Reconciliation is hot. Western NGOs have spent millions in former Yugoslavia to achieve it. Put some people from ethnic groups that used to right each other together in some course or project and you can get a lot of money because it is supposed to contribute to reconciliation. As the reasoning goes: these people didn't talk to each other and now they are talking again; this must the the first step towards reconciliation.
It doesn't work always. Many of those projects in Kosovo found their end in march 2004 when Serbs saw their "project-friends" in the mobs that attacked them. And one has to wonder whether it works better in other situations.
A related concept is that of justice. Many millions have been spent on the ICTY and other courts to condemn the war criminals. But the effect has been limited. On the one hand it is good to see that some consensus arises on the facts and that for example you don't hear anymore that people deny that mass killings happened in Srebrenica. But when you hear the comments from the different parties it looks like the courtroom has become the newest battlefield. Everyone wants crimes by the other side exposed and preferably provided with labels like "genocide". And with good reason: the conflict is going on. Serbia and Croatia are still involved in a genocide case at the ICJ and in Bosnia the statuses of the Republika Srpska and the Croat majority region are ongoing sources of conflict.
South Africa is often seen as an example how to solve conflicts. But the South Africans did it very different compared to former Yugoslavia. First they found a political solution that had wide support on all sides. Many in the West think that only apartheid was abolished but the whites negotiated a deal that gave the country a very capitalistic constitution that protects them from large scale expropriations.
Only when there was a solution in which every part felt safe did the South Africans proceed to the next step: the "truth and reconciliation commission". Because of this timing justice was no longer loaded with political consequences. A second step they made was to pardon most of the crimes. In the heat of a conflict people do things that they normally wouldn't do and this was an implicit recognition of that fact. Also, because the primary aim of the commission was not to get these people convicted there was much more attention to what they thought at that time and how they came to their acts. This is a climate that produces real reconciliation.
In contrast the Western approach to Yugoslavia has been counterproductive. There has been no commitment to solutions that are seen by all sides as fair. On the contrary: a formalistic approach was chosen - encouraged by the Badinter Commission - that gave Yugoslavia's republics independence without negotiations and discarded widely shared concerns amongst certain groups as "nationalistic". And while the West has been very helpful to help those "warlike" people of the Balkans to find reconciliation it has been very unwilling to investigate its own role.
Showing posts with label Bosnia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bosnia. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Monday, May 10, 2010
Why Dayton needs more support in Bosnia
I come from a country that always has coalition governments. This gives me a different point of view than people from countries like the UK and the US with their two-party systems where one party nearly always gets the absolute majority. Germany and France have systems that are a bit less extreme but that still value big parties and absolute majorities.
There is a lot of discussion which system is better. People from absolute majority countries tend to boast of the decisiveness of their system. People from coalition countries point out that absolute majority countries usually tend to swing from one extreme to the other, while the governance of their countries shows much more continuity. And the need for compromises tends to create a climate of cooperation that pays off in times of crisis. Thatcher could only happen in an absolute majority country. Also there is the risk in absolute majority country that the ruling party may become captured by a small minority. The influence of the religious right and the Tea Party on the Republicans in the US is infamous in this respect. Such capture often prevents sound policies. It may be no coincidence that the UK and Greece, two of the countries where the economic incompetence of the government at the moment is most obvious, are both absolute majority countries.
This background may explain why people tend to look so different to the Dayton Agreement. Dayton is the perfect example of a coalition system. It is very similar to what other countries with a divided population have adopted. It is also rather close to how Bosnia was ruled in Yugoslav times.
Some people think that Dayton will perpetuate the divisions between the ethnic groups. I beg to differ. There are sharp divisions between the ethnic groups. It was the decision by the Muslim elite to go alone towards independence that triggered the civil war. Bosnia needs a system where such far reaching decisions can no longer be taken without the explicit agreement of al three groups.
Far from solidifying the divisions such a coalition system can strengthen the cooperation between the groups. The Netherlands where I live was once divided between protestants, catholics and social-democrats. Now that division is nearly totally gone - thanks to steady cooperation. Something similar could happen in Bosnia.
Bosnia's greatest problem is that many Western diplomats have been undermining Dayton. By maintaining the hope that it can be changed towards an absolute majority system they have prevented Bosnia's politicians from fully committing themselves to a system of cooperation. And so they have maintained the antagonism.
Accepting Dayton means accepting that for each of the three groups there is a part of Bosnia where the form a solid majority and where as a consequence they are the rulers. Accepting these facts clears the road for more attentions to human rights and treatment of minorities in the different territories.
Some people believe that accepting that Bosnia is divided in a Serbian, a Bosniak and a Croat part means accepting ethnic cleansing. I disagree. All plans before the war consisted of dividing Bosnia in autonomous regions where one ethnic group or the other had the majority. So this is a completely accepted principle. The only thing that was changed by the war where the borders between those territories.
Some other people believe that when you just do as if everyone is equal the result will be that everyone is treated as equal. Their point of reference are multi-ethnic cities like New York where nobody cares about your nationality. What they forget is that how you treat others is a matter of habit: once you are in a bad habit it is very difficult to give that up. The US with all its multi-ethnicity has not been able to give an equal treatment to its black community or its latino's - even now the black are hugely overrepresented in its prisons. The greatest step forward came when the US recognized in the 1960s that it was discriminating its blacks and it introduced policies of "positive discrimination" and quotas to repair this situation. Similarly Bosnia needs to recognize that there are in Bosnia many people who look to people of other ethnic groups with a mix of fear and contempt and to introduce policies that can contain this situation.
Will it lead to division of Bosnia? I think that the risk that Bosnia will fall apart will stay there for a long time. I don't think that a coalition system will change the chances that it will happen. But if it happens it will certainly help making it a more peaceful event.
Is Dayton perfect? No. There is the verdict of the European Court of Human Rights that forbids explicit defining the ethnicity of the presidents (my favorite solution would be that presidents can be appointed by specific areas: one by the RS, one by the Federation and one by the Croat majority municipalities). Dayton is also rather complex. But I expect that changes towards more efficiency will only come once all sides have come to recognize that the principles of Dayton are the right way to go.
Although the Dayton formula can lead to reconciliation one should not make the mistake to think that after some time a more centralized form of government will become possible. Extinguishing ethnic hatred takes generations. The war crimes and fights of World War II still had a profound effect on the interethnic trust in Bosnia 45 years later. There is no reason to suppose that this time will be different.
There is a lot of discussion which system is better. People from absolute majority countries tend to boast of the decisiveness of their system. People from coalition countries point out that absolute majority countries usually tend to swing from one extreme to the other, while the governance of their countries shows much more continuity. And the need for compromises tends to create a climate of cooperation that pays off in times of crisis. Thatcher could only happen in an absolute majority country. Also there is the risk in absolute majority country that the ruling party may become captured by a small minority. The influence of the religious right and the Tea Party on the Republicans in the US is infamous in this respect. Such capture often prevents sound policies. It may be no coincidence that the UK and Greece, two of the countries where the economic incompetence of the government at the moment is most obvious, are both absolute majority countries.
This background may explain why people tend to look so different to the Dayton Agreement. Dayton is the perfect example of a coalition system. It is very similar to what other countries with a divided population have adopted. It is also rather close to how Bosnia was ruled in Yugoslav times.
Some people think that Dayton will perpetuate the divisions between the ethnic groups. I beg to differ. There are sharp divisions between the ethnic groups. It was the decision by the Muslim elite to go alone towards independence that triggered the civil war. Bosnia needs a system where such far reaching decisions can no longer be taken without the explicit agreement of al three groups.
