In august 1991 the EU created an "Arbitration Commission" for legal advice on how to handle the situation in Yugoslavia. This commission is usually known as the Badinter Commission after its president. On 20 november the commission published its first conclusion. The remainder followed on 11 januari 1992.
The composition of the commission was rather unusual: all 5 members were famous constitutional lawyers - but not specialists in a relevant field: no international lawyers, no Balkan experts and no specialists in ethnic conflicts.
When judges don't know about a subject they are supposed to investigate the subject with an open mind and without prejudice. It is dubious whether these lawyers conformed to that image. Yugoslavia was hotly debated in the newspapers at that time and Badinter himself was known as an activist lawyer who had become famous for fighting against the death penalty in his homeland France. Also 3 to 4 months seems rather short to develop a balanced view on a completely new subject. This raises the question whether the commission was selected for rubberstamping and justifying the existing EU policy instead.
The EU policy at that time was a mix of contradicting interests. You had - specially in the US - people who saw Yugoslavia as the last communist bastion and who considered encouraging separatism as a nice way to topple it. You had also the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians who had historical ties to Slovenia and Croatia and would love to see them independent. And lastly there was the desire to keep the policy consistent with that towards the Soviet Union (most Soviet republics were recognised in december 1991).
As a result the policy was from the beginning contradictory. Slovenia declared itself independent on june 25 1991. The first reaction of the EU was not to recognize it. But the next thing it did was to send a troika to Zagreb to broke a cease-fire that meant a de-facto recognition.
To understand this blunder one should imagine the EU sending a mediator to Spain to mediate between the government and the ETA and to conclude a binding truce. The Spanish government would never accept this. They would insist to have the negotiations with the ETA alone. That way it would be their decision and it would also only their decision to end the truce. They might accept mediation to lay the contact but they would never third party involvement in the negotiations. In a normal situation third party involvement in negotiations would only be acceptable when the parties were in a military stalemate.
The core of the advice of the commission was that Yugoslavia was "in dissolution" and that the republics could be recognized when they declared themselves independent. Their borders were considered to have the same inviolability as those of independent states. This was not the first time the West tried to "dissolve" Yugoslavia: previously Lord Carrington already had made an effort.
International law knowns two types of ways a new country can come into existence. One way is that of former colonies. When colonialism ended in Latin America and Africa the existing colonial borders were maintained as the borders of the new states. The other way is separatism. Here the law is much stricter: the mother country has nearly absolute power to deny independence. A status as republic like in Yugoslavia does not automatically help: the International Court of Justice has decided that Quebec is not allowed to secede without consent of Canada.
From my viewpoint as a social scientist this distinction makes sense:
- Both in Latin America and in Africa the borders were meaningless from the ethnic point of view and there was no structured popular demand to change that. Demands for border changes tended to come from overambitious local leaders. Giving in to these commands would only cause unrest and lay the basis for future conflicts.
- In the case of separatism the situation is very different: it is usually the outcome of a long process of ethnic polarisation. Minorities on both sides of the existing borders will desperately try to have the borders changed. And everyone is aware that you will pay a price when you finish on the wrong side of the border. Even if you are not blatantly discriminated there are the small problems that come for example from speaking a minority language.
Giving the power to the motherland makes sense in this situation. It makes separatism impossible when there is not an open democratic climate. It forces the separatist firebrands to think up an acceptable solution for both sides. If they don't do so the present situation - that is usually not that bad - will stay and there is no risk for war. A revolutionary transfer of power to another ethnic group is less desirable: it can easily get out of hand - both because of protests from groups who lose priviliges and because revolutionaries tend to exaggerate in their "reforms".
The border between those two models is unclear. But situations in between had never happened and so there was no jurisprudence.
The falling apart of the Soviet Union was somewhere in between the two models. In the case of the Baltics nationalism was strong and it looked like separatism. But in many other republics independence was caused by a combination of dislike of communism and power politics by Yeltsin. So separatism and nationalism were no immediate problems and it looked a bit like the postcolonial model. Yet on the other hand the republics had been designed as belonging to one nationality and as such they implicitly became nation states pretending to further the interests of one nationality. As a consequence nationalism did rise later and many of the republics did develop ethnic and/or border problems. So both models fitted partially. The international community gave Russia the freedom to choose - in effect applying the separatism model. The situation was decided by the speedy and unconditional recognition of the other republics by Yeltsin's Russia. Although he was not formally the leader of the Soviet Union he had enough authority to decide the situation.
However, even in the former Soviet Union not everything worked. Quite a few conflicts arose and due to the excesses of newly invented nationalisms many millions found themselves forced to move to another republic. The border between Armenia and Azerbajdzjan gave immediately problems and obviously never worked. I find it amazing that Western "mediators" keep clinging here to the mantra of territorial integrity. Something similar applies to a lesser degree to Moldova.
In Yugoslavia the situation was different. Croat and Slovene nationalism had a long history and were clearly rising. This was a clear case of separatism. To arrive at the opposite conclusion the Badinter Commission used a lot of legalistic wizardry that centered on declaring Yugoslavia as "in dissolution". Others have done a good job analyzing this wizardry (see the book of Radan). I will restrict myself as a social scientist to analyzing the sorry consequences of this policy.
Normally separatism manifests itself in mass demonstrations and boycotts. If the mother country opposes it has no choice but keeping pushing. Occassionally some terrorism may develop, but this will not change the balance of power. Usually separatist leaders are careful not to break the law as this might give the national government an excuse to imprison them. As the Kosovo Albanians knew for decades: if the mothercountry opposes you don't have much of a chance.
Croatia and Slovenia however, behaved much more self-confident around 1990. It did help that they already had a considerable degree of autonomy. But even that could not explain their extreme boldness: Slovenia fired the first shots in the dissolution of Yugoslavia - aimed at conscripts with a "no shoot" order. And both Slovenia and Croatia locked Yugoslav army units in their baracks - an extreme provocation. They felt free to do so because of foreign support - both diplomatic and with massive arms supplies.
But let's consider for a moment what a commission of international lawyers might have decided. First they very probably would have concluded that this was an internal affair of Yugoslavia and that other countries had no business here. Yugoslavia was free to deny Croatia and Slovenia independence or to impose them any condition it wanted. The commission might well have gone one step further and investigated why the situation in Yugoslavia was so getting out of hand. Encouraging separatism in other countries is illegal under international law and so they might have recommended a profound investigation and prosecution of the countries involved in the arms supplies and diplomatic support to Croatia and Slovenia. Suspected countries were Germany, Austria, Hungary and the US and so this might have become very painful for the EU.
