With the fall of Mogadishu in Somalia to Islamic militias, a heated discussion has started about the role of the CIA in Somalia. The CIA is believed to have supported the war lords with lots of money. The goal was to get their help in finding Al Qaeda fugitives and (to a lesser extent) to strengthen their position versus the Islamic militias. However, it would have alarmed and united the Islamic militias, resulting in the fall of Mogadishu. The main criticism is that the CIA had only short term goals and no longterm strategy.
So far the summary of this NY Times article.
This reminds me very much of the Balkan. Here we have trophies like Milosevic, Mladic, Karadzic and Gotovina that have all the attention of the US and Europe. And here too a larger strategy seems to be lacking.
Trophies are empty victories. In fact nothing changes. And so after one trophy has been catched the focus immediately shifts to the next. Once it was believed that if only Milosevic was in The Hague everything would be over. But then the focus shifted to Mladic and Karadzic. And only the naive believe that when they have been caught we won't hear about some new "indicted war criminals" who absolutely have to be arrested.
The trophy hunting for Milosevic didn't stop after he was arrested. Next we saw a prosecution that tried to make its trophy as big as possible by overcharging. In the end they never got beyond circumstantial evidence and even there their performance was stained by many unreliable witnesses. No wonder many observers found Milosevic the most rational and credible man in the courtroom.
It leaves one wondering what would have happened if Milosevic had stayed in Belgrade. Very probably he would now be in jail for some political murder or corruption. But even when he was still politically active he would have been put in a political straightjacket just like Meciar in Slovakia.
A similar case applies to Mladic and Karadzic. Getting them in The Hague will be satisfying for their victims. But it is very doubtful whether it will deliver political results. From the political point of view it is irrelevant whether they are in some remote refuge in Bosnia, Serbia or Montenegro or in a jail in The Hague. They will land in jail sooner or later and until that they will be largely polical irrelevant. It is just a waste to spend lots of political energy on them.
Kosovo's Albanian war criminals are very interesting in this respect because here the international community has adopted a more pragmatic approach. Of course it helps that there is less media attention and as a consequence less trophy value in those people.
There is an age-old strategy to deal with popular extremist groups: fight them, but also listen to them and pick up their valid points so that they will loose appeal. Unfortunately the Western trophy hunters do exactly the opposite: their focus on their trophy is so strong that they identify the whole nationality with the trophy. This has as effect that the local people (just as everywhere else mostly innocent people) start to odentify with the war criminals and to believe that they can't be that bad.
In my opinion we should stop trophy hunting and instead concentrate on creating a stable situation. As for the war criminals: indict them, arrest them when possible and for the rest ignore them. They are politically irrelevant.
Monday, June 12, 2006
Monday, May 29, 2006
Jessen-Petersen still can't get it right
It is going well in Kosovo. At least that is what UNMIK chief Søren Jessen-Petersen tells us. Only 19 potentially ethnically motivated crimes in the first quarter of 2006. And as only in 12 cases the victims were Serbs, the Serbs seem even overrepresented as aggressors.
Yet there is something fishy about those figures. The official statement mentions also that the police has an operation "Stringent Security" aimed at improving the security of the minorities and that this has led to 1735 people being arrested. There are no further details but it certainly looks as if there is more wrong than those 12 cases.
Many Serbs are still afraid to work on their lands, returns are still low and Serbs are still leaving Kosovo. To blame this all on propaganda from Belgrade seems just cheap to me.
Just today HRW published a report Not on the Agenda that discusses the failure to bring people to court after the march 2004 riots. Work to do for the SRSG...
Jessen-Petersen has all rights to be proud of his achievements. But he should give a honest description of the present situation and not hide the remaining problems under vague generalities. By being honest he will give both sides homework to do and he will build trust that there is progress towards some common future.
What mr. Jessen-Petersen is doing now is just making propaganda aimed at promoting the independence of Kosovo in the Western world. Inside Kosovo it will have only negative effects. The Albanians become complacent that everything is right and they don't have to do any more. And the Serbs (and some other minorities) loose the trust that he is really working to guarantee a position for them in a future Kosovo.
Mr. Jessen-Petersen has been appointed to take care that Kosovo is governed in an acceptable way. Instead he is working as a goodwill ambassador for the Kosovo government. In a case like this he is doing so to such an extent that it is detrimental to his real job.
Unfortunately he is stepping in a long tradition at the UN and UNMIK. Many UN diplomats prefer not to rock the boat. They will leave in one or two years anyway. By ignoring problems they don't get associated with them and they don't risk making errors. Unfortunately that leaves it to outsiders like Kai Eide to formulate the problems.