Far from solidifying the divisions such a coalition system can strengthen the cooperation between the groups. The Netherlands where I live was once divided between protestants, catholics and social-democrats. Now that division is nearly totally gone - thanks to steady cooperation. Something similar could happen in Bosnia.
Bosnia's greatest problem is that many Western diplomats have been undermining Dayton. By maintaining the hope that it can be changed towards an absolute majority system they have prevented Bosnia's politicians from fully committing themselves to a system of cooperation. And so they have maintained the antagonism.
Accepting Dayton means accepting that for each of the three groups there is a part of Bosnia where the form a solid majority and where as a consequence they are the rulers. Accepting these facts clears the road for more attentions to human rights and treatment of minorities in the different territories.
Some people believe that accepting that Bosnia is divided in a Serbian, a Bosniak and a Croat part means accepting ethnic cleansing. I disagree. All plans before the war consisted of dividing Bosnia in autonomous regions where one ethnic group or the other had the majority. So this is a completely accepted principle. The only thing that was changed by the war where the borders between those territories.
Some other people believe that when you just do as if everyone is equal the result will be that everyone is treated as equal. Their point of reference are multi-ethnic cities like New York where nobody cares about your nationality. What they forget is that how you treat others is a matter of habit: once you are in a bad habit it is very difficult to give that up. The US with all its multi-ethnicity has not been able to give an equal treatment to its black community or its latino's - even now the black are hugely overrepresented in its prisons. The greatest step forward came when the US recognized in the 1960s that it was discriminating its blacks and it introduced policies of "positive discrimination" and quotas to repair this situation. Similarly Bosnia needs to recognize that there are in Bosnia many people who look to people of other ethnic groups with a mix of fear and contempt and to introduce policies that can contain this situation.
Will it lead to division of Bosnia? I think that the risk that Bosnia will fall apart will stay there for a long time. I don't think that a coalition system will change the chances that it will happen. But if it happens it will certainly help making it a more peaceful event.
Is Dayton perfect? No. There is the verdict of the European Court of Human Rights that forbids explicit defining the ethnicity of the presidents (my favorite solution would be that presidents can be appointed by specific areas: one by the RS, one by the Federation and one by the Croat majority municipalities). Dayton is also rather complex. But I expect that changes towards more efficiency will only come once all sides have come to recognize that the principles of Dayton are the right way to go.
Although the Dayton formula can lead to reconciliation one should not make the mistake to think that after some time a more centralized form of government will become possible. Extinguishing ethnic hatred takes generations. The war crimes and fights of World War II still had a profound effect on the interethnic trust in Bosnia 45 years later. There is no reason to suppose that this time will be different.
Friday, April 09, 2010
Why the West should punish Silajdzic
The moment I knew things went wrong in Yugoslavia was when I heard that Tudjman had said that the Serbs should leave if they didn't like it in his Croatia. This is the language of ethnic cleansing. This is how it usually starts. The minority no longer has full citizenship rights and once departure is an option some "prodding" to make that departure more likely is only a small step. I have always considered it one of the main Western failures that it didn't react at all to this statement by Tudjman.
I had the same feeling over the recent statement by Silajdzic that “If someone does not like Bosnia-Herzegovina they are free to leave, but they cannot take any part (of the country) with them”.
In the Western press this was brought as just a tit-for-tat after Dodik had said that "peaceful divorce" should be discussed. I disagree. Many borders have changed in former Yugoslavia and I don't see why we should see Dodik's demands as different from all those others - even if we don't want to give him what he wants. Dodik doesn't want to rob people of their houses and Silajdzic does. That is a very big difference.
For these reasons I believe that a strong Western reaction to Silajdzic 's statements is absolutely necessary. Ignoring this will further diminish the West's already reduced credibility in Bosnia.
Those who believe that this is an exception I encourage to listen to this interview of Silajdzic with Al Jazeera. I found it disgusting. It reminds me of our Dutch extremist Geert Wilders: the same depressive toneless way of talking, the same endless stream of accusations, similar distortions and the same lack of a positive vision of hope. Just as I don't expect Wilders ever to speak positively about Muslims I don't expect Silajdzic ever to speak positively about Serbs - no matter how much they change. These men thrive not on hope but on resentment.
I had the same feeling over the recent statement by Silajdzic that “If someone does not like Bosnia-Herzegovina they are free to leave, but they cannot take any part (of the country) with them”.
In the Western press this was brought as just a tit-for-tat after Dodik had said that "peaceful divorce" should be discussed. I disagree. Many borders have changed in former Yugoslavia and I don't see why we should see Dodik's demands as different from all those others - even if we don't want to give him what he wants. Dodik doesn't want to rob people of their houses and Silajdzic does. That is a very big difference.
For these reasons I believe that a strong Western reaction to Silajdzic 's statements is absolutely necessary. Ignoring this will further diminish the West's already reduced credibility in Bosnia.
Those who believe that this is an exception I encourage to listen to this interview of Silajdzic with Al Jazeera. I found it disgusting. It reminds me of our Dutch extremist Geert Wilders: the same depressive toneless way of talking, the same endless stream of accusations, similar distortions and the same lack of a positive vision of hope. Just as I don't expect Wilders ever to speak positively about Muslims I don't expect Silajdzic ever to speak positively about Serbs - no matter how much they change. These men thrive not on hope but on resentment.
Friday, February 26, 2010
Answers to Jakob Finci
Jakob Finci is the head of the small (500 people) Jewish community in Bosnia. As a neutral ethnic group he would be positioned nicely for a mediating position and indeed he used that position during the war to evacuate some 300 people from Sarajevo. However, in practice he has adopted the Bosniak position. Of course it is not unwise for a small community to attach itself to the largest and most powerful ethnic group. But that makes him less suitable as a mediator - as is visible in his initiatives:
- one of his initiatives is a truth commission. However, he fails to mention that unlike the situation in for example South Africa the political situation in Bosnia is not resolved. Without such an agreement the commission will have the same problem as the ICTY in The Hague: each party is sorry for the war crimes that have been committed by their side, but they consider them as "collateral damage" in a justified war.
- a more recent initiative by Finci was his complaint at the European Court of Human Rights about the fact that the Bosnian constitution by reserving some state positions for members of the three main ethnic groups is discriminating against Roma and Jews. I found this initiative rather phony: even if the constitution allowed the highest positions to those groups it is very unlikely that they would actually get them anytime soon.
But Finci has a point that the ethnic restrictions shouldn't be forever. During the war you couldn't be neutral and many people who did feel neutral - often because of mixed marriages - ended up as refugees in the West. Dayton reflected that situation. But this is not a desirable solution for peace time. But what Dayton wants to achieve with those ethnic rights is securing minority rights and that is very much a valid principle in peace time too. The obvious solution would be to connect the political minority rights to territorial entities. In order to achieve this the Federation would have to be split into a Bosniak and a Croat part. When that was done all the veto and representational rights of the ethnic groups could be converted in rights for the three entities.
Bosnia now has a law that it needs to repair in order to satisfy European requirements. My suggestion would be to keep the requirement for a Croat and to replace the requirements for a Muslim and a Serb by requirements that one president will be appointed by the parliament of the Federation and another by the parliament of the RS.
- one of his initiatives is a truth commission. However, he fails to mention that unlike the situation in for example South Africa the political situation in Bosnia is not resolved. Without such an agreement the commission will have the same problem as the ICTY in The Hague: each party is sorry for the war crimes that have been committed by their side, but they consider them as "collateral damage" in a justified war.