In the meantime in Yugoslavia happened what nearly always happens when you give separatists free reign: excesses. In all new republics you saw discrimination and administrative ethnic cleansing. Slovenia "erased" its minorities, Croatia refused its Serbs minority rights and used loyalty declarations as an excuse to rob them of their jobs, Macedonia treated its Albanians as second class citizens and Bosnia didn't even bother to include its Serbs in the independence process. Yet Europe preferred not to notice this and restricted itself to token reprimands.
These twin failty Western "principles" - accepting an independence based on violence and ignoring administrative ethnic cleansing - were the basis on which Milosevic based his policies in Croatia and Bosnia. After the West had shown even to ignore massive ethnic cleansing (operation Storm) Milosevic applied that principle too in Kosovo. It is popular to paint Milosevic as a kind of Hitler, but to a large extent he just showed us in an enlarged form our own lack of principles.
What troubled the discussions about Yugoslavia most in the 1991-1995 period was that Milosevic made no explicit demands. It was clear that he wanted to secede Serb areas from Croatia and Bosnia. Yet he never made claim to specific areas. If he had done so he would have had to come with (demographic) arguments and he would have had to indicate the limits of the Serb claims (no Adriatic harbour for example). Milosevic also stayed vague about whether the areas should be independent, joined wit Serbia or autonomous. This vagueness created a kind of unholy alliance between Milosevic, Bosnia and Croatia and the West. The West could keep to its Badinter principles, Bosnia and Croatia could continue to deny consessions and Milosevic could have his Serbs conquer much more territory than their numbers justified. When territorial claims were made by Serbs in negotiations it was always on an ad-hoc basis based on what they controlled at that moment. Arguments on demographic or other objective data were scarce.
The price of this situation was that the negotiations never got to the core of the problem. Normally it is the job of the negotiators to get the demands of both parties on the table together with their motives and arguments.
The vagueness had even more consequences. It allowed Western countries to support who they liked - usually Croatia or Bosnia. This had the usual harmful effects that all foreign interventions have: it created an unpredictable situation where the power distribution was not clear and shifting. Because the parties cannot estimate their strength versus the others this creates unrealistic expectations on all sides and prolongs the conflict.
It is interesting to compare this situation with two others. The partition of Czecheslovakia in 1993 happened peacefully with some minor border changes but without international mingling. I am can convinced that this was possible in Yugoslavia too. The second situation is that of Kosovo. Learning from Milosevic's mistake Serbia takes nowadays a highly formalistic approach that highlights its sovereignty. Many people in the EU interpret this as nationalism, but it is in fact just demanding the rights that every country has towards separatist provinces. It is my impression that Serbia is prepared to let Kosovo go, but on its conditions - as it is allowed to do under international law. As these conditions include an acceptable position for Kosovo's Serb citizens and monuments this may take some time. The international tendency to reward violence that is still visible in Kosovo today only prolongs this process as it leads to a worsening treatment of Kosovo's Serbs.
Officially Europe rejects border changes unless both sides agree - that is what is in the Helsinki Treaty. But in practice it does not tolerate border changes under any condition. Although an exchange of Presevo against Northern Mitrovica is a quite acceptable solution for both many Serbs and Albanians the Contact Group for Kosovo explicitly forbade it in its "principles".
The EU is afraid that border changes in Kosovo will work as a precedent for other republics like Bosnia and Macedonia. This highlights that the Badinter process has started a domino effect. In fact Kosovo is already the second stone in the domino. The Badinter Commission denied it independence, but after some time and a few fights the Western countries now feel themselves compelled to grant it independence too. And although they are still denying it it is clear to any observer that more dominos will follow. Once you start using opportunistic arguments instead of applying the law you create a free for all.
In maintaining this policy the EU is not above using tricks. One trick is pretending that when Kosovo's borders are changed all Serbia's borders will come into play. This deligitimizes the internationally accepted process for handling separatism. Even more troubling is that the West has become a bit of a defender of ethnic cleansing to adapt the population to the borders. The first time we saw that happening was in Croatia where the EU and the US hardly critisised the cleansing of the Krajna. Next in line to be cleansed are Kosovo's Serbs - half of them are gone already.
After Kosovo the situation is most serious in Bosnia. The EU still hasn't accepted that the Serbs have (and should have) some real influence. As a consequence they keep reacting like Pavlov dogs when the racist Silajdzic sends them on a guilt trip. The consequence has been a continuing polarisation that - if not stopped - will end in either separation or ethnic cleansing. The latter option is certainly possible: on forums one sees regularly Bosniaks state that Serbs will be allowed to stay only if they accept Muslim dominance (a similar type of "tolerance" is quite common in Kosovo too) and on his blog ICG's James Lyon threatened separatist Bosnian Serbs with a scenario that would end with "more Serbs on red tractors".
Wednesday, May 23, 2007
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Sunnites and Serbs
The New York Times is bringing the news that the Sunnites in Iraq are threatening to leave the cabinet because they feel unable to achieve anything for their ethnic group.
This development looks surprisingly similar to what happened in Kosovo after the 1999 war. Initially the Serbs participated in the government but after some time they gave up because they felt that they were only being used for propaganda purposes.
It looks like the West is making in both areas the same kind of mistakes. They are following the traditional colonial script that has been used since ages by any conqueror: support one side and give it the free hand. In areas where just the control has shifted from one ethnic group to another this is bound to give rise to repression and intolerance.
In a normal country - even an undemocratic one - government are under some pressure to treat all ethnic groups with a certain decency. If they don't they risk uprisings and violence and the government may be toppled. But in an occupation like Iraq of Kosovo there is no risk because they can be sure that any uprising will be quelled by foreigners. And so the only effect of harrassing minorities is an electoral award amongst the rascist segment of the majority population.
The alternative is to strive for a balance where both sides get some influence and are forced to arrive at a compromise.
In Kosovo UNMIK should have granted the Serb majority areas autonomy years ago. And in Iraq the US military should simply refuse to intervene in Sunnite majority areas when they are not assisted by Sunnite Iraqi soldiers and working with an elected Sunnite provincial government.
If this sounds like surrendering to Al Qaeda consider that Al Qaeda is just a small part of the resistance. When the sunnite population turns against it Al Qaeda will soon loose its strength. Consider ths situation in Anbar province. In this province that is nearly totally Sunnite the population had enough of the Al Qaeda violence and they turned against it by siding with the Americans and government troups. Many enlisted with the police. This led to a strong reduction of Al Qaeda violence. This can only happen in tbis province because in the absense of a Shiite population there is no fear to become victim of Shiite violence that is supported by government troups.
