherent. Protests against dictators often focus on the favoritism. However, many of those protesters just want their own group to be the favored one.
Dictatorships have other peculiarities that are logical from their perspective. They use crony capitalism to prevent the development of independent power centers. They see repression as the lesser evil in an environment where there is always the threat of uprisings and civil war. Tolerating corruption can keep civil servants loyal. And just like many long serving democratic politicians dictators tend to develop a sense of entitlement.
Insurgents often attack dictators for these traits. But from the point of view of the dictatorship such attacks are just power struggles by people who would do the same if they were in their shoes. Unlike a genuine appeal to common values such attacks are unlikely to result in a change of behavior.
Islamists in opposition
Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood have a lot in common with the communists of yore. Both claim to have the absolute truth about how human society should be organized. Both attract lots of idealist people. Both lead in the end to intolerant totalitarian states.
Such ideologies are most attractive in times of turbulence as they bring strict codes of conduct. In times of modernization when many people stay behind while others get rich quickly in dubious ways their strict justice is appreciated. In the Syrian civil war it is mainly the corruption of many rebel leaders that has led to demand for more principled leadership.
Unfortunately such ideologies are a straightjacket. They may be right on a lot of points and sometimes their initial rule is quite effective. But there are always problems that the ideology cannot solve and these grow as time passes.
Such ideologies suffocate the intellectual debate already when haven’t won yet. Under their influence the public debate becomes focused on the merits of the ideology instead of concrete reforms. After they win things become even worse as they tend to suppress open debate.
The tragedy of the uprisings in the Arab world is that the opposition doesn’t understand the power of ideas. Both the “liberals” who would like to impose Western models, and Islamists who would like to impose their vision of sharia, prefer their ideological blueprint over detailed discussions about the needs of their country. Yet concrete ideas for improvement are the most likely to be copied by the government.
Transition
The transition from a traditional authoritarian regime to a democracy is a tricky one. Both the government and its subjects need to change their attitude. If the government adopts too soon a democratic attitude it will create opportunities for a coup – and the turbulence will hurt the country. If it waits too long it hinders the development of the country into a more complex society.
The main justification for dictatorship is that they maintain order and peace. When people get used to peace this is no longer enough and people start asking for the government to do more to develop their country. The average dictator – who cares about his reputation – will react to this with reforms. As the ruler and his subjects get used to “serving” their country the step towards democracy becomes easier. “Non-violent” revolutions abuse this process by pretending to be more peaceful and mature than they really are.
It may seem absurd to negotiate with perverse brutes like Saddam. But although one may despise them as a person one should still respect them for their role. Democracy is formalistic system and not respecting a sitting president will translate itself later on in a lack of respect for democratic rules. Such negotiations force the opposition to control its hunger for power and revenge and to focus on reforms. Revenge like we see in Libya is not “understandable” as many journalists and politicians claim. It painfully shows people who don’t respect authority and don’t believe in building their country together and as a consequence are not ready for democracy.
Traditionally democracy developed when kings gradually and reluctantly gave up their power as their country developed. In some countries – like Morocco – it still works this way. A modern variety is the “guided democracy” where some power - usually the military - keeps a check on the democratic leaders and takes power back when it thinks they no longer serve the interests of the country. This often means steady negotiations between the old and the new order.
Countries like Belgium and Switzerland show that you can have a democracy in an ethnically diverse country. They do have ethnic disputes but they keep them largely separate from the discussions on the common interests. For countries in transition it can take considerable effort to achieve this attitude.
If the West wants to help the Arab countries to become more democratic it should focus on democratic values like tolerance and commitment to a common good. It should encourage the opposition to negotiate with the government and to focus on concrete measures that improve the life of the average citizen. That will create trust between government and opposition and lay the basis for further reforms later on.
Syria
Before Hafez Assad grabbed power in 1970 Syria was an instable country where loose coalitions of politicians and military officers grabbed power in a rapid succession. Many Syrians initially valued the stability brought by Assad. Unfortunately parts of the opposition tried to exploit prejudices against Alawites.
The Syrian opposition likes to claim that its initial protests in 2011 were peaceful. Yet the protesters indulged from the very beginning in destroying Baath Party offices and other Assad related buildings. Their focus was on getting rid of Assad – not on negotiations and gradual improvements.
In Syria support for the government and the opposition is about equal. Not only minorities but also many Sunni’s prefer Assad over the rebels. In this light the refusal of the rebels to negotiate showed little respect for democracy. Rebels often claimed that they only want to talk with people without “blood on their hands”. But nearly everyone has blood on his hands in a war. What they want is a kind of victor’s justice. We can see in Libya what happens when such triumphalism is indulged: discrimination and harassment of many people and a sense of entitlement among the victors.
It is often claimed that the radicalization of the Syrian opposition would not have happened if the West had given more support to the moderate faction. However, a tendency to radicalize is inherent to revolutions and that tendency continues after the initial revolution has succeeded. Revolution is the imposition of your ideas with extralegal means. Doing so legalizes similar attempts by more radical groups.
If discussions about the position of Assad and other people dominate the coming Geneva conference it is doomed to fail. It is hard to find a compromise in zero-sum power discussions. Instead the talks should focus on Syria’s national interest with subjects like economic reform and restructuring of the security apparatus. That is an area where the parties can find common ground. It is to the international mediators to sell this to the opposition and the Gulf States. This will not be an easy sell after we indulged their zero-sum power thinking for so long. Yet it is the only way.
The Geneva conference has committed to a transitional government. However, experience in Northern Africa learns that such governments tend to be weak as neither side trusts them. As a consequence they can’t act at a time when there is a huge demand for reform and restoring order. The result is anarchy and a rise of radicals.
It would be better to apply in Syria the same method as was used in a.o. South Africa and El Salvador. There the old government stayed in place and implemented the agreed on reforms while the negotiations went on. In the Syrian case one could imagine a solution where Assad’s side keeps the security related positions and the opposition gets some of the other positions like housing and healthcare. In the meantime the rebels would keep control of their territories. Their integration into the government controlled part would be subject to local negotiations.
Instead of getting rid of Assad the accent should be on getting rid of the presidential system. You cannot rule a divided country like Syria with a “winner takes it all” presidential system. Diminishing the power of Assad would make the question whether he should leave less important.
Rather than taking over Assad’s security apparatus the negotiations should focus on reforming them into a streamlined organization. At the moment there are seventeen security services and some other security related organizations who not always work in tandem. This makes concluding agreements with the Assad side and checking that they are followed up very difficult.
Conclusion
In this article I have tried to sketch the position of both sides in the Arab Spring and specially Syria. In a climate where both sides are often demonized my goal has been to paint them as human beings who behave quite rational when one considers the context. I have tried to paint both their delusions and their valid demands and worries. Seeing the human being on the other side is the first step towards peace. I hope that the Geneva negotiations will be able to set that first step.
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