- a more recent initiative by Finci was his complaint at the European Court of Human Rights about the fact that the Bosnian constitution by reserving some state positions for members of the three main ethnic groups is discriminating against Roma and Jews. I found this initiative rather phony: even if the constitution allowed the highest positions to those groups it is very unlikely that they would actually get them anytime soon.
But Finci has a point that the ethnic restrictions shouldn't be forever. During the war you couldn't be neutral and many people who did feel neutral - often because of mixed marriages - ended up as refugees in the West. Dayton reflected that situation. But this is not a desirable solution for peace time. But what Dayton wants to achieve with those ethnic rights is securing minority rights and that is very much a valid principle in peace time too. The obvious solution would be to connect the political minority rights to territorial entities. In order to achieve this the Federation would have to be split into a Bosniak and a Croat part. When that was done all the veto and representational rights of the ethnic groups could be converted in rights for the three entities.
Bosnia now has a law that it needs to repair in order to satisfy European requirements. My suggestion would be to keep the requirement for a Croat and to replace the requirements for a Muslim and a Serb by requirements that one president will be appointed by the parliament of the Federation and another by the parliament of the RS.
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
One argument for an independent RS in Bosnia
One element that held Bosnia together was the mixed population. But with the low number of Serbs in the Federation and the sense of discrimination among Serbs there an important element that held Bosnia together is falling away. If the international community wants to preserve Bosnia as a whole it should pay top attention to this situation. When the Serbs of the RS stop feeling connected with the territory of the Federation I see no future for Bosnia as a whole.
Postscript: the number of Serb returnees to the Federation is disputed. See this article.
Postscript: the number of Serb returnees to the Federation is disputed. See this article.
Wednesday, January 06, 2010
The dark side of micro-finance in Bosnia
Al Jazeera has an article about micro-finance in Bosnia. The theory is that microfinance helps people to start small businesses. Reality in Bosnia was that most loans were just used for consuming (nobody checked what you did with the money). Companies competed to extend loans and by the end of 2008 there were 390,000 loans on the books, together totaling over BAM 1 billion ($770m). As there was no central credit rating organization some people took several loans from different banks. Now the default rates are rising fast and the banks have become stingy.
For starting businesses the loans were not suitable. The rates were too high, the typical term of one year maximum much too short and the amounts of money available much too low. If you asked for 70,000 US$ it was not possible. So nothing was solved for the large communist era companies that wanted to transform themselves.
For starting businesses the loans were not suitable. The rates were too high, the typical term of one year maximum much too short and the amounts of money available much too low. If you asked for 70,000 US$ it was not possible. So nothing was solved for the large communist era companies that wanted to transform themselves.
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Inzko is going for broke in Bosnia
Bosnia's international overlord (OHR) Inzko has thrown down the gauntlet: he has stated that Dodik has violated Dayton and announced that he will go to the Security Council. It is the culmination of a long policy of confrontation from both sides, but mostly from Inzko.
In the Dayton Agreement Inzko's function is described as a mediator. But Inzko hasn't shown any of the neutrality that is expected from a mediator. Instead he has extensively tried to use his "Bonn powers". These powers were after Dayton given to the OHR to enable him to counter obstruction like the blocking of refugee returns. Inzko abused them by instead trying to use them to "improve" Dayton. What he failed to perceive was the element of authoritiveness. Using the Bonn powers to fight obstruction was in the spirit of Dayton and as such Bosnia's Serbs could accept it. However, using these same powers to "reform" the Dayton Agreement in a way that makes it more acceptable for the Bosniaks and less acceptable for the Serbs definitely is not acceptable for them. By acting so Inzko has undermined the credibility of his function.
Dodik has reacted to this with his own challenge: he wants a referendum on the extension of the appointment of some international judges. He claims that these judges are prejudiced but he doesn't seem very serious about that: I haven't heard a list of complaints or seen a website that attacks the functioning of those judges. They definitely would be there if Dodik wanted to convince the international community of his viewpoint. Instead it looks like Dodik just is trying to pick a fight on a point where he thinks he can get the support of his population.
This confrontationist attitude may cost Dodik dearly. By shaping the confrontation as a challenge to the OHR and the international community he is doing exactly what his enemies wish: challenging the world's big powers openly more or less forces them to react. It looks like Dodik has become overconfident after his previous confrontations with Inzko and now wants to definitively dispower Inzko.
In my opinion both sides are foolish. Their behavior may seriously harm Bosnia.
In the Dayton Agreement Inzko's function is described as a mediator. But Inzko hasn't shown any of the neutrality that is expected from a mediator. Instead he has extensively tried to use his "Bonn powers". These powers were after Dayton given to the OHR to enable him to counter obstruction like the blocking of refugee returns. Inzko abused them by instead trying to use them to "improve" Dayton. What he failed to perceive was the element of authoritiveness. Using the Bonn powers to fight obstruction was in the spirit of Dayton and as such Bosnia's Serbs could accept it. However, using these same powers to "reform" the Dayton Agreement in a way that makes it more acceptable for the Bosniaks and less acceptable for the Serbs definitely is not acceptable for them. By acting so Inzko has undermined the credibility of his function.
Dodik has reacted to this with his own challenge: he wants a referendum on the extension of the appointment of some international judges. He claims that these judges are prejudiced but he doesn't seem very serious about that: I haven't heard a list of complaints or seen a website that attacks the functioning of those judges. They definitely would be there if Dodik wanted to convince the international community of his viewpoint. Instead it looks like Dodik just is trying to pick a fight on a point where he thinks he can get the support of his population.
This confrontationist attitude may cost Dodik dearly. By shaping the confrontation as a challenge to the OHR and the international community he is doing exactly what his enemies wish: challenging the world's big powers openly more or less forces them to react. It looks like Dodik has become overconfident after his previous confrontations with Inzko and now wants to definitively dispower Inzko.
In my opinion both sides are foolish. Their behavior may seriously harm Bosnia.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Diplomatic blunders in Butmir
Franz-Lothar Altmann, a German academic, has a clear opinion why the negotiations on the future of Bosnia at Butmir failed:
European Union foreign policy chief Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister who himself was the UN High Representative in Bosnia in the 1990s, recognized the system wasn't working and called a set of constitutional reform talks this October.Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Bildt has not made the progress on Bosnia that he'd hoped for
It was a good sign, but according to Franz-Lothar Altmann, who studies the Wesrtern Balkans region at the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, Bildt made some big mistakes.
“Important people from parties in Bosnia had not been invited, others who were invited were amazed that they were on the list of invitees,” said Altmann.
The worst part, though, was that Bildt set up the talks without first bringing the present UN High Representative Valentin Inzko on board.
“It was certainly disgusting, I must say, because he's the one who had to bear the consequences and is on the forefront of this process,” Altmann said.
Bildt's diplomatic fauxs pas, and lack of a clear set of proposals before the meeting meant they ended in deadlock. Bosniaks and Croats are still after a stronger central government, and Serbs are still threatening to secede if anyone tries to force one on them.
European Union foreign policy chief Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister who himself was the UN High Representative in Bosnia in the 1990s, recognized the system wasn't working and called a set of constitutional reform talks this October.Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Bildt has not made the progress on Bosnia that he'd hoped for
It was a good sign, but according to Franz-Lothar Altmann, who studies the Wesrtern Balkans region at the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, Bildt made some big mistakes.
“Important people from parties in Bosnia had not been invited, others who were invited were amazed that they were on the list of invitees,” said Altmann.