Both Iraq and Kosovo have been advertised as "humanitarian" interventions. This supposes a kind of neutrality where we are fighting principaly on the side of justice and fairness. In reality however the Western and specially the American troops have never really been able to cut the ties that tie them to side side for whom they interfered.
It is time to realize that a humanitarian can only restore a balance of power between ethnic groups that has become too onesided. But after have restored a rough balance the interventionists should retreat and leave it to the local population to work out a practical solution.
This development looks surprisingly similar to what happened in Kosovo after the 1999 war. Initially the Serbs participated in the government but after some time they gave up because they felt that they were only being used for propaganda purposes.
It looks like the West is making in both areas the same kind of mistakes. They are following the traditional colonial script that has been used since ages by any conqueror: support one side and give it the free hand. In areas where just the control has shifted from one ethnic group to another this is bound to give rise to repression and intolerance.
In a normal country - even an undemocratic one - government are under some pressure to treat all ethnic groups with a certain decency. If they don't they risk uprisings and violence and the government may be toppled. But in an occupation like Iraq of Kosovo there is no risk because they can be sure that any uprising will be quelled by foreigners. And so the only effect of harrassing minorities is an electoral award amongst the rascist segment of the majority population.
The alternative is to strive for a balance where both sides get some influence and are forced to arrive at a compromise.
In Kosovo UNMIK should have granted the Serb majority areas autonomy years ago. And in Iraq the US military should simply refuse to intervene in Sunnite majority areas when they are not assisted by Sunnite Iraqi soldiers and working with an elected Sunnite provincial government.
If this sounds like surrendering to Al Qaeda consider that Al Qaeda is just a small part of the resistance. When the sunnite population turns against it Al Qaeda will soon loose its strength. Consider ths situation in Anbar province. In this province that is nearly totally Sunnite the population had enough of the Al Qaeda violence and they turned against it by siding with the Americans and government troups. Many enlisted with the police. This led to a strong reduction of Al Qaeda violence. This can only happen in tbis province because in the absense of a Shiite population there is no fear to become victim of Shiite violence that is supported by government troups.
Both Iraq and Kosovo have been advertised as "humanitarian" interventions. This supposes a kind of neutrality where we are fighting principaly on the side of justice and fairness. In reality however the Western and specially the American troops have never really been able to cut the ties that tie them to side side for whom they interfered.
It is time to realize that a humanitarian can only restore a balance of power between ethnic groups that has become too onesided. But after have restored a rough balance the interventionists should retreat and leave it to the local population to work out a practical solution.
Thursday, March 15, 2007
KFOR is not prepared for violence
KFOR and international leaders keep repeating that they are ready to quell potential violence in Kosovo.
On februari 10 they could show what they were worth when 3000 demonstrators tried to storm government buildings. Two demonstrators were killed. This resulted in a lot of discussion - mostly in Kosovo - about what went wrong and that way we get some inside view in how security in Kosovo really operates.
Some conclusions:
- Kosovo's police (KPS) was not involved in the preparations and did a poor job. They don't have rubber bullets.
- There is not one water cannon in Kosovo.
- Only the Polish, Rumanian and Ukrainian units possessed riot gear. So none of the members of the Kosovo Contact Group have it.
Although in this case on the police was involved one gets the impression that the internationals in Kosovo are just as badly prepared as in 2004. There is no reason to believe that the soldiers are better prepared.
This somehow confirms my fears. NATO or KFOR spokesmen nearly always stay stuck in generalities when they tell how prepared they are. They only time they get more specific is when they say that KFOR has moved more troops to the north of Kosovo. It makes me wonder what NATO secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer really means when he says "Let nobody in Kosovo have any illusions that they should test KFOR ... That goes for the majority and the minority". Does he mean that KFOR is only prepared for violence from the minority?
My recommendations would be:
- introduce an exam for international policemen. It should contain both basic police skills and UN specific rules. The candidates should also have at least two years of experience as police man. The tests should be in English as the candidates should be fluent in that language.
- Both KFOR soldiers and international policemen should in their first month in Kosovo get an exercise that gives them an experience with violent demonstrations and their control. This should be done in a realistic test-village that the exercise protesters may try to burn down. This should also test the chain of command.
- Put more trust in Kosovo's police. They should be the first line of defense and should be equipped as such.
On februari 10 they could show what they were worth when 3000 demonstrators tried to storm government buildings. Two demonstrators were killed. This resulted in a lot of discussion - mostly in Kosovo - about what went wrong and that way we get some inside view in how security in Kosovo really operates.
Some conclusions:
- Kosovo's police (KPS) was not involved in the preparations and did a poor job. They don't have rubber bullets.
- There is not one water cannon in Kosovo.
- Only the Polish, Rumanian and Ukrainian units possessed riot gear. So none of the members of the Kosovo Contact Group have it.
Although in this case on the police was involved one gets the impression that the internationals in Kosovo are just as badly prepared as in 2004. There is no reason to believe that the soldiers are better prepared.
This somehow confirms my fears. NATO or KFOR spokesmen nearly always stay stuck in generalities when they tell how prepared they are. They only time they get more specific is when they say that KFOR has moved more troops to the north of Kosovo. It makes me wonder what NATO secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer really means when he says "Let nobody in Kosovo have any illusions that they should test KFOR ... That goes for the majority and the minority". Does he mean that KFOR is only prepared for violence from the minority?
My recommendations would be:
- introduce an exam for international policemen. It should contain both basic police skills and UN specific rules. The candidates should also have at least two years of experience as police man. The tests should be in English as the candidates should be fluent in that language.
- Both KFOR soldiers and international policemen should in their first month in Kosovo get an exercise that gives them an experience with violent demonstrations and their control. This should be done in a realistic test-village that the exercise protesters may try to burn down. This should also test the chain of command.
- Put more trust in Kosovo's police. They should be the first line of defense and should be equipped as such.
Saturday, February 24, 2007
The mafia culture of dependency
When I studied antropology I wrote my bachelor paper about the "mafia" - a phenomena that has fascinated me ever since. The difference between mafia and normal crime is that maffia has a stronger connection with government.
Mafia's usually appear when the government is weak. Sometimes they are only temporary. Many formerly communist countries for example went through a phase where organised crime and government were closely connected. The possibility to make much money with fraudulent privatisations was an important factor in this.
