Interview with Peter Feith

Note: this is my own translation of an interview of Peter Feith with the NRC Handelsblad (a Dutch newspaper). Please excuse my imperfect english. At one point in the interview it looks like the words police and politics have been confused: this was so in the dutch original.

"Kosovars expect fast a better life"

Ducthman Pieter Feith will supervise Kosovo's government from next week.
The UN withdraws from Kosovo, the EU takes over the mission - under the guidance of Dutchman Peter Feith. A mighty man, who can abolish laws and fire officials.

By our reporter Petra de Koning
Brussel, 16 febr. The Americans - and not the Europeans who now come to help - are the heroes of the Albanians in Kosovo. „They are still seen as the liberators of the repression by the former Serb president Milosevic”, says the Dutch high diplomat Pieter Feith. „But that is going to change now.” From next week he will supervise Kosovo's on behalf of the EU and the international community.

If Kosovo declares independence from Serbia next sunday it is expected that the government of prime minister Hasim Thaci will ask the EU officially for support. But the nearly 2000 cops, judges, prosecutors and officials from EU member states that will travel to Kosovo wiill not be received with flowers like the American soldiers after the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. Nine year of UN rule did not bring the inhabitants of Kosovo the prosperity and freedom that they had hoped.

If any Kosovar will be waiting along the roadside when Feith arrives next week in the capital Pristina, they will mostly want to ask the special EU representative something: „The expectations are high”, says Feith. „It is expected that their quality of life and economic circumstances will improve rapidly.”

Feith (63), who prior mediated on behalf of NATO between Serbs and Albanians in South-Serbia and Macedonia, will not only be a representative of the EU . He will also be ‘international representative’ in Kosovo – he leads the international civilian office in Kosovo - in which also Amercicans participate. They pay a quarter of the budget of his office (the EU pays half) and his deputy is an American, Fletcher Burton.

The Kosovaren think that in the end their former liberators will determine what happens. The Americans, says Feith, have „unmistakenly” more authority in Kosovo than de Europeans. „But the EU nor the Amerikans will be able to fullfill their high expectations.”

The Kosovo mission is by the EU. The Kosovars will address the EU when they are not contented.
„That is right.”

The Americans stay their heroes.
„I told prime minister Hasim Thaci already once that Kosovo will never be the 51st state of the United States. But Kosovo does have a chance to become a member of the EU. The memory of 1999 will fade, the future is to the EU. But we will have to explain clearly that durable improvement of life circumstances can only come from the Kosovo government. They have to address the corruption and organised crime.”

What is Kosovo's biggest problem?
„Kosovo must consolidate like a multi-etnic state. The rights of minorities must be respected and fixed in legislation. Another big problem is unemployment of 44 percent. There is little initiative: obviously Kosovo has been too long under UN rule.”

And then, as europarlementarians said previously, arises a ‘protectorate mentatlity’?
„A mentality of dependency: ‘The administrators from outside will have to solve it for us.’ That should change by independence.”

Kosovo must ‘consolidate’ as multi-etnic state, you say. But does it function now? The Serb minority in Kosovo is afraid.
„Maybe they are safer than they feel. The KFOR soldiers are still there. But the feeling of safety should not only depend on that, there must come a natural basis for it. We have also the problem of the return of Serb refugees to Kosovo. That process is manipulated.’’

Serbia blocks the return?
„Yes.”

Serbia will certianly not stop to do that after Kosovo's independence.
„That is very likely. But must we reign to that? Serbia wants to be a part of the EU too.”

Will you as a EU representative in Kosovo also jusge whether Serbia behaves well enough to become a EU member?
„As EU we want to project our values, like those about a well functioning multi-ethnic state. If serbia keeps rejecting that you can wonder whether it qualifies for the next step towards Europe.”

In your contact with Serbia that will be your source of power: you are the forward EU post that looks if Serbia satisfies.
„That will indeed give me some preponderance, when you assume that my recommendations will be followed in Brussel. It can not be that the Serbians isolate Kosovo and also continue towards Europa.”

Will they understand that fast?
„I think that after an initial period of obstruction the moods will calm down.”

Inside Kosovo too your power will be based on the wish to become a EU member.
„I have executive powers. I can annul legislation, fire corrupt officials, cancel government decisions. But I am impressed with the intentions of Kosovo's politicians. Today or tomorrow a constitution will be published, that will be checked by me and my organisation and will be approved by parliament tomorrow.”