The worst part, though, was that Bildt set up the talks without first bringing the present UN High Representative Valentin Inzko on board.
“It was certainly disgusting, I must say, because he's the one who had to bear the consequences and is on the forefront of this process,” Altmann said.
Bildt's diplomatic fauxs pas, and lack of a clear set of proposals before the meeting meant they ended in deadlock. Bosniaks and Croats are still after a stronger central government, and Serbs are still threatening to secede if anyone tries to force one on them.
Friday, November 20, 2009
Republika Srpska: After Independence
Matthew Parish, a formerly Chief Legal Adviser to the International Supervisor of Brcko who has written a book about his experience, wrote an article for Balkan Insight under the title Republika Srpska: After Independence.
It is a detailed analysis of the options that the international community had and has to influence the situation in Bosnia. His conclusion is that the international community can do very little to prevent a slow Montenegro-style independence for the Republika Srpska. He arrives also at the conclusion that the best thing that the international community can do to keep Bosnia together is to keep pushing for it. I have advocated something similar in a previous post.
It is a detailed analysis of the options that the international community had and has to influence the situation in Bosnia. His conclusion is that the international community can do very little to prevent a slow Montenegro-style independence for the Republika Srpska. He arrives also at the conclusion that the best thing that the international community can do to keep Bosnia together is to keep pushing for it. I have advocated something similar in a previous post.
Friday, October 30, 2009
Ethnic traps in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan
I have recently reading a lot about Afghanistan and Iraq and what strikes me is the similarity between America’s problems there and in the Balkans. Americans keep making the same mistakes based on their misunderstanding of ethnic dynamics.
What strikes one in the Balkans first is that the Americans have no idea how compromises are made. As long as the US is supporting one faction one can be sure it won’t compromise, but somehow that doesn’t register in the US and they keep playing favorites. Even more amazing is that those favorites are largely historically determined and have little to do with present US interests. Yet they keep being promoted because somehow it is supposed to be humiliating for the US if a former ally suffered a defeat. Another US addiction is to borders. Partitioning of both Bosnia and Kosovo is taboo. Why? Because somewhere in the past the US committed itself to those borders. In the mean time it keep deceiving itself that within those borders the conditioned for a peaceful multi-ethnic society are present.
What brings me to Iraq. One of the hottest items it Kirkuk. Should it be controlled by the Arabs or the Kurds. Here too the taboos abound. Kirkuk is a province that should not be partitioned. Let alone that one should look for a comprehensive solution that concerns all the borders of Kurdistan. To make the discussion even more abstract the subject of ethnic cleansing by the Kurds is taboo. Just as in the Balkans the pretense must be maintained that no ethnic cleansing happens under US control. And so we see that the discussions about Kirkuk are about abstract voting rights instead of the real issues.
In Afghanistan the absurdity of US ethnic thinking becomes even more visible. Afghanistan is divided between the Pashtus who constitute some 43% of the population and have traditionally ruled Afghanistan and the other tribes who nearly all speak Dari, a Persian dialect. Afghanistan is relatively recent creation that comes from conquests by the Pashtu rulers. The other tribes have rather mixed feelings about Pashtu rule that has included ethnic cleansing and the Taliban.
The US conquered Afghanistan with the help of those other tribes, but then turned its back to them and offered the Pashtus the governance of Afghanistan. To add injury to insult they imposed a hugely centralized government system. This system was imposed by the American diplomat Khalilzad – himself of Pashtu descent. In its defense we are told that otherwise the Pasthus would become angry and not support us. But don’t expect the Pashtus to be grateful. Many of them sympathize with the Taliban and even president Karzai is pushing for negotiations with the Taliban. They know that Taliban rule means Pashtu rule.
A very basic strategy in Afghanistan would be to give the non-Pashtu provinces the tools to get rid of the Taliban. Many would jump at the chance. It would leave us with only the Pashtu provinces in the need of counterinsurgency. But it doesn’t fit in the US imposed system where only national institutions are reinforced. It looks like the US is incapable to discern its friends from its enemies. This reminds one of the dubious US friendships with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
What strikes one in the Balkans first is that the Americans have no idea how compromises are made. As long as the US is supporting one faction one can be sure it won’t compromise, but somehow that doesn’t register in the US and they keep playing favorites. Even more amazing is that those favorites are largely historically determined and have little to do with present US interests. Yet they keep being promoted because somehow it is supposed to be humiliating for the US if a former ally suffered a defeat. Another US addiction is to borders. Partitioning of both Bosnia and Kosovo is taboo. Why? Because somewhere in the past the US committed itself to those borders. In the mean time it keep deceiving itself that within those borders the conditioned for a peaceful multi-ethnic society are present.
What brings me to Iraq. One of the hottest items it Kirkuk. Should it be controlled by the Arabs or the Kurds. Here too the taboos abound. Kirkuk is a province that should not be partitioned. Let alone that one should look for a comprehensive solution that concerns all the borders of Kurdistan. To make the discussion even more abstract the subject of ethnic cleansing by the Kurds is taboo. Just as in the Balkans the pretense must be maintained that no ethnic cleansing happens under US control. And so we see that the discussions about Kirkuk are about abstract voting rights instead of the real issues.
In Afghanistan the absurdity of US ethnic thinking becomes even more visible. Afghanistan is divided between the Pashtus who constitute some 43% of the population and have traditionally ruled Afghanistan and the other tribes who nearly all speak Dari, a Persian dialect. Afghanistan is relatively recent creation that comes from conquests by the Pashtu rulers. The other tribes have rather mixed feelings about Pashtu rule that has included ethnic cleansing and the Taliban.
The US conquered Afghanistan with the help of those other tribes, but then turned its back to them and offered the Pashtus the governance of Afghanistan. To add injury to insult they imposed a hugely centralized government system. This system was imposed by the American diplomat Khalilzad – himself of Pashtu descent. In its defense we are told that otherwise the Pasthus would become angry and not support us. But don’t expect the Pashtus to be grateful. Many of them sympathize with the Taliban and even president Karzai is pushing for negotiations with the Taliban. They know that Taliban rule means Pashtu rule.
A very basic strategy in Afghanistan would be to give the non-Pashtu provinces the tools to get rid of the Taliban. Many would jump at the chance. It would leave us with only the Pashtu provinces in the need of counterinsurgency. But it doesn’t fit in the US imposed system where only national institutions are reinforced. It looks like the US is incapable to discern its friends from its enemies. This reminds one of the dubious US friendships with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Saving Bosnia by making dissolution possible?
I am wondering whether the only way to save Bosnia is to make its dissolution possible.
My solution would be to give the Bosniaks what they want regarding provinces: split both the Federation and the RS is provinces. However, to keep the Serbs and the Croats happy two conditions should be satisfied: the borders of the RS should be maintained as provincial borders and one or more Croat provinces should be created. And after 5 years those provinces should have the right to secede (and join other countries).
Cutting up the Federation and the RS should diminsh the antagonism. The five years delay should give the Bosniak politicians time to decide whether they really want to live together with the Serbs and Croats. The right to secede would be a permanent stimulus against extremism. At the moment there is a strong current in the Bosniak community to make Bosnia into a Bosniak state with Croats and Serbs as second rate citizens. Bosnia needs some counterweight against that in order to prevent yet another case of "silent cleansing". As long as the Bosniaks refuse a census as that might reveal to which extent they have silently cleansed their part of Bosnia I think this is a risk. If there is insufficient enthousiasm after 5 years it would be over and the world would be relieved of its task to keep something together that doesn't want to be together.