Mafia's come often into existence as "protectors" of some minority. The US, with its many streams of immigrants has seen them all: Irish, Jewish, Italian, Russian, Vietnamese, Japanese, Chinese, etc.. In the US they tend to disappear when the minority intergrates.
But sometimes the mafia is more permanent. A good example is Sicily. The mafia mentality is believed to have originated when the island was a province of Spain.
The Spanish tended to depend on local leaders to govern the province. And so you got the typical middle men: towards the population they could offer connections with the government and towards the government they could offer control of the population. This pattern was so strong that it continued after Sicily became part of Italy: Rome just substituted the position of the Spanish.
A second factor in the development of the Sicilian mafia were the large estates owned by absentee landlords. Their administrators used to employ troops of armed men to keep the tenants in check. These would develop into the "soldiers" of the mafia.
Important in keeping control was also the omerta: the with violence enforced rule not to betray the strongmen to outsiders.
I have the impression that Kosovo is quite similar:
- A century ago its elite prided itself in its good connections with the Turks.
- Later they positioned themselves as the mediator between the Yugoslav state and the local population. The pressure for independence from the 1960s falls in this pattern. It served to keep the Albanians from integrating into Yugoslavia - what would have lessened the grip of the local elite. It was an ideology of dependency: Yugoslavia was blamed for not donating enough money, but the local elite spent the donated money on not-productive investments and did nothing to stimulate the economy.
- Nowadays it is the same with the UN having taken the place of Yugoslavia. The Kosovo press is full of every misstep of UN officials and likes to highlight how much money they are making. Yet the frustration of the UN to get anything done is hardly discussed. The only way to get things done seems to be by accepting corruption (see the privatisation).
Kosovo has its own version of the omerta, usually called the "wall of silence". It is still very active as is shown by the fate of the people involved in the recent process against the "Dukagjini group" that was accused of war crimes. Since the process three witnesses and two of the investigating policemen have been killed.
A recent Spiegel International article gave a good description of how it works in Kosovo. When the Decani monastry was shelled at the commanding NATO general simply called Haradinaj. But the price is that Haradinaj is treated like a statesman despite being suspected of war crimes (32 bodies were found near the family farm) and heroin trade.
And allthough the article doesn't discuss it, this kind of dependency is easy to manipulate. It may be very well have been Haradinaj himself who initiated the shelling. It is in his interest to be indispensable. The disappearing witnesses in his ICTY trial show that we may never know.
This has consequences for how one should consider the future of Kosovo:
- As long as the UN stays they will be part of the game. So provisional independence is not a good idea. Instead Kosovo should become fully independent. Some UN soldiers should stay but only interfere when the minorities are threatened. In the economic sphere the internationals should withdraw. There will be corruption and we will sometimes not like how they handle privatisation, but we should leave it to the Kosovars themselves to solve that.
- A union with Albania is at the moment not a good idea. It might put Kosovo in another "foreign rule" situation (like Sicily). First Kosovo should become independent and get itself in order. Only much (15 to 20 years) later one should consider a union.
- When Kosovo is independent there is a good chance that the minorities will be set up as the next external "enemy". The present climate in Kosovo, where any consession to minorities is criticised doesn't promise much good. This is yet another argument for ethnic borders.
Mafia's usually appear when the government is weak. Sometimes they are only temporary. Many formerly communist countries for example went through a phase where organised crime and government were closely connected. The possibility to make much money with fraudulent privatisations was an important factor in this.
Mafia's come often into existence as "protectors" of some minority. The US, with its many streams of immigrants has seen them all: Irish, Jewish, Italian, Russian, Vietnamese, Japanese, Chinese, etc.. In the US they tend to disappear when the minority intergrates.
But sometimes the mafia is more permanent. A good example is Sicily. The mafia mentality is believed to have originated when the island was a province of Spain.
The Spanish tended to depend on local leaders to govern the province. And so you got the typical middle men: towards the population they could offer connections with the government and towards the government they could offer control of the population. This pattern was so strong that it continued after Sicily became part of Italy: Rome just substituted the position of the Spanish.
A second factor in the development of the Sicilian mafia were the large estates owned by absentee landlords. Their administrators used to employ troops of armed men to keep the tenants in check. These would develop into the "soldiers" of the mafia.
Important in keeping control was also the omerta: the with violence enforced rule not to betray the strongmen to outsiders.
I have the impression that Kosovo is quite similar:
- A century ago its elite prided itself in its good connections with the Turks.
- Later they positioned themselves as the mediator between the Yugoslav state and the local population. The pressure for independence from the 1960s falls in this pattern. It served to keep the Albanians from integrating into Yugoslavia - what would have lessened the grip of the local elite. It was an ideology of dependency: Yugoslavia was blamed for not donating enough money, but the local elite spent the donated money on not-productive investments and did nothing to stimulate the economy.
- Nowadays it is the same with the UN having taken the place of Yugoslavia. The Kosovo press is full of every misstep of UN officials and likes to highlight how much money they are making. Yet the frustration of the UN to get anything done is hardly discussed. The only way to get things done seems to be by accepting corruption (see the privatisation).
Kosovo has its own version of the omerta, usually called the "wall of silence". It is still very active as is shown by the fate of the people involved in the recent process against the "Dukagjini group" that was accused of war crimes. Since the process three witnesses and two of the investigating policemen have been killed.
A recent Spiegel International article gave a good description of how it works in Kosovo. When the Decani monastry was shelled at the commanding NATO general simply called Haradinaj. But the price is that Haradinaj is treated like a statesman despite being suspected of war crimes (32 bodies were found near the family farm) and heroin trade.
And allthough the article doesn't discuss it, this kind of dependency is easy to manipulate. It may be very well have been Haradinaj himself who initiated the shelling. It is in his interest to be indispensable. The disappearing witnesses in his ICTY trial show that we may never know.
This has consequences for how one should consider the future of Kosovo:
- As long as the UN stays they will be part of the game. So provisional independence is not a good idea. Instead Kosovo should become fully independent. Some UN soldiers should stay but only interfere when the minorities are threatened. In the economic sphere the internationals should withdraw. There will be corruption and we will sometimes not like how they handle privatisation, but we should leave it to the Kosovars themselves to solve that.
- A union with Albania is at the moment not a good idea. It might put Kosovo in another "foreign rule" situation (like Sicily). First Kosovo should become independent and get itself in order. Only much (15 to 20 years) later one should consider a union.
- When Kosovo is independent there is a good chance that the minorities will be set up as the next external "enemy". The present climate in Kosovo, where any consession to minorities is criticised doesn't promise much good. This is yet another argument for ethnic borders.