But also without special powers you would have authority by your judgement of Kosovo as a prospective EU member.
„Yes, and Kosovo gets offered a treasure of experience. The future is to the Kosovars, I don't want them to have excuses not to help the country forward. But we will do it differently than in Bosnia where the international community still takes important decisions. We are concerned to hand over responsibilities.”

A French ex-general leads the mission of police and jurists. You are the highest international representative. Who is the boss?
„If it concerns politics, I advice the french commander.”

Can you imagine that in a couple of years Serbia and Kosovo will be EU members?
„Over mány years. It is primarily about the perspective. That is an encouragement to keep reforming. The willingness to help them is large.”

Because of their conflict.
„Yes, but one of the first conditions will be to improve their mutual relations. It would be a serious mistake to add two new member states who have a conflict.”

The EU already has Cyprus, that has a conflict with prospective member Turkey. That is complicated enough.
„You say that.”

The impossibility of peacekeeping

Sometimes peacekeeping works. This is usally when the peacekeepers have to separate two well-armed factions. In that case there is no easy win and both faction see an advantage.

The situation becomes different when one or both sides believe that they have a chance to win. In that case it is very difficult to maintain te peace. There are two variations on this theme:
- in one scenario both sides believe that they have a chance to win. For example Croatia in 1991/1992, Bosnia, Kosovo before the war, or Darfur. In such cases we see regularly breaks of the armistice and even if one side is really committed they often give up when the other side keeps violating it. The peacekeepers are sitting in between and can do little more than register the violations.
- in the other scenario one side is definitely weaker and the main job of the peacekeepers is to protect them. In reality this is nearly impossible. We saw it in Croatia 1994/1995, regionally in Bosnia and in Kosovo after the war. The dominant party an ignore the peacekeepers when it suits them and they can do nothing against it.

Peacekeepers have tried a variety of strategies to remedy this powerlessness:
- In Kosovo they have been able to improve the situation by promising independence and pointing out that violence hurts that prospect. But such an approach has two weeknesses: it doesn't help for the light violence that doesn't reach the newspapers and it won't work anymore after the promissed independence has been delivered.
- Another strategy is to choose sides. The bombing of Serb targets in 1995 and 1999 worked along these lines. But while it changes the balance of power it just increases the chance that the supported side will become the aggressor.
- A final trick is to support the violations. The way the West reacted when the Serb enclaves in Croatia were destroyed was an example of this strategy. Aggression was relabelled as justified action.

I believe that all these strategies are lacking. In my opinion the only thing that works is empowerment. Give the weaker party control over its own safety. Do not ask them to give up their arms. But don't choose sides and be prepared to censor the weaker side when they become aggressive.

In my opinion missions like KFOR or Eulex in Kosovo are inherently flawed as they do not follow this criterium. This is because there starting-point is not a balance but the conviction that one side has to dominate. In my opinion this is a very dangerous idea as domination is associated with superiority and discrimination. Eulex has two missions: protecting Kosovo's Serbs and dispowering them. These policies are contradictory and will in the end do more harm than good.

History repeating itself

I find it frightening to see how closely the situation around Kosovo's independence resembles that around Croatia's independence in 1991/1992. Both then and now the US was pushing an independence that on itself was not very controversial. But by pushing it under controversial conditions the US creates a mess. Let's compare:

- Croatia's independence was not controversial. Neither is Kosovo's: older opinion polls show that the majority of the Serbs could live with a partition of Kosovo - what amounts to independent for the Albanian part. Serbia's objections are in both cases based on their claim that according to international law they have the power to dictate conditions and unilateral moves by the other side are not allowed.
More recently Serb politicians have spoken out against partition and opinion polls show less support for partition. I think this happened mainly because internationals and Albanians interpreted partition as giving up on the Serbs south of the Ibar. I believe these objections can be overcome with a good proposal.

- in both cases Serbia's main objections concern the fate of the Serb minority. With good reason: In 1991 large numbers of Serbs were leaving Croatia and the fate of Kosovo's Serbs is well known.
A recent opinion poll among Kosovo's Serbs showed that 30% plans to leave when Kosovo becomes independent and 60% plans to stay. The departures will likely be concentrated in the smaller settlements south of the Ibar where a clear majority will leave. Quite a few Serb villages may be emptied. Serbs elsewhere now feel still protected by numbers, parallel structures and peacekeepers. But when Kosovo's government will increase its grip and the peacekeepers start leaving they will feel the same pressure to leave.