I wouldn't mind to make the threshold for separation higher than 50%. I think separating a country is even more controversial than changing a constitution. So a similar procedure as for changing a constitution might be used. I have never understood why the West considers 50% enough for separatism. I can understand that if 55% is persistently in favor of separation you want to give it to them. But even then you could build in extra safeguards like demanding two referenda with a 4 year interval.
I talk deliberately about provinces instead of cantons as they would be quite different. First of all they would follow the ethnic borders - meaning for example a split of Mostar. They would also be much bigger so that they can take up more tasks - including control over the police. The total of Bosnia might be split in about 10 provinces.
Allthough the Federation and the RS would disappear as seperate administrative units with their own parliaments and ministers some remnants would remain in the form of cooperations of provinces. For example the energy operations of the RS might continue as a company "banja Luka power" owned by the Serb provinces. Pensions for war veterans is another subject that might probably better be handled separately by each group. It is still too much true that one side's heroes are another side's war criminals.
Here is an interesting piece about progress in Bosnia..
My solution would be to give the Bosniaks what they want regarding provinces: split both the Federation and the RS is provinces. However, to keep the Serbs and the Croats happy two conditions should be satisfied: the borders of the RS should be maintained as provincial borders and one or more Croat provinces should be created. And after 5 years those provinces should have the right to secede (and join other countries).
Cutting up the Federation and the RS should diminsh the antagonism. The five years delay should give the Bosniak politicians time to decide whether they really want to live together with the Serbs and Croats. The right to secede would be a permanent stimulus against extremism. At the moment there is a strong current in the Bosniak community to make Bosnia into a Bosniak state with Croats and Serbs as second rate citizens. Bosnia needs some counterweight against that in order to prevent yet another case of "silent cleansing". As long as the Bosniaks refuse a census as that might reveal to which extent they have silently cleansed their part of Bosnia I think this is a risk. If there is insufficient enthousiasm after 5 years it would be over and the world would be relieved of its task to keep something together that doesn't want to be together.
I wouldn't mind to make the threshold for separation higher than 50%. I think separating a country is even more controversial than changing a constitution. So a similar procedure as for changing a constitution might be used. I have never understood why the West considers 50% enough for separatism. I can understand that if 55% is persistently in favor of separation you want to give it to them. But even then you could build in extra safeguards like demanding two referenda with a 4 year interval.
I talk deliberately about provinces instead of cantons as they would be quite different. First of all they would follow the ethnic borders - meaning for example a split of Mostar. They would also be much bigger so that they can take up more tasks - including control over the police. The total of Bosnia might be split in about 10 provinces.
Allthough the Federation and the RS would disappear as seperate administrative units with their own parliaments and ministers some remnants would remain in the form of cooperations of provinces. For example the energy operations of the RS might continue as a company "banja Luka power" owned by the Serb provinces. Pensions for war veterans is another subject that might probably better be handled separately by each group. It is still too much true that one side's heroes are another side's war criminals.
Here is an interesting piece about progress in Bosnia..
Monday, July 20, 2009
Some thoughts on Bosnia
In a recent opinion piece William Montgomery criticizes Western Balkan policy:
This is because we continue to insist that it is possible, with enough pressure and encouragement, to establish fully functioning multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosovo with no change in borders. And we have consistently ignored all evidence to the contrary and branded as obstructionist anyone who speaks openly about alternative approaches.
The reality is that no amount of threats or inducements, including fast membership in the European Union or NATO, will persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cede a significant portion of the rights and privileges given them under the Dayton Agreement to the central government, as the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the international community are determined to bring about. The Bosnian Serbs are determined to have full control over their own destiny, and fear that if they continue to transfer authority to a central government, the more numerous Bosniaks will end up in control.
The end result is continued tension between the two Bosnian entities, a dysfunctional country, and the prospect of many more years of efforts by Western politicians — like Vice President Joe Biden on his recent visit — to pound a square peg into a round hole. .
Regarding a solution he writes: a solution probably involves shaping a different relationship within Bosnia and permitting the Republika Srpska, the Serbian portion of the divided country, to hold a referendum on independence. This would have to include a lot of guarantees about future relationships, and be done as a complete package led and implemented by the international community..
I am glad to see a more realistic policy. But I would like to see a more realistic view of a multi-ethnic society: a multi-ethnic society can only exist when the rights for all ethnic groups are guaranteed. One can discuss about the situation before the war, but just after a war it is ridiculous to assume that the Serbs will not be discriminated if Muslim politicians get the chance. Just study the history of American South after the civil war. So there is a need for iron guarantees like the existence of the RS. The RS is not part of the problem; it is part of the solution and a similar solution for Bosnia's Croats is necessary.
Inzko recently has used his Bonn powers to veto a decision by RS parliament to take back the powers it had ceded to Bosnia's central government. Parliamentarians later claimed that their resolution was meant symbolic. What I totally miss is the ideological perspective in Inzko's reaction. The implicit message in the Serb resolution is "we have given up enough; now it is up to the other side". Inzko should either prove this message incorrect or come up with some Muslim concession to get things going again.
In a more recent article from Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Senad Pećanin, director of the news weekly Dani, gives three reasons why Bosnia should stay united:
- the division of the country would not be just. It would represent a reward for ethnic cleansing and genocide.
- the division would not happen in a peaceful manner; that would be absolutely impossible. It is something which could not be done without a new war. The part of BiH with a majority Croat population would want to have the same rights as the Serbs, that is, to also secede and eventually join Croatia.
- a sort of European Gaza would be created for the Bosnian Muslims. This would be a clear message for radical Muslims; a confirmation for those who say that the international community, for three and a half years, did nothing to stop the war, the mass killings and the deportations of hundreds of thousands of people because, in reality, it was all a big conspiracy of Christians against Muslims.
This requires an answer:
- the reward of ethnic cleansing argument is an old one. But it ignores that ethnic cleansing happened on all sides. Ethnic cleansing is not only ethnic cleansing when it happens violently. This fact that it happened on all sides makes it practically impossible to turn the clock back and let everyone return. Sooner or later one will have to recognize this as the new reality.
- the ethnic cleansing argument also ignores that already before the war there was a demand by the Serbs (and to a lesser extent the Croats) to have institutionally guaranteed minority rights. Yugoslavia had offered such guarantees. When denied such rights the Serbs started a cruel war to get them the only sure way: a clearly demarcated area where they were the majority. But those rights should not have been contested in the first place.
- the war threat: I think a split of the Federation is inevitable. I find it rather stupid that this opportunistic war alliance now dictates a highly inefficient configuration of Bosnia. For the rest - as Montgomery writes - it is a matter of profound negotiations. Negotiations that should have been held in 1991 or 1992.
- I find the last point the most problematic. When Bosnia secedes from Yugoslavia or Kosovo secedes from Serbia it is considered normal, but when a Christian area wants to secede from a Muslim area it would be considered a big conspiracy of Christians against Muslims. Sounds like nonsense to me.
- Before World War II many countries had territorial claims. It was a heritage of the colonial expansion when there was enough for everyone to grab in Africa and Asia. Countries that missed the colonial tried it closer to home. Germany became obsessed with Lebensraum and contracts for minerals from the Balkans. Italy "needed" South Tirol for defense. Czechoslovakia "needed" (and got) Sudetenland for wealth and defense. Many countries thought that they didn't have enough and made trouble with their neighbors (Yugoslavia suffered from this as Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy were financing terrorism among its Croats and Macedonians). And so on. After World War II it was decided that this was a very bad way to deal with each other. Free trade and open borders were offered as better solution. And now Pećanin tells us that the Muslims somehow "need" the territory of the Serbs and the Croats. Sounds rather strange to me. If he somehow claimed that the Muslims didn't get a fair share of Bosnia it would be worth considering, but this is absurd.