Thursday, February 22, 2007
International intervention: strategies that work
The municipal elections in Albania last sunday (februari 18th) have criticised by "international community". Yet I want at this place to stress the positive aspects. From a fierce confrontation the parties have come to a compromise about how the elections should be organised. Some more pressure may be needed to solve some local problems. But this is how I believe the international community should operate: as a voice of reason that mediates a solution that is acceptable to both parties.
This is a kind of compromise that you cannot impose. It leaves the main initiative with the local community.
Bosnia
Compare this to Bosnia. Since Dayton the international community has constantly hang on the side of the Bosniacs pressuring for more centralisation. Yet in doing so they have produced an intolerant climate that has only lead to more separation between the ethnic groups.
One of the motives to demand centralisation is disfunctional government. Yet most problems are with the Federation. So rather one would expect that folding the RS into the federation will only increase the problems. So it seems that the solution is rather in more autonomy for the Croats in the Federation. If the international community would take this line the pressure will soon stop.
Peacekeeping should concentrate on maintaining a neutral climate and keeping polarising issues away. One such controversial issue is of course centralisation. Another is the genocide complaint against Serbia. I believe in fact finding: the truth helps reconciliation. And I would love this fact finding to be extended to the political domain. But this complaint isn't about fact finding: it is about putting a label on someone. And I cannot see how that can be helpful. The international community should never have allowed this complaint to be filed.
There is considerable international attention to the (lack of) returns to cities like Sreberenica. However, somehow attention to the continuing departure of Croats and Serbs from the Bosniac controlled area is missing. Yet these facts are related. How can you expect Serbs and Croats to be enthousiastic about the return of Bosniacs when they see how their own people are treated by Bosniacs.
Does this mean that Bosnia never would be more centralised. It might be, but as a compromise between local parties - maybe mediated by the international community - just as the compromise in Albania. The compromise a few months ago came close - until the international community allowed Silajdzic to spoil it.
Kosovo
The peace keeping mission in Kosovo has from the first day been overshadowed by the threat of Albanian violence. It worked: allthough the mission was well aware and also sympathic to the problems of the minorities it kept giving priority to Albanian interests. This became even more clear in march 2004: afterwards the general impression was that the Albanians had won. The only punishment was that the Kosovo government was supposed to pay the rebuilding. But there was no tax increase to drive this point home and it was clear that in the end the international would pay the bill.
It could have been otherwise. For example in 2004 the international community could have grabbed power back from the Kosovo government and used it to give the Serbs autonomous municipalities. It could even have asked Serb troops or police in - if only temporarily for Leposavic to release the peacekeepers there for elsewhere in Kosovo.
Similar strategies could have used before. For example by setting ultimatums to the Kosovo government to solving certain problems.
A peace mission needs to keep to stay neutral and to achieve that it needs strategies to use when either side grabs the power.
Peacekeeping is about building the basic blocks of living together - including elementary human rights. Only that basis can you have a real peace proces and reconciliation. In this regards the mission in Kosovo has failed.
This is a kind of compromise that you cannot impose. It leaves the main initiative with the local community.
Bosnia
Compare this to Bosnia. Since Dayton the international community has constantly hang on the side of the Bosniacs pressuring for more centralisation. Yet in doing so they have produced an intolerant climate that has only lead to more separation between the ethnic groups.
One of the motives to demand centralisation is disfunctional government. Yet most problems are with the Federation. So rather one would expect that folding the RS into the federation will only increase the problems. So it seems that the solution is rather in more autonomy for the Croats in the Federation. If the international community would take this line the pressure will soon stop.
Peacekeeping should concentrate on maintaining a neutral climate and keeping polarising issues away. One such controversial issue is of course centralisation. Another is the genocide complaint against Serbia. I believe in fact finding: the truth helps reconciliation. And I would love this fact finding to be extended to the political domain. But this complaint isn't about fact finding: it is about putting a label on someone. And I cannot see how that can be helpful. The international community should never have allowed this complaint to be filed.
There is considerable international attention to the (lack of) returns to cities like Sreberenica. However, somehow attention to the continuing departure of Croats and Serbs from the Bosniac controlled area is missing. Yet these facts are related. How can you expect Serbs and Croats to be enthousiastic about the return of Bosniacs when they see how their own people are treated by Bosniacs.
Does this mean that Bosnia never would be more centralised. It might be, but as a compromise between local parties - maybe mediated by the international community - just as the compromise in Albania. The compromise a few months ago came close - until the international community allowed Silajdzic to spoil it.
Kosovo
The peace keeping mission in Kosovo has from the first day been overshadowed by the threat of Albanian violence. It worked: allthough the mission was well aware and also sympathic to the problems of the minorities it kept giving priority to Albanian interests. This became even more clear in march 2004: afterwards the general impression was that the Albanians had won. The only punishment was that the Kosovo government was supposed to pay the rebuilding. But there was no tax increase to drive this point home and it was clear that in the end the international would pay the bill.
It could have been otherwise. For example in 2004 the international community could have grabbed power back from the Kosovo government and used it to give the Serbs autonomous municipalities. It could even have asked Serb troops or police in - if only temporarily for Leposavic to release the peacekeepers there for elsewhere in Kosovo.
Similar strategies could have used before. For example by setting ultimatums to the Kosovo government to solving certain problems.
A peace mission needs to keep to stay neutral and to achieve that it needs strategies to use when either side grabs the power.
Peacekeeping is about building the basic blocks of living together - including elementary human rights. Only that basis can you have a real peace proces and reconciliation. In this regards the mission in Kosovo has failed.
Friday, January 26, 2007
Is Dayton disfunctional?
Peace making is in its heart very simple: formulate a compromise solution that both parties and you as a mediator find acceptable. And then religiously stay faithful to those appointments.
Unfortunately even simple recipes are often ignored in practice. Bosnia's war started after president Izetbegovic withdraw his consent from the Lisbon Agreement and the US supported him in that. And the present deadlock in Bosnia started after Silajdzic - who rejects the Dayton Agreement allthough he is one of its architects - torpedoed Bosnia's new constitution. The deadlock became complete when Western diplomats failed to condemn this move allthough they had helped to formulate that constitution.
The mantra that we keep hearing nowadays is that Dayton is "disfunctional" and need to be replaced. I disagree. Sure, there are a lot of overlapping governmental structures in Bosnia and all together they are doing a rather bad job. But Bosnia has a long history of weak government (see for example the Agrokomerc scandal in 1987).