- in both cases the West is playing down the security side of the problem. Yet there is for the Serb side the real problem:
In Croatia Western diplomats kept repeating that the Serbs didn't need to worry because Western pressure (and in the end EU admission) would sooner or later force Croatia to adopt better minority rights anyway. In the mean time the Serbs were leaving... Nowadays Croatia has 400,000 Serbs less and there is hardly anybody left to give autonomy to. And with the Serb population the Western pressure to give autonomy has evaporated.
The Ahtisaari proposal in Kosovo would be a quite decent proposal if autonomy was the only issue. But the main issue is security and Ahtisaari is very silent on that. I expect that in a couple of years when the great majority of Kosovo's Serbs has left Kosovo will silently revoke the autonomy.
But don't expect those Western diplomats and politicians to be repentent for what they have done. They will blame everything on Serb nationalists.

- in both cases it is the US that is pushing for independence. Yet they do not take the initiative but instead press other countries to do so. In 1991 it was Germany that did the dirty work for the US and it looks that Germany is prepared to do it again.

- in both cases the US is pushing for conditions that are seen in Serbia as extremely unfair. In the case of Croatia it insisted on Croatia's territorial integrity while it neglected to stress the right of the Serbs for autonomy and human rights. In the end it even helped Croatia to clean many of its remaining Serbs in Operation Storm. In Kosovo we see the same: the right for self-determination of the Albanians is stressed while they support the Ahtisaari plan that offers hardly any protection for the Serb minority. They may even try to help cleanse the Serbs. They tried it already once in 2001, when they searched Serb houses in northern Mitrovica for arms while the Albanians planned a violent demonstration in the south of the city that hoped to overrun the Serb dominated north side.

- in both cases the EU reacts puzzled and doesn't know what to do. This offers the possibility for the US to impose their solution by forming a "coalition of the willing" that then pressures the rest of the EU to follow their lead in the name of "unity".

- negotiations turn out to be fake as the secessionists (Croats and Kosovo) already have the assurance from Washington that they will be recognized. They don't see any need to do concessions.

- in the case of Croatia the EU created a legal excuse for their decision with the Badinter Commission. It looks we will now see a similar attempt for a legal excuse.

- The policy drives Serbia towards radical policies. But the countries that are favoured with these policies pay also a high price. Croatia and Bosnia saw several years of war. Even without war Kosovo may stay in legal limbo for many years.

- In both cases simple measures could have saved the situation. In the case of Croatia there were two points were the West could have done better. The first point was before the independence declarations when they could have explicitly declared that Yugoslavia's central government had the right to military intervention if the republics tried to secede with reaching agreement with Belgrade first. This would have forced Slovenia and Croatia to give up on independence. Most probably they would have soon afterwards consented to federal elections - something they had opposed until then. But a consensual secession would also have been possible. The West followed this course with the Soviet Union, but somehow failed to do it with Yugoslavia.
A second point was after the secession was more or less a fact and it came to recognising Slovenia and Croatia. The West could have demanded that certain minority rights problems were repaired before it granted recognition. As both had minority problems (Slovenia had its "erased") that would have been a strong signal towards these victorious nationalists that we would not accept them unless they behaved themselves.
In Kosovo the most obvious holes in the Ahtisaari plan should be fixed:
1) Serb villages south of Ibar get local parttime policemen. Being in service for only one day a week they wouldn't cost much, but as trained policemen they would have the right to carry a gun and to arrest people outside their working hours this would mean that there would always be somebody to deter criminal attacks.
2) Serb municipalities get the right to appoint their own police chiefs. Of course there is a risk that some of them will appoint a radical. But theer is just as well a risk that Pristina appoints a police chief who is connected to radicals or organised crime. Trust should go both ways.
3) Serbs get control over their own economy. Privitisation and permits are major tools to discriminate minorities. Where possible it will be decentralised. Privatisation of Brezovica will become an affair of Kosovo's Serbs. They will decide whether to privitise and if they want to privitise they will select the buyer.
4) Kosovo's north tip and Strpce get a special status as Serb majority areas. They can decide over all developments in their area. This should give them the power to resist attempt by Pristina to Albanise those areas.
5) Introduce the (Ahtisaari and other) reforms now and let them be in effect for 6 months. If they work they will build trust for independence. If they don't work we will need additional reforms. This is also in line with the "standards before status" principle and with the principle that basic human rights should not be subject of negotiations.