- Would a split-up of Bosnia bring radical Muslims to power as the article claims? I don't think so. There nothing evil in giving everyone his share. And what would converting to radicalism help the Bosniaks?
In fact I believe that it is one of the first things we should do with Bosnia: talking about a split as an acceptable solution for a country that never really existed. Just as Montgomery says, a split would need extensive negotiations and international guarantees. But removing the taboo is an essential need for solving Bosnia's problems. It even increases the likelihood that Bosnia will stay together because negotiations will finally involve give-and-take from both sides instead of one-sided pressure on the Serbs.
This is because we continue to insist that it is possible, with enough pressure and encouragement, to establish fully functioning multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosovo with no change in borders. And we have consistently ignored all evidence to the contrary and branded as obstructionist anyone who speaks openly about alternative approaches.
The reality is that no amount of threats or inducements, including fast membership in the European Union or NATO, will persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cede a significant portion of the rights and privileges given them under the Dayton Agreement to the central government, as the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the international community are determined to bring about. The Bosnian Serbs are determined to have full control over their own destiny, and fear that if they continue to transfer authority to a central government, the more numerous Bosniaks will end up in control.
The end result is continued tension between the two Bosnian entities, a dysfunctional country, and the prospect of many more years of efforts by Western politicians — like Vice President Joe Biden on his recent visit — to pound a square peg into a round hole. .
Regarding a solution he writes: a solution probably involves shaping a different relationship within Bosnia and permitting the Republika Srpska, the Serbian portion of the divided country, to hold a referendum on independence. This would have to include a lot of guarantees about future relationships, and be done as a complete package led and implemented by the international community..
I am glad to see a more realistic policy. But I would like to see a more realistic view of a multi-ethnic society: a multi-ethnic society can only exist when the rights for all ethnic groups are guaranteed. One can discuss about the situation before the war, but just after a war it is ridiculous to assume that the Serbs will not be discriminated if Muslim politicians get the chance. Just study the history of American South after the civil war. So there is a need for iron guarantees like the existence of the RS. The RS is not part of the problem; it is part of the solution and a similar solution for Bosnia's Croats is necessary.
Inzko recently has used his Bonn powers to veto a decision by RS parliament to take back the powers it had ceded to Bosnia's central government. Parliamentarians later claimed that their resolution was meant symbolic. What I totally miss is the ideological perspective in Inzko's reaction. The implicit message in the Serb resolution is "we have given up enough; now it is up to the other side". Inzko should either prove this message incorrect or come up with some Muslim concession to get things going again.
In a more recent article from Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Senad Pećanin, director of the news weekly Dani, gives three reasons why Bosnia should stay united:
- the division of the country would not be just. It would represent a reward for ethnic cleansing and genocide.
- the division would not happen in a peaceful manner; that would be absolutely impossible. It is something which could not be done without a new war. The part of BiH with a majority Croat population would want to have the same rights as the Serbs, that is, to also secede and eventually join Croatia.
- a sort of European Gaza would be created for the Bosnian Muslims. This would be a clear message for radical Muslims; a confirmation for those who say that the international community, for three and a half years, did nothing to stop the war, the mass killings and the deportations of hundreds of thousands of people because, in reality, it was all a big conspiracy of Christians against Muslims.
This requires an answer:
- the reward of ethnic cleansing argument is an old one. But it ignores that ethnic cleansing happened on all sides. Ethnic cleansing is not only ethnic cleansing when it happens violently. This fact that it happened on all sides makes it practically impossible to turn the clock back and let everyone return. Sooner or later one will have to recognize this as the new reality.
- the ethnic cleansing argument also ignores that already before the war there was a demand by the Serbs (and to a lesser extent the Croats) to have institutionally guaranteed minority rights. Yugoslavia had offered such guarantees. When denied such rights the Serbs started a cruel war to get them the only sure way: a clearly demarcated area where they were the majority. But those rights should not have been contested in the first place.
- the war threat: I think a split of the Federation is inevitable. I find it rather stupid that this opportunistic war alliance now dictates a highly inefficient configuration of Bosnia. For the rest - as Montgomery writes - it is a matter of profound negotiations. Negotiations that should have been held in 1991 or 1992.
- I find the last point the most problematic. When Bosnia secedes from Yugoslavia or Kosovo secedes from Serbia it is considered normal, but when a Christian area wants to secede from a Muslim area it would be considered a big conspiracy of Christians against Muslims. Sounds like nonsense to me.
- Before World War II many countries had territorial claims. It was a heritage of the colonial expansion when there was enough for everyone to grab in Africa and Asia. Countries that missed the colonial tried it closer to home. Germany became obsessed with Lebensraum and contracts for minerals from the Balkans. Italy "needed" South Tirol for defense. Czechoslovakia "needed" (and got) Sudetenland for wealth and defense. Many countries thought that they didn't have enough and made trouble with their neighbors (Yugoslavia suffered from this as Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy were financing terrorism among its Croats and Macedonians). And so on. After World War II it was decided that this was a very bad way to deal with each other. Free trade and open borders were offered as better solution. And now Pećanin tells us that the Muslims somehow "need" the territory of the Serbs and the Croats. Sounds rather strange to me. If he somehow claimed that the Muslims didn't get a fair share of Bosnia it would be worth considering, but this is absurd.
- Would a split-up of Bosnia bring radical Muslims to power as the article claims? I don't think so. There nothing evil in giving everyone his share. And what would converting to radicalism help the Bosniaks?
In fact I believe that it is one of the first things we should do with Bosnia: talking about a split as an acceptable solution for a country that never really existed. Just as Montgomery says, a split would need extensive negotiations and international guarantees. But removing the taboo is an essential need for solving Bosnia's problems. It even increases the likelihood that Bosnia will stay together because negotiations will finally involve give-and-take from both sides instead of one-sided pressure on the Serbs.
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
Escalation in Bosnia
With the Republika Srpska suing 9 people including US representative Raffi Gregorian for “conspiring against Republika Srpska” Bosnia seems to face a new crisis. Lajcak, Bosnia's top international envoy, immediately chose the old international strategy of parrying Serb actions with threats, saying "We don’t have to go back too far into the history to see how defying the international community usually ends up".
I think mr. Lajcak is missing the point here. This is not about ethnic conflicts - at least it should be. This is about the borders between a criminal investigation and a political abuse of judicial powers. The rude reaction of mr. Lajcak suggests that he may very well be on the wrong side of the fine line between those two positions:
- If anything, the Federation in Bosnia is considered more rather than less corrupt than the RS. This raises the question why we hear only about such investigations regarding the RS.
- Parliamentary democracies generally know legal immunity for top politicians. Now, in the rather unsettled situation of Bosnia Dodik is not officially on the top level but he is the leader of one of the main political currents in the country, so some judicial restraint is justified. Specially from foreigners.
That doesn't mean that corruption shouldn't be addressed. But it does imply that care should be taken not to confuse the fight against corruption with politics. There are many ways to achieve that.
Will this restraint harm the fight against corruption? I don't think so. On the contrary, it prevents the fight against corruption from becoming politicized. Such politization only increases corruption as the focus comes on a few high-profile cases and politicians start to see the fight as a political tool rather than as a good cause.