Yet there is something fishy about those figures. The official statement mentions also that the police has an operation "Stringent Security" aimed at improving the security of the minorities and that this has led to 1735 people being arrested. There are no further details but it certainly looks as if there is more wrong than those 12 cases.
Many Serbs are still afraid to work on their lands, returns are still low and Serbs are still leaving Kosovo. To blame this all on propaganda from Belgrade seems just cheap to me.
Just today HRW published a report Not on the Agenda that discusses the failure to bring people to court after the march 2004 riots. Work to do for the SRSG...
Jessen-Petersen has all rights to be proud of his achievements. But he should give a honest description of the present situation and not hide the remaining problems under vague generalities. By being honest he will give both sides homework to do and he will build trust that there is progress towards some common future.
What mr. Jessen-Petersen is doing now is just making propaganda aimed at promoting the independence of Kosovo in the Western world. Inside Kosovo it will have only negative effects. The Albanians become complacent that everything is right and they don't have to do any more. And the Serbs (and some other minorities) loose the trust that he is really working to guarantee a position for them in a future Kosovo.
Mr. Jessen-Petersen has been appointed to take care that Kosovo is governed in an acceptable way. Instead he is working as a goodwill ambassador for the Kosovo government. In a case like this he is doing so to such an extent that it is detrimental to his real job.
Unfortunately he is stepping in a long tradition at the UN and UNMIK. Many UN diplomats prefer not to rock the boat. They will leave in one or two years anyway. By ignoring problems they don't get associated with them and they don't risk making errors. Unfortunately that leaves it to outsiders like Kai Eide to formulate the problems.
Wednesday, May 24, 2006
The lessons from Bosnia's reform debacle
It was a big disappointment for many Western leaders. American diplomats and the European Venice Commission had put a lot of effort in uniting the Bosnian political parties. And then rejection by radical parties on all sides made it miss the quorum.
Some commentators are nostalgic for Ashdown who would have pushed the Bosnians until they did what he wanted. But others note that any reform will only work if the people really want it.
Some arguments for reform are valid: Bosnia needs for example a ministry of Agriculture if it wants to receive EU subsidies. But I find the argument about too many officials always a bit risky: there are more reasons for that than Dayton.
But changing a constitution is a dangerous process. It provokes radicals from all sides who believe that the fight for control is open again. And so we see Serb radicals who want to block every centralisation and Bosniac radicals who see their chance to attack the RS.
The Bosniac argument is rather tricky. They deny the legality of the Dayton agreements as a constitution for Bosnia because it didn't follow all the procedures for constitutional change. And they see the reform as some cosmetic improvements that would force them to accept something very similar to Dayton - including the hated Republika Srpska. By rejecting Dayton they reject the very basis for a dialogue. They know that a second and a third phase of reform are planned but they don't trust that it will really happen.
Bosnia's independence was not a product of Bosnian nationalism but a product of Muslim nationalism. It's core document was the Islamic Declaration by Izetbegovic that promoted the traditional Muslim beliefs about Islamic states. And allthough it didn't stress that point most Bosnians knows their Ottoman history and are well aware of the inferior "dhimmi" status of the Christians in that period.
It is not that Bosnia was in danger of becoming fundamentalist. The secular tradition is strong enough. But the document provided an ideological basis for Bosnia's Muslim elite to aim for independence.
The danger is for the other ethnic groups to become second rate citizens who are discriminated against on the labor market and elsewhere. A Croatian party that voted against the reform mentioned discrimination as their main reason.
It is very seductive for a nationalist party that gains control and independence to follow a policy that pushes the other ethnic groups out. Croatia could not resist this tendency: that was a major reason for its war. In Bosnia with its bloody past one sees tendencies to follow a similar path.
Dayton was meant to be a guarantee against such discrimination. The entities as a territorial solution it is a clumsy solution for a mixed population. But for the moment it is the best there is. The canton model as proposed before the war already looks a lot better. So it would be logical to decentralise to the district level so that the entities become more or less superfluous.
The road from here seems clear to me. Each of the ethnic groups should work on improving the situation in the territory under their control. And as that procedes trust will increase and the ethnic borders become less important. The question is whether all groups want to do this.
As I argued before in a previous post, the basis for minority rights is respect. That is the reason why discriminated minorities want their own institutions. Even if these institutions are inefficient and corrupt they form a better basis for emancipation than plain integration. There is a lot of conflict between those institutions. But I think that we should see those conflicts are a reflection of the general distrust between the communities. So the solution is not to impose a unitary structure where one side has all the power, but a tedious process of dialogue where the differences are worked out into a solution that is acceptable for all.