The question is why the US is following this kind of catastrophic policy. I believe things went wrong around 1991-1993. The old guard of diplomats (like ambassadors Eagleburger and Scanlan) were business man diplomats who didn't have a clue what was happening and who advocated a wait-and-see attitude. But at the same time the cold warriors at the State Department were enthusiastic about Slovene and Croat elections and irritated by Yugoslavia's lack of "reform". When these cold warriors undermined Yugoslavia's stability and Yugoslavia descended in open war this old guard became incredible and had to give way in the end.

Since then traditional diplomats who value stability have been out of the loop and the policy towards ex-Yugoslavia has been determined by a coalition of non-Serb ethnic interest groups and self styled idealists for whom being anti-Serb is the politically correct attitude.

Answer to Vetevendosja

Vetevendosja has sent an open letter to the foreign ministers of the EU member nations. I will react to some parts of their (rather long) letter.

"This new EU mission has been described as a ‘state-building’ mission and one which will lay the groundwork for an independent Kosova. [...] Furthermore, it will be based upon a Resolution which expressly states in Article 10, that the international mission has as its goal the restoration of ‘substantial autonomy’ for Kosova within Serbia."

- I was surprised to see Albanian nationalists confirm that resolution 1244 does not allow for an independent Kosovo.

"First, the establishment of this new EU mission has been agreed without consulting the people of Kosova. Its existence is based on the (Martti) Ahtisaari Settlement which has not been accepted officially as part of any ‘status’ agreement for Kosova. [...] This is a decision that can only be made by all the people of Kosova, voting in a referendum as an expression of our right to self-determination guaranteed by international conventions to which all of your member states subscribe."

- Sorry, Kosovo isn't independent yet. The Spanish Basques don't have the right to organise an independence referendum either. Slovakia became independent without a referendum.
- Note also the resistance against the Ahtisaari plan. It confirms me in my fears that the implementation of the plan will not be wholeheartedly and will be continuously sabotaged.

"Second, this new EU mission is doomed to fail because although it proclaims that it is coming to help build democracy in Kosova, it will be undemocratic. The International Civilian Office (ICO) will hold executive power in Kosova, ensuring that the political pluralism we enjoy remains simply a façade,
[...]
We want the EU to be in Kosova helping us to build our institutions and monitoring minority rights, but we do not need to be governed by the EU. Democracy cannot be established through a system which is undemocratic. It can only be slowly destroyed. The turnout in the last election is evidence enough to prove this point."

- As I have repeatedly written I agree with this. The EU mission should restrict itself to minority rights and leave economics to Kosovo. Of course they will influence Kosovo's economic policies in the context of the path to EU membership. But this is a different process that doesn't involve the right to fire people.

"Ahtisaari’s Settlement will accentuate the ‘ethnic’ nature of the Kosova conflict, rather than resolving its political causes. It prescribes decentralization along ethnic lines which will create a Serb entity inside Kosova, like Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Six new Serb majority municipalities will be created, containing most of the key mineral and water resources of Kosova, for example, the reservoir of Gazivodë which supplies 60% of Kosova’s water. These municipalities will be linked territorially and administratively, and have the right to be funded by Belgrade. The parallel structures which have functioned in these areas, without obstruction by UNMIK since 1999, will be legalized and all the Serbs who work in these structures will still receive their salaries from Belgrade. Thus, Serbia’s influence in Kosova will be strengthened by this plan, not weakened. Once more, Serbs in Kosova will be instrumentalized by Serbia, which has consistently refused to allow them to integrate."

- Come on, guys, the conflict is ethnic. Kosovo's argument to become independent is ethnic.
- Decentralisation along ethnic lines is an old principle that is applied in many countries. The fact that some anti-Serb people make a lot of noise about the RS in Bosnia doesn't change that.
- Integration comes not by force but by seduction. If the Albanians make it attractive enough the Serbs will come sooner or later to their cities for shopping and work. This will not apply for the Serbs north of the Ibar: you will have to accept that the ethnic border is there and that north of the Ibar it is the Albanians who are the minority and have to adapt themselves.
- I would consider that with Stari Trg and the coal mines the Albanians have the majority of Kosovo's mineral wealth. For access to water many countries are dependent on each other. If the north would become part of Serbia (what I prefer) it would very well be possible to make a treaty stipulating the Albanian rights.