As for Dodik, the main goal should be to have him behave more honest, not on getting him behind bars or out of office. He is a politician for a part of Bosnia's Serbs. They should decide when he has to give up his position. The international community should instead focus on the monetary aspect. They have given money to Bosnia and if Dodik is wasting some of that they should insist that transactions are turned back or money is paid back.
I think mr. Lajcak is missing the point here. This is not about ethnic conflicts - at least it should be. This is about the borders between a criminal investigation and a political abuse of judicial powers. The rude reaction of mr. Lajcak suggests that he may very well be on the wrong side of the fine line between those two positions:
- If anything, the Federation in Bosnia is considered more rather than less corrupt than the RS. This raises the question why we hear only about such investigations regarding the RS.
- Parliamentary democracies generally know legal immunity for top politicians. Now, in the rather unsettled situation of Bosnia Dodik is not officially on the top level but he is the leader of one of the main political currents in the country, so some judicial restraint is justified. Specially from foreigners.
That doesn't mean that corruption shouldn't be addressed. But it does imply that care should be taken not to confuse the fight against corruption with politics. There are many ways to achieve that.
Will this restraint harm the fight against corruption? I don't think so. On the contrary, it prevents the fight against corruption from becoming politicized. Such politization only increases corruption as the focus comes on a few high-profile cases and politicians start to see the fight as a political tool rather than as a good cause.
As for Dodik, the main goal should be to have him behave more honest, not on getting him behind bars or out of office. He is a politician for a part of Bosnia's Serbs. They should decide when he has to give up his position. The international community should instead focus on the monetary aspect. They have given money to Bosnia and if Dodik is wasting some of that they should insist that transactions are turned back or money is paid back.
Sunday, November 04, 2007
What Lajčák is doing wrong in Bosnia
On 25 april 2006 a proposed reform of the Bosnian constitution did not reach the required 2/3 majority. Most votes against came from the SBiH led by Silajdžić.
Silajdžić was one of the negotiators at Dayton and his signature is under the treaty. Yet he does not recognize the treaty and he says that he only signed it to prevent further killing. He compares it to signing with a gun at your head. According to his view Bosnia's constitution of 1992 is still valid. This has given him the freedom to call for the immediate abolishment of the Serb Republic and to denounce it as a product of ethnic cleansing.
Signing the new constitution would have meant that he committed himself to a constitution that recognises the Serb Republic and most of Dayton. He could still call for the abolition of the RS, but he would have committed himself to rules that make it very improbable to happen. (I attended a meeting of his supporters before the vote: the most heard complaint was that they didn't get enough back in exchange for giving up their rejection of Dayton.) After torpedoing the new constition Silajdzic has increased his rethorics against the RS and won the next elections on that theme.
The attitude of the international community to the rejection of the new constitution was amazing. There was only some soft protest and after that it became silent. Given that Silajdzic is well connected in international diplomatic circles one wonders whether some diplomats condoned or even encouraged his sabotage. The open way in which Silajdzic rejects Dayton would have never been accepted from a Serb leader.
But what I find most problematic are Silajdzic' claims that the RS is the product of ethnic cleansing. This has become a "political correct" way to utter a blatantly racist message. The implicit message (and sometimes Silajdzic has been quite explicit about it) is that all Serbs are ethnic cleansers and murderers and that as such they don't deserve equal treatment and minority rights.
Now Lajčák is rewarding Silajdzic for his obstructionist behaviour. He is going to impose reforms that weaken the Serb position without asking anything from the Muslim side in return.
Parliamentary veto rights
There are two different ways to guarantee minority rights. One is assigning autonomous areas like the Serb Republic. The other is veto rights, like the double majority requirement (the Badinter principle) that guarantees the rights of Macedonia's Albanians.
The rule that Lajčák now abolishes is a very weak version of the Badinter principle. It had been introduced to seduce the Serb Republic to cede some competences to the central government.
Lajčák now claims that exercising these rights amounts to obstruction. But higher houses like the senate in the US and the House of Lords in the UK and the fillibuster represent the same principle: they give minorities the right to block a decision. This makes negotiation necessary but that is part of the political game. That this does not work in Bosnia would rather suggest a lack of willingness to compromise and that comes to a large extent from the Muslim side.
Lajčák claims that he wants to normalise the situation in Bosnia. But he seems not to realise that Silajdžić's rejection of Dayton is hanging as a huge black cloud over Bosnia and that normalisation is not possible as long as it stays there.
Bonn powers
In 1997 the Western countries gave Bosnia's High Representative the "Bonn powers". These were meant to help him overcome obstruction. They have mainly been used to fire some majors who blocked refugee returns.
Now Lajcak is using these powers in a completely different way. The possibility to block decisions with the quorum rule was given to the Serbs by the international community and so one can hardly blame them for using it. If Lajcak believes that the Serbs abused this possibility - and that it was not Muslim stubbornness to compromise that caused them to do so - he should have built a case first - for example by denouncing individual laws that were blocked this way.
The Bonn powers were meant to be used against a few "bad apples". By using it against the Serb community as a whole Lajcak takes a dangerous step. It will certainly not help Bosnia's democracy.
Another strange aspect of Lajcak's ruling is the overkill. His predecssors imposed very specific measures. They might fire some majors but they didn't change the way majors were appointed. Lajcak is doing the opposite: he could have imposed those disputed laws (like the police reform), but he chose to use those specific complaints to change some very fundamental rules.
Christian Schwarz-Schilling
Lajcak's precessor Christian Schwarz-Schilling is often blamed for being too lax. But he nearly achieved a new constitution that would have done much to normalize the situation in Bosnia. With more international support he might well have achieved it.
But it looks like some Western diplomats don't like it when ethnic conflicts are solved the way they should be: with compromises and small steps that - when successful - create trust for the next step. They prefer to have good guys to support and bad guys to pummel.
With Lajcak this type of diplomat is back in charge and they may well push Bosnia again in the abyss, just as they did in the early 1990s when they at several stages encouraged Bosnia's Muslims not to sign compromises but instead to hold out for something better.
The ethnic balance
Ethnic relations are based on trust. Outside interventions that favor one side above the other can easily destroy that trust. On the losing side it generates a lot of distrust, while on the winning side it gives ultra-nationalists a feeling of invincibility that easily leads to racism and ethnic cleansing.
Bosnia lost that inter-ethnic trust with the Wests rashed recognition and refound it with Dayton. Now Lajcak is out to destroy that trust again with possible disastrous consequences. We should not let this happen.
The role of the USA
In recent years the visible American role in Bosnia had been rather minor. But while European diplomats have generaly reacted rather puzzled to the recent crisis the Americans have reacted resolutely in support of Lajcak's measures. In a short time we saw supporting statements for Lajcak from the US ambassadors in Bosnia and Serbia, Gregorian and several State Department officials. At the same the ambassador in Serbia attacked the RS for separatism and a Soros funded foundation lanced a rabid attack on the Serb psychiatric system.
See also the rather misleading statements by Lajcak's deputy - the American Raffi Gregorian - for the US Helsinki commission. Gregorian is acting here as if the US government is his second boss: it would be unthinkable to see Lajcak before a Slovene parliament commission.
This all makes me believe that this is a well orchestrated campaign of some American diplomats with Lajcak and Silajdzic to change the balance of power in Bosnia once and for all.
My expectation how this will play out is as follows:
- Lajcak will continue to ignore all criticism and questions about the effects of his actions on Bosnia's ethnic balance. Instead he will adopt a "presidential" attitude and repeat that he is acting in the interest of Bosnia's integration into the EU. This is a man who just like Ahtisaari has sold his soul in exchange for an international carreer.