In the beginning the Serbs were the most recalcitrant. But more and more the Muslims are taking over. We see a continuing propaganda that tries to assign a kind of collective guilt to the Serbs and the Croats. The does not bode well for the future. You cannot have a fruitful dialogue when you use the word "genocide" in every other sentence.
There was a war and many Serbs and Croats committed war crimes. But Bosniacs committed war crimes too. And from all populations most people are innocent.
In my opinion the West should give the Bosniacs an ultimatum: if they don't stop this propaganda and don't accept the Serbs and Croats as equal citizens there is no common future for Bosnia and the West will support partition. It is impossible to have a real democracy where half the population consists of second class citizens.
At the moment there is still some ethnic balance in Bosnia. But the Muslim population is growing faster than the others. And discrimination and propaganda is driving Croats and Serbs away. Some publications already estimate the Muslims above 50%. The CIA World Fact Book has an estimate of 48%. Whatever the real figure, it is clear that guarantees for the Serbs and Croats will become even more important in the future.
It is also interesting to note that opinion polls show that the Bosniac population generally supports the reforms while the Serbs and Croats have more reservations. Yet with the politicians it was exactly opposite: the largest group of opposing politicians were Bosniacs. This suggests that - in contrast to what the international community often wants to believe - it is the Bosniac politicians who play the most active role inciting ethnic polarisation, while the Serb and Croat give a moderate version of what their voters believe. If the international community wants to reverse the ethnic polarisation in Bosnia it definitely should pay more attention to the Bosniac politicians.
Some commentators are nostalgic for Ashdown who would have pushed the Bosnians until they did what he wanted. But others note that any reform will only work if the people really want it.
Some arguments for reform are valid: Bosnia needs for example a ministry of Agriculture if it wants to receive EU subsidies. But I find the argument about too many officials always a bit risky: there are more reasons for that than Dayton.
But changing a constitution is a dangerous process. It provokes radicals from all sides who believe that the fight for control is open again. And so we see Serb radicals who want to block every centralisation and Bosniac radicals who see their chance to attack the RS.
The Bosniac argument is rather tricky. They deny the legality of the Dayton agreements as a constitution for Bosnia because it didn't follow all the procedures for constitutional change. And they see the reform as some cosmetic improvements that would force them to accept something very similar to Dayton - including the hated Republika Srpska. By rejecting Dayton they reject the very basis for a dialogue. They know that a second and a third phase of reform are planned but they don't trust that it will really happen.
Bosnia's independence was not a product of Bosnian nationalism but a product of Muslim nationalism. It's core document was the Islamic Declaration by Izetbegovic that promoted the traditional Muslim beliefs about Islamic states. And allthough it didn't stress that point most Bosnians knows their Ottoman history and are well aware of the inferior "dhimmi" status of the Christians in that period.
It is not that Bosnia was in danger of becoming fundamentalist. The secular tradition is strong enough. But the document provided an ideological basis for Bosnia's Muslim elite to aim for independence.
The danger is for the other ethnic groups to become second rate citizens who are discriminated against on the labor market and elsewhere. A Croatian party that voted against the reform mentioned discrimination as their main reason.
It is very seductive for a nationalist party that gains control and independence to follow a policy that pushes the other ethnic groups out. Croatia could not resist this tendency: that was a major reason for its war. In Bosnia with its bloody past one sees tendencies to follow a similar path.
Dayton was meant to be a guarantee against such discrimination. The entities as a territorial solution it is a clumsy solution for a mixed population. But for the moment it is the best there is. The canton model as proposed before the war already looks a lot better. So it would be logical to decentralise to the district level so that the entities become more or less superfluous.
The road from here seems clear to me. Each of the ethnic groups should work on improving the situation in the territory under their control. And as that procedes trust will increase and the ethnic borders become less important. The question is whether all groups want to do this.
As I argued before in a previous post, the basis for minority rights is respect. That is the reason why discriminated minorities want their own institutions. Even if these institutions are inefficient and corrupt they form a better basis for emancipation than plain integration. There is a lot of conflict between those institutions. But I think that we should see those conflicts are a reflection of the general distrust between the communities. So the solution is not to impose a unitary structure where one side has all the power, but a tedious process of dialogue where the differences are worked out into a solution that is acceptable for all.
In the beginning the Serbs were the most recalcitrant. But more and more the Muslims are taking over. We see a continuing propaganda that tries to assign a kind of collective guilt to the Serbs and the Croats. The does not bode well for the future. You cannot have a fruitful dialogue when you use the word "genocide" in every other sentence.
There was a war and many Serbs and Croats committed war crimes. But Bosniacs committed war crimes too. And from all populations most people are innocent.