"Decentralization is not being implemented in order to bring government closer to the people. It is being used as a tool for apartheid."

- Calling the autonomy of the Serb villages "apartheid" is in my opinion racist rethorics. Any minority with its own language and religion will to a certain extent keep to itself. Connecting this with self-government is a quite normal - specially in an area where inter-ethnic relations are tense and discrimination is common.

"Many Albanian families have an Orthodox heritage. Many of their ancestors worshipped in Orthodox churches until the 18th century when the majority of conversions took place under the Ottoman Empire. [...] The Ahtisaari Plan establishes the absurd logic that should an Albanian want to convert to Orthodoxism, he will also have to become a ‘Serb’. "

- As far as I know before the conversions the Kosovo Albanians tended to be Catholic - not orthodox. But maybe they want to point to the fact that up to a third of the ancestors of Kosovo's Albanians may have been converted Serbs.
- For the moment I can see very little Albanian attachment to those church monuments (and nobody who wants to convert). One can only hope that this will change one day as they are Kosovo's main tourist attraction.
- One should be glad that the Serb church wants to spend millions to maintain Kosovo's monuments. I expect that one day somewhere in the future they will no longer have so much money available and Kosovo will have to take over the maintainance. So: enjoy the bonanza as long as it lasts!!!
- The fact that Orthodox churches are bound to countries is nowadays a problem in many countries (Macedonia, Montenegro, the Russian church in France, etc.). The Orthodox churches will have to adapt themselves to the modern times where people are free to choose their own churches. But let's give this time. The Kosovo problem is complicated enough without it.

"the plan envisages the creation of special zones around selected monasteries, further isolating them from the community and including hundreds of hectares of socially owned and private property. In the zone surrounding the Monastery of Deçan, villagers have only been allowed the right to cut hay on their land, nothing more. "

- In anarchic Kosovo it may be new, but in other European countries it is very normal that land use is restricted by planning. In the case the owners of land are disadvantaged by plan changes one should talk about indemnifications.

"The economic relations of the decentralized municipalities will be much closer with Serbia than the rest of Kosova.
Therefore, what will be known as Kosova’s single market will be much smaller than it is today (and today it is very small)."

- money has its own logic. Just as smugglers and criminals have never had problems over the Kosovo-Serbian border and as many Kosovo Albanians keep buying Serb products - so will the Kosovo Serbs buy Albanian products if they are cheap enough.
- Kosovo is a very small market anyway. Given the scale on which many companies operate nowadays I expect multinationals to build one factory for the whole Balkan.

"The Serb entity will be de-facto controlled by Belgrade and the Albanian will be controlled by the EU and held hostage to Belgrade by mechanisms such as a double majority voting system for the Serb minority, which gives them the right to veto changes to the constitution and to a number of domestic laws. Belgrade will be guaranteed the ability to destabilize Kosova’s government at will."

- the right to veto certain laws does not open the possibility to destabilise Kosovo's government.
- for the moment Kosovo's Albanians make it very hard for the Kosovo's Serbs to identify with Kosovo. One day that will change and Serbia's influence will diminish.
- once Kosovo's status is settled in an agreement with Serbia the Serb government will feel much less need to interfere. This should be seen as one more stimulus for Kosovo to seek a real agreement with Serbia. For this the Ahtisaari plan is insufficient as it doesn't provide Kosovo's Serbs with enough protection. A good plan should have at least two extra aspects: 1) more security for the Serbs south of the Ibar by appointing part-time local village police men; 2) a kind of autonomy for the area north of the Ibar that gives them the power to resist Albanisation policies from Pristina.

The Transparancy report on corruption

Transparancy International has published a report on corruption and Kosovo is in the top 10. I am not impressed.

4 of the top 10 "countries" in their "corruption barometer" are on the Balkan (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Romania). It is a consequence of their method: They simply ask 1000 people from each country whether he has paid a bribe in the last year. In many post-communist countries health care is free, but you often need to pay a bribe to get served. This makes them score very high. This is definitely a less harmfull type of corruption as when you need to bribe the police or some privitisation is corrupted but TI doesn't differentiate between types of corruption in their ratings.