Lajcak's ultimatum ends on 1 december. Bosnia's Serbs have anounced to withdraw from parliament if he imposes his decisions. Lajcak will not budge.
- the American diplomats (Gregorian, English, Burns, etc.) will continue to act as the attack dogs. They will interpret any criticism of Lacjak as an attack against the international community and criticize any Serb move as another manifestation of their evil nationalism.
US policies are very much driven by interest groups and my guess would be that there is some oil money behind this policy.
- The big question is what Europe will do. American Balkan policies typically consist of a lot of propaganda and pressure after which it lets Europe do the irreversible steps. We saw this with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the Badinter commission. The recognition of Kosovo will probably be played in the same way. For the moment Europe is just confused about what is happening in Bosnia. But when Lajcak keeps seeking the confrontation they will have to chose sides at some time.
Silajdžić was one of the negotiators at Dayton and his signature is under the treaty. Yet he does not recognize the treaty and he says that he only signed it to prevent further killing. He compares it to signing with a gun at your head. According to his view Bosnia's constitution of 1992 is still valid. This has given him the freedom to call for the immediate abolishment of the Serb Republic and to denounce it as a product of ethnic cleansing.
Signing the new constitution would have meant that he committed himself to a constitution that recognises the Serb Republic and most of Dayton. He could still call for the abolition of the RS, but he would have committed himself to rules that make it very improbable to happen. (I attended a meeting of his supporters before the vote: the most heard complaint was that they didn't get enough back in exchange for giving up their rejection of Dayton.) After torpedoing the new constition Silajdzic has increased his rethorics against the RS and won the next elections on that theme.
The attitude of the international community to the rejection of the new constitution was amazing. There was only some soft protest and after that it became silent. Given that Silajdzic is well connected in international diplomatic circles one wonders whether some diplomats condoned or even encouraged his sabotage. The open way in which Silajdzic rejects Dayton would have never been accepted from a Serb leader.
But what I find most problematic are Silajdzic' claims that the RS is the product of ethnic cleansing. This has become a "political correct" way to utter a blatantly racist message. The implicit message (and sometimes Silajdzic has been quite explicit about it) is that all Serbs are ethnic cleansers and murderers and that as such they don't deserve equal treatment and minority rights.
Now Lajčák is rewarding Silajdzic for his obstructionist behaviour. He is going to impose reforms that weaken the Serb position without asking anything from the Muslim side in return.
Parliamentary veto rights
There are two different ways to guarantee minority rights. One is assigning autonomous areas like the Serb Republic. The other is veto rights, like the double majority requirement (the Badinter principle) that guarantees the rights of Macedonia's Albanians.
The rule that Lajčák now abolishes is a very weak version of the Badinter principle. It had been introduced to seduce the Serb Republic to cede some competences to the central government.
Lajčák now claims that exercising these rights amounts to obstruction. But higher houses like the senate in the US and the House of Lords in the UK and the fillibuster represent the same principle: they give minorities the right to block a decision. This makes negotiation necessary but that is part of the political game. That this does not work in Bosnia would rather suggest a lack of willingness to compromise and that comes to a large extent from the Muslim side.
Lajčák claims that he wants to normalise the situation in Bosnia. But he seems not to realise that Silajdžić's rejection of Dayton is hanging as a huge black cloud over Bosnia and that normalisation is not possible as long as it stays there.
Bonn powers
In 1997 the Western countries gave Bosnia's High Representative the "Bonn powers". These were meant to help him overcome obstruction. They have mainly been used to fire some majors who blocked refugee returns.
Now Lajcak is using these powers in a completely different way. The possibility to block decisions with the quorum rule was given to the Serbs by the international community and so one can hardly blame them for using it. If Lajcak believes that the Serbs abused this possibility - and that it was not Muslim stubbornness to compromise that caused them to do so - he should have built a case first - for example by denouncing individual laws that were blocked this way.
The Bonn powers were meant to be used against a few "bad apples". By using it against the Serb community as a whole Lajcak takes a dangerous step. It will certainly not help Bosnia's democracy.
Another strange aspect of Lajcak's ruling is the overkill. His predecssors imposed very specific measures. They might fire some majors but they didn't change the way majors were appointed. Lajcak is doing the opposite: he could have imposed those disputed laws (like the police reform), but he chose to use those specific complaints to change some very fundamental rules.
Christian Schwarz-Schilling
Lajcak's precessor Christian Schwarz-Schilling is often blamed for being too lax. But he nearly achieved a new constitution that would have done much to normalize the situation in Bosnia. With more international support he might well have achieved it.
But it looks like some Western diplomats don't like it when ethnic conflicts are solved the way they should be: with compromises and small steps that - when successful - create trust for the next step. They prefer to have good guys to support and bad guys to pummel.
With Lajcak this type of diplomat is back in charge and they may well push Bosnia again in the abyss, just as they did in the early 1990s when they at several stages encouraged Bosnia's Muslims not to sign compromises but instead to hold out for something better.
The ethnic balance
Ethnic relations are based on trust. Outside interventions that favor one side above the other can easily destroy that trust. On the losing side it generates a lot of distrust, while on the winning side it gives ultra-nationalists a feeling of invincibility that easily leads to racism and ethnic cleansing.
Bosnia lost that inter-ethnic trust with the Wests rashed recognition and refound it with Dayton. Now Lajcak is out to destroy that trust again with possible disastrous consequences. We should not let this happen.
The role of the USA
In recent years the visible American role in Bosnia had been rather minor. But while European diplomats have generaly reacted rather puzzled to the recent crisis the Americans have reacted resolutely in support of Lajcak's measures. In a short time we saw supporting statements for Lajcak from the US ambassadors in Bosnia and Serbia, Gregorian and several State Department officials. At the same the ambassador in Serbia attacked the RS for separatism and a Soros funded foundation lanced a rabid attack on the Serb psychiatric system.
See also the rather misleading statements by Lajcak's deputy - the American Raffi Gregorian - for the US Helsinki commission. Gregorian is acting here as if the US government is his second boss: it would be unthinkable to see Lajcak before a Slovene parliament commission.
This all makes me believe that this is a well orchestrated campaign of some American diplomats with Lajcak and Silajdzic to change the balance of power in Bosnia once and for all.
My expectation how this will play out is as follows:
- Lajcak will continue to ignore all criticism and questions about the effects of his actions on Bosnia's ethnic balance. Instead he will adopt a "presidential" attitude and repeat that he is acting in the interest of Bosnia's integration into the EU. This is a man who just like Ahtisaari has sold his soul in exchange for an international carreer.
Lajcak's ultimatum ends on 1 december. Bosnia's Serbs have anounced to withdraw from parliament if he imposes his decisions. Lajcak will not budge.
- the American diplomats (Gregorian, English, Burns, etc.) will continue to act as the attack dogs. They will interpret any criticism of Lacjak as an attack against the international community and criticize any Serb move as another manifestation of their evil nationalism.
US policies are very much driven by interest groups and my guess would be that there is some oil money behind this policy.
- The big question is what Europe will do. American Balkan policies typically consist of a lot of propaganda and pressure after which it lets Europe do the irreversible steps. We saw this with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the Badinter commission. The recognition of Kosovo will probably be played in the same way. For the moment Europe is just confused about what is happening in Bosnia. But when Lajcak keeps seeking the confrontation they will have to chose sides at some time.
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