Dayton is a bit complicated. But that can be expected from a compromise. Democracy itself is complicated compared to dictatorship - yet we all believe that it is preferable. Similarly the extra costs of Dayton is a small price to pay for achieving that all population groups feel represented.
However the biggest problem with Dayton is that some people haven't really accepted it. They are holding out for a "better" solution that is more in their favor. And so they are obstructing all the little compromises that have to be made to make an abstract agreenment workable. In the beginning the Serbs were the main obstructors, but nowadays they have become more constructive and it is the Bosniacs from Silajdzic who are the main obstructors. Yet until now the West has failed to confront them.
The Silajdzic Bosniacs and their international supporters like to say that Dayton is outdated and needs to be adapted to meet the demands of the EU. Yet that was exactly what the rejected new constitution did. The problem was that the new constitution tried to do this in the spririt of the Dayton Treaty and that was what they didn't like. They want to replace Dayton with something that is more in their favor.
The Silajdzic Bosniacs like to state that Dayton is the product of ethnic cleansing. They are wrong. Autonomy for the Serbs was discussed already before the war and internationally it was seen as quite a reasonable demand. Ethnic cleansing did change the borders of the ethnic areas, but that worked both ways: the Bosniac areas are now largely "clean" too. The partition doesn't seem particularly unfair in the sense that one group gets more than its share either. The Serbs now have some more autonomy as they could expect before the war. But that should be expected after a war that deteriorated the ethnic relations.
Bosnia's Serbs did quite some warcrimes. But Silajdzic now seems to believe that the war crimes of some people give him the right to treat all Bosnia's Serbs like second rate citizens. His ideal is a Bosnia were Serbs learn at school that the Muslims were first and the Serbs are late immigrants and where they learn that all the war crimes in the 1992-1995 war were committed by Serbs. He knows that when you form the upperclass - like the Muslims do in Bosnia - you don't need violence for ethnic cleansing: subtle discrimination will be enough to convince the Serbs that it is better to leave. This was exactly the attitude that worried Bosnia's Serbs when it became independent.
I believe that if the West does not confront Silajdzic Bosnia has little chance to survive as a state. The problem with radicals like Silajdzic is that they are insatiable. They more you give in to them the more they will demand.
As I said in the beginning: there is only one way to make a peace agreement work: keeping to it.
[in reaction to Seesaw's reaction about the "200 ministers" in the federation I added the part below]
The "200 ministers" rethoric is misleading. It suggests that all decentralisation is inefficient and wrong. To make a valid evaluation of the situation one should not only look at the ministers but also at the number of people who work for them and how good they do their job.
I believe that the inefficiency is mainly a problem of the Federation. The RS is doing quite well in the present structure. This despite their complicated geography and their international isolation.
The Federation is supposed to function similarly as the RS. But it contains Croat cantons who insist on autonomy. And as the Federation refuses to make special rules for the Croats this means that overall the main level of government is pushed down to the level of the cantons. This makes the Federation as a level of government more or less superfluous.
In order for governments to be representive of the population, borders should take into account ethnic realtities. For that reason it has always amazed me that Dayton did not give the Croats a similar structure as the RS.
Anyhow, it is now a matter of making the Federation work. I consider this an internal affair of the Federation. There is no need at all to involve the RS in it.
Unfortunately even simple recipes are often ignored in practice. Bosnia's war started after president Izetbegovic withdraw his consent from the Lisbon Agreement and the US supported him in that. And the present deadlock in Bosnia started after Silajdzic - who rejects the Dayton Agreement allthough he is one of its architects - torpedoed Bosnia's new constitution. The deadlock became complete when Western diplomats failed to condemn this move allthough they had helped to formulate that constitution.
The mantra that we keep hearing nowadays is that Dayton is "disfunctional" and need to be replaced. I disagree. Sure, there are a lot of overlapping governmental structures in Bosnia and all together they are doing a rather bad job. But Bosnia has a long history of weak government (see for example the Agrokomerc scandal in 1987).
Dayton is a bit complicated. But that can be expected from a compromise. Democracy itself is complicated compared to dictatorship - yet we all believe that it is preferable. Similarly the extra costs of Dayton is a small price to pay for achieving that all population groups feel represented.
However the biggest problem with Dayton is that some people haven't really accepted it. They are holding out for a "better" solution that is more in their favor. And so they are obstructing all the little compromises that have to be made to make an abstract agreenment workable. In the beginning the Serbs were the main obstructors, but nowadays they have become more constructive and it is the Bosniacs from Silajdzic who are the main obstructors. Yet until now the West has failed to confront them.
The Silajdzic Bosniacs and their international supporters like to say that Dayton is outdated and needs to be adapted to meet the demands of the EU. Yet that was exactly what the rejected new constitution did. The problem was that the new constitution tried to do this in the spririt of the Dayton Treaty and that was what they didn't like. They want to replace Dayton with something that is more in their favor.
The Silajdzic Bosniacs like to state that Dayton is the product of ethnic cleansing. They are wrong. Autonomy for the Serbs was discussed already before the war and internationally it was seen as quite a reasonable demand. Ethnic cleansing did change the borders of the ethnic areas, but that worked both ways: the Bosniac areas are now largely "clean" too. The partition doesn't seem particularly unfair in the sense that one group gets more than its share either. The Serbs now have some more autonomy as they could expect before the war. But that should be expected after a war that deteriorated the ethnic relations.
Bosnia's Serbs did quite some warcrimes. But Silajdzic now seems to believe that the war crimes of some people give him the right to treat all Bosnia's Serbs like second rate citizens. His ideal is a Bosnia were Serbs learn at school that the Muslims were first and the Serbs are late immigrants and where they learn that all the war crimes in the 1992-1995 war were committed by Serbs. He knows that when you form the upperclass - like the Muslims do in Bosnia - you don't need violence for ethnic cleansing: subtle discrimination will be enough to convince the Serbs that it is better to leave. This was exactly the attitude that worried Bosnia's Serbs when it became independent.
I believe that if the West does not confront Silajdzic Bosnia has little chance to survive as a state. The problem with radicals like Silajdzic is that they are insatiable. They more you give in to them the more they will demand.
As I said in the beginning: there is only one way to make a peace agreement work: keeping to it.
[in reaction to Seesaw's reaction about the "200 ministers" in the federation I added the part below]
The "200 ministers" rethoric is misleading. It suggests that all decentralisation is inefficient and wrong. To make a valid evaluation of the situation one should not only look at the ministers but also at the number of people who work for them and how good they do their job.
I believe that the inefficiency is mainly a problem of the Federation. The RS is doing quite well in the present structure. This despite their complicated geography and their international isolation.