Kosovars seem very hopeful that the situation will improve. Amazingly, just over the border in Albania people are very pessimistic. Quite a few Western countries - including the US - are pessimistic too.

The energy ministry is considered the most corrupt institution in Kosovo. Bad news for foreign investors in the new power plant.

Discrimination in Bosnia II

Balkan Insight reports that a Roma has brought a case for the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg that Bosnia's constitution is discriminatory. The problem is that the constitution specifies for many positions whether the position should filled by a Bosniak, a Croatian or a Serb. This means that there is no place for other minorities like Jews and Roma.

If the court agrees with him Bosnia would have to change its constitution. I think this might be a good think, provided it is done in a wise way. One of the most urgent requirements would be the creation of a Croatian entity.

Once such an entity is created Bosnia could switch from a ethnic to a territorial system, where each entity has the right to a post that is now reserved to its majority.

This would also mean the end to the system whereby local government is determined by the ethnic composition is determined by the population of an area before the war. Such a policy is good for returns. But it is bad for local democracy when out-of-towners determine what is going to happen. I think that 12 years after the war we have slowly reached the point where the second consideration should be considered more important than the first.

But this is the optimistic scenario. It could also happen that the question is reframed in a partial way - leading to the next "police reform" crisis.

Discrimination in Bosnia?

I encountered a rather old (july 2006) message on the blog "Allah's Willing Executioners". According to this blog:
A law passed earlier this month allows people living in state-owned apartments that were nationalized under the former Yugoslavia’s socialist regime to purchase the dwellings. But the law – backed by lawmakers from the country’s Muslim majority – provides that any apartment previously owned by the Muslim community cannot be purchased if the community objects to the sale.
“Holders of tenant’s tenure for apartments whose formal owners are wakfs can not buy up those apartments without previous written approval of the apartment’s owner,” the law states, using the Arabic word for a Muslim community endowment.
The Jewish community, as well as the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, was not given the same veto power. [....]

This is clearly a blog with a message so I am curious to hear other visions on this law and its background.

The Kosovo negotiations

Der Spiegel has a nice article about the negotiations on Kosovo's future by the trio Ischinger, Wisner and Bozan-Kharchenko. The long article gives a good description of the people involved and tells a bit about how the negotiations went.

In my opinion the biggest failure of the negotiations remains the onesidedness. When it comes to principles the principle that Belgrade won't rule Kosovo anymore is on top. But the principle that the way in which Kosovo is treating its Serbs is unacceptable and that they need just as hard guarantees keeps missing.

These two principles are to a certain extent contradictory. But I believe that as long we we don't recognize this contradiction the conflict is inresolvable. The claim that the Ahtisaari proposal is enough for Serb minority rights is in my opinion just ridiculous.

The article tries to put the blame for the failed negotiations on the Serb side. It gives as example the Serb reaction to the trio's 14 working points. Yet during the negotiations the Serb position has shifted while the Albanians didn't cede an inch.

As I see it the Serbs have now a proposal that the Albanians can live with once they have swallowed their pride and suspicions. Now it is the turn of Albanians to provide a proposal that the Serbs can live with. This will mean much greater autonomy and maybe border changes.

At the beginning of the negotiations the troika indicated that they were open to talks about partition. But Serbia doesn't want partition if it means giving up on the Serbs south of the Ibar and the Albanians want Presevo in return. And then - rather than tackle those problems - the troika simply dropped the ball.

The present EU proposal is in my opinion just a proposal for ethnic cleansing.

NATO soldiers as ethnic cleansers

While Kosovo's Serbs are preparing to flee once Kosovo declares independence, the "peacekeepers" in Kosovo prepare to enforce Albanian rule in Kosovo's northern tip. Kosovo's international rulers are still devided but if they push through this will mean the de facto ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's north tip. It doesn't help that the soldiers involved are Germans and Americans - two nations with whom Serbs have some bad memories.

Kosovo's Albanians have had 8 years to prove that they can rule their Serb minority in decent way. They have convincingly proven that they can not. I believe that the UN should draw the conclusion from this and cede the rule of Kosovo's north tip to Serbia. A nice side effect would be that the potential for conflict if Kosovo declares independence would be much reduced.