In my opinion the West should give the Bosniacs an ultimatum: if they don't stop this propaganda and don't accept the Serbs and Croats as equal citizens there is no common future for Bosnia and the West will support partition. It is impossible to have a real democracy where half the population consists of second class citizens.
At the moment there is still some ethnic balance in Bosnia. But the Muslim population is growing faster than the others. And discrimination and propaganda is driving Croats and Serbs away. Some publications already estimate the Muslims above 50%. The CIA World Fact Book has an estimate of 48%. Whatever the real figure, it is clear that guarantees for the Serbs and Croats will become even more important in the future.
It is also interesting to note that opinion polls show that the Bosniac population generally supports the reforms while the Serbs and Croats have more reservations. Yet with the politicians it was exactly opposite: the largest group of opposing politicians were Bosniacs. This suggests that - in contrast to what the international community often wants to believe - it is the Bosniac politicians who play the most active role inciting ethnic polarisation, while the Serb and Croat give a moderate version of what their voters believe. If the international community wants to reverse the ethnic polarisation in Bosnia it definitely should pay more attention to the Bosniac politicians.
Tuesday, May 02, 2006
How careless discrimination creates war crimes
Sudetenland
One of the most successfull strategies in wars is the incitement of each other's minorities. The Allied forces used this trick with great success in World War I and the result was the creation of a number of new states, including Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. The Allies were indulgent towards their new states and gave them more than the ethnic borders justified. Czechoslovakia got Sudetenland with the argument that the old borders of Bohemia shoulf be respected and Poland got the so called "Polish Corridor" because it wanted access to the sea.
Both areas were populated mainly by Germans, who would have preferred to stay with Germany or Austria, but the Allies determined differently. The situation was most painfull in Sudetenland. Allready on januari 1919 the Czech president Masyrek had said (in an interview with Le Monde) that the German population was the result of immigration and that only very loyal Germans had a future in Czechoslovakia. For the rest he expected that the German element would fastly disappear. This announcement of an assimilation or emigration policy did not have any effect. In september of that year the Treaty of Saint-Germain definitively allocated the area to Czechoslovakia.
Many elements of this period are very reminiscent of the present situation in former Yugoslavia, including a strong Czech lobby in the US and France insisting on keeping as much Germans as possible in Czechoslovakia in order to weaken Germany.
Sure, the Czech government had signed a treaty in which it promissed to protect its minorities. But this did not prevent them from a policy of Czechization and from pursuing a policy that changed the Germans from the richest population group into poverty. But the real danger was in the long term. Only a piece of paper protected the Germans from a hostile government. And for anyone who has studied history this is a very poor protection. In 1945 it would prove to be insufficient indeed when they were actually chased from their homes. The Allies - including those in the West - knew it would happen and did not object in any way.
It is usually believed that the cruel behaviour of the Germans in Poland and the Sovjet-Union during World War II was a consequence of a theory that saw the Slavs as Untermenschen. I believe it is the other way around:
For the Czechs the Treaty of Saint-Germain may have been just a matter of nationalism. But for the Germans it was a matter of survival. Allocating Sudetenland to a country that made it clear that it wanted to purge them was a crime that must have made an enormous impression on a man with a sense of history like Hitler. I believe that the obsession about Lebensraum and the dislike of the Slavs was a direct consequence of this situation. The Untermenschen theory was a just a justification for an existing feeling when it was translated in policies.
Krajna
The situation in former Yugoslavia has many similarities with that after World War I. Here too we see the Allies playing the ethnic game in order to weaken an enemy - in this case the "communist" Milosevic. And in this case too the Allies tend to give the new states more territory than strict ethnic criteria would allow them.
Tudjman was brutally clear about the Serbs. During the 1989 elections he made his infamous remark that he thanked God that his wife was neither a Serb nor a Jew. And on Serb complaints about discrimination he asked why they didn't go to Serbia if they liked it better there.
Yet the international community insisted that the Krajna and the other Serb-majority areas should stay with Croatia. For the international community it was just a matter of making a good treaty that guaranteed minority rights. But for the Serbs no treaty could make up for the fact that they would live on borrowed time in a country that would use the first available excuse to throw them out.
I think this explains much of the war crimes. While the Croats and the Muslims lived in a world where the international community would interfere if the situation got too much out of hand the Serbs lived in an existential void. If they didn't defend themselves there was no hope.
Kosovo
In Kosovo the international community is once again in the same situation. It is clear to everybody that many Albanians want all Serbs out and that there is a big chance in 10 years no Serbs will be left in Kosovo. Yet the international is moving forward with the same cynical opportunism as in Sudetenland and the Krajna towards a solution that will give the Serbs - even those in the Serb-majority north - only some token guarantees that are bound to be worthless in the long term.
I am worried about the despair and distrust that this