The Federation is supposed to function similarly as the RS. But it contains Croat cantons who insist on autonomy. And as the Federation refuses to make special rules for the Croats this means that overall the main level of government is pushed down to the level of the cantons. This makes the Federation as a level of government more or less superfluous.
In order for governments to be representive of the population, borders should take into account ethnic realtities. For that reason it has always amazed me that Dayton did not give the Croats a similar structure as the RS.
Anyhow, it is now a matter of making the Federation work. I consider this an internal affair of the Federation. There is no need at all to involve the RS in it.
Monday, December 04, 2006
PfP membership for Serbia will not stop the SRS
Serbia has been allowed to enter the Partnership for Peace, a kind of waiting room for NATO membership. But it gives me rather mized feelings.
On the one hand I am glad that for this recognition that Serbia needs to become more integrated with the rest of Europe and the world. But I am disappointed that the main motive seems to be to diminish the support for the SRS. I believe that this kind of "social engineering" does not work and often backfires.
The Western intervention in former Yugoslavia has a long history of being motivated by how the West can get those people to do what the West wants. On that basis it assigns rewards and punishments that often seem unrelated to what they are supposed to repair. Instead the West should do better to listen more to what the Balkanians really want.
In the case of Serbia this might be more attention for the Kosovo Serbs - instead of the highly formalistic policy of the Contact Group that considers abstract "principles" more important than the fate of Kosovo's Serbs.
In the case of Croatia this might be some monetary support for the return of the Serbs. One of the strongest argument from Croatia's right against assigning houses to returning Serbs is that it means that means that "Serb war criminals" are advantaged above "Croat war veterans". An EU donation to support the building of extra houses with conditions that a part of them should be assigned to Serbs might do a lot to diminish this criticism. It would also bring Croatia closer to the EU.
Just as Hitler's success was based on the injustices of the Versailles Treaty, so the success of the SRS is based on clear injustices towards Serbs. If the West wants to stop the SRS they should solve those injustices, instead of coming with the PfP, that can easily be discarded by the SRS as an empty gesture.
Unfortunately the world react the same as in 1919. Then too many people saw only the destruction in France and Belgium and considered it normal that the Germans should pay for their crimes. Now the same kind of people sees only Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo and cannot understand why the Serbs should complain.
People who feel powerless have a tendency to seek refuge in magic thinking. In Hitlers time it made them accept his "dagger-stab legend" and his hatred against Jews. The dogma's of the SRS seem not more coherent.
On the one hand I am glad that for this recognition that Serbia needs to become more integrated with the rest of Europe and the world. But I am disappointed that the main motive seems to be to diminish the support for the SRS. I believe that this kind of "social engineering" does not work and often backfires.
The Western intervention in former Yugoslavia has a long history of being motivated by how the West can get those people to do what the West wants. On that basis it assigns rewards and punishments that often seem unrelated to what they are supposed to repair. Instead the West should do better to listen more to what the Balkanians really want.
In the case of Serbia this might be more attention for the Kosovo Serbs - instead of the highly formalistic policy of the Contact Group that considers abstract "principles" more important than the fate of Kosovo's Serbs.
In the case of Croatia this might be some monetary support for the return of the Serbs. One of the strongest argument from Croatia's right against assigning houses to returning Serbs is that it means that means that "Serb war criminals" are advantaged above "Croat war veterans". An EU donation to support the building of extra houses with conditions that a part of them should be assigned to Serbs might do a lot to diminish this criticism. It would also bring Croatia closer to the EU.
Just as Hitler's success was based on the injustices of the Versailles Treaty, so the success of the SRS is based on clear injustices towards Serbs. If the West wants to stop the SRS they should solve those injustices, instead of coming with the PfP, that can easily be discarded by the SRS as an empty gesture.
Unfortunately the world react the same as in 1919. Then too many people saw only the destruction in France and Belgium and considered it normal that the Germans should pay for their crimes. Now the same kind of people sees only Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo and cannot understand why the Serbs should complain.
People who feel powerless have a tendency to seek refuge in magic thinking. In Hitlers time it made them accept his "dagger-stab legend" and his hatred against Jews. The dogma's of the SRS seem not more coherent.
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
Centrifugal Europe: example Brtitain
I have previously posted about how the prospect of EU membership was an important factor in the success of the secession movements in the different republics in fromer Yugoslavia. Today an article from the United Kingdom about nationalism there.
In 1999 London gave Scotland and Wales a great deal of autonomy, believing that that would stop nationalism there. It hasn't. Nationalism is as high as ever. And what is new: the English are getting nationalist too. 51% of the Scottish favor independence now, but from the English 59% favor Scottish independence.
One more illustration that "feeding the beast" is not the solution to solve nationalism. It only makes it stronger. Instead one should primarily work on a central state where everyone feels equal. And if one carefully listens the supporters of the nationalist parties have some specific demands (like keeping more money in the province) that can be solved. More power for the regional parliament usually doesn't bother them: it is more a hobby of the nationalist politicians themselves, not their supporters.
In 1999 London gave Scotland and Wales a great deal of autonomy, believing that that would stop nationalism there. It hasn't. Nationalism is as high as ever. And what is new: the English are getting nationalist too. 51% of the Scottish favor independence now, but from the English 59% favor Scottish independence.
One more illustration that "feeding the beast" is not the solution to solve nationalism. It only makes it stronger. Instead one should primarily work on a central state where everyone feels equal. And if one carefully listens the supporters of the nationalist parties have some specific demands (like keeping more money in the province) that can be solved. More power for the regional parliament usually doesn't bother them: it is more a hobby of the nationalist politicians themselves, not their supporters.
Friday, November 17, 2006
Integration and equality
Until not so long ago the "multi-cultural" society was in fashion. But nowadays the pendulum has swung the other way and it is in fashion to talk about integration.
The most famous example of integration is probably the American "melting pot". Its succes is based several factors: It begins that people expect that they will have to integrate some the when the move to the USA. They may spend their lives in mono-ethnic communities, like the Chinatowns, but the expectation is still there for the next generation. It helps also that people in the US are highly mobile, so many people will move at some time in their lives to areas where their ethnic group is rare, so that they have to integrate.
It is also interesting to notice the limits of the integration: blacks don't integrate very well. This has to do with discrimination. Not the official kind of discrimination: there were laws that discriminated the Chinese too at some point, yet it didn't hamper their integration. The real difference is that the discrimination of the blacks is rests on stereotypes that nearly everyone shares to some degree.
The US is not the only country that integrated its minorities well. France is another example. They did it by suppressing local languages, like that Breton and German. Yet it worked: for example the Alsace has within a few generations been converted from German speaking to French speaking and there is hardly a complaint. The secret: a sense of equality. One of the ways to achieve this is an educational system that is based on achievement. Everyone who manages to qualify for one of the "grand écoles" is nearly certain of a nice carreer.
France is not the only country that has integrated minorities well. Another example is Greece, that has been quite successful in integrating its Vlach, Slavic and Albanian minorities. Many of those people now feel primarily Greek. Iran is another country that until now has been quite successful, but it is still in an early stage of integration and things may yet go wrong.
On the other hand you have for example Turkey that never has been able to give its Kurds the impression that are equal. I consider it more or less inivitable that some day they will have to give up on Kurdistan and give it independence. England had a similar experience with Ireland a century ago. They mostly succeeded in imposing their language, but they failed on creating equality.
Kosovo and integration
That brings me back to Kosovo and the position of the Serbs there. Serbs are demanding autonomy, while Albanians are refusing it in the name of "integration".
To quote some fragments from a recent article:
"We never have said that we don't support decentralisation. But we have been reserved and we still are, especially regarding the creation of mono-ethnic municipalities … We want to integrate the communities, and the creation of mono-ethnic municipalities is in opposition to this,"
...
"The process might have its difficulties. I don't know how it is functional for a village located 1km from the centre to be part of another municipality that is, for example, 20km away,"
As I tried to prove above, the crucial part of integration is equality. Separate living or municipalities are not important. The US had its China towns and its Little Italy's but it never doubted that they would integrate one day. Similarly, seperate municipalities will not stop Serbs from Lipljan or Gracanica to integrate.
On the other hand, the ongoing discrimination will hinder integration. So the top priority of Kosovo's government should be to stop that discrimination. A very important aspect of that discrimination is the lack of safety, that - among others - makes it impossible for Serbs to work their lands. The best way to achieve this is to give the Serbs responsibility for their own safety (= police).
One shouldn't expect wonders of course: integration is slow process that takes generations. But one can expect that once the Serbs feel really safe enough to go back to the cities (meaning that not only they will not beaten up, but also that they can rent a house without having burglaries every month) it will speed up.
The above does not apply to the land north of the Ibar. The vicinity to the Serbia will make that the Serbs there feel less need to integrate with the Albanians south of the Ibar. But one should wonder if one should try. Respecting the present ethnic border is the easiest thing to do. And it would invite Serbia to do the same in Presevo.
On final note on the language. I consider it only logical that Kosovo's Serbs will learn the Albanian language at school. Unfortunately the gap between the Gheg and Tosk dialects is an obstacle. The present situation - where Gheg is the spoken language and Tosk the official language - makes it very difficult to teach Albanian to the Serbs. If you teach them the official language they will not be able to use it on the streets and as a consequnece they will find it difficult to remember. But if you teach them Gheg they will still be isolated from the official world.
The most famous example of integration is probably the American "melting pot". Its succes is based several factors: It begins that people expect that they will have to integrate some the when the move to the USA. They may spend their lives in mono-ethnic communities, like the Chinatowns, but the expectation is still there for the next generation. It helps also that people in the US are highly mobile, so many people will move at some time in their lives to areas where their ethnic group is rare, so that they have to integrate.
It is also interesting to notice the limits of the integration: blacks don't integrate very well. This has to do with discrimination. Not the official kind of discrimination: there were laws that discriminated the Chinese too at some point, yet it didn't hamper their integration. The real difference is that the discrimination of the blacks is rests on stereotypes that nearly everyone shares to some degree.
The US is not the only country that integrated its minorities well. France is another example. They did it by suppressing local languages, like that Breton and German. Yet it worked: for example the Alsace has within a few generations been converted from German speaking to French speaking and there is hardly a complaint. The secret: a sense of equality. One of the ways to achieve this is an educational system that is based on achievement. Everyone who manages to qualify for one of the "grand écoles" is nearly certain of a nice carreer.
France is not the only country that has integrated minorities well. Another example is Greece, that has been quite successful in integrating its Vlach, Slavic and Albanian minorities. Many of those people now feel primarily Greek. Iran is another country that until now has been quite successful, but it is still in an early stage of integration and things may yet go wrong.
On the other hand you have for example Turkey that never has been able to give its Kurds the impression that are equal. I consider it more or less inivitable that some day they will have to give up on Kurdistan and give it independence. England had a similar experience with Ireland a century ago. They mostly succeeded in imposing their language, but they failed on creating equality.
Kosovo and integration
That brings me back to Kosovo and the position of the Serbs there. Serbs are demanding autonomy, while Albanians are refusing it in the name of "integration".
To quote some fragments from a recent article:
"We never have said that we don't support decentralisation. But we have been reserved and we still are, especially regarding the creation of mono-ethnic municipalities … We want to integrate the communities, and the creation of mono-ethnic municipalities is in opposition to this,"
...
"The process might have its difficulties. I don't know how it is functional for a village located 1km from the centre to be part of another municipality that is, for example, 20km away,"
As I tried to prove above, the crucial part of integration is equality. Separate living or municipalities are not important. The US had its China towns and its Little Italy's but it never doubted that they would integrate one day. Similarly, seperate municipalities will not stop Serbs from Lipljan or Gracanica to integrate.
On the other hand, the ongoing discrimination will hinder integration. So the top priority of Kosovo's government should be to stop that discrimination. A very important aspect of that discrimination is the lack of safety, that - among others - makes it impossible for Serbs to work their lands. The best way to achieve this is to give the Serbs responsibility for their own safety (= police).
One shouldn't expect wonders of course: integration is slow process that takes generations. But one can expect that once the Serbs feel really safe enough to go back to the cities (meaning that not only they will not beaten up, but also that they can rent a house without having burglaries every month) it will speed up.
The above does not apply to the land north of the Ibar. The vicinity to the Serbia will make that the Serbs there feel less need to integrate with the Albanians south of the Ibar. But one should wonder if one should try. Respecting the present ethnic border is the easiest thing to do. And it would invite Serbia to do the same in Presevo.
On final note on the language. I consider it only logical that Kosovo's Serbs will learn the Albanian language at school. Unfortunately the gap between the Gheg and Tosk dialects is an obstacle. The present situation - where Gheg is the spoken language and Tosk the official language - makes it very difficult to teach Albanian to the Serbs. If you teach them the official language they will not be able to use it on the streets and as a consequnece they will find it difficult to remember. But if you teach them Gheg they will still be isolated from the official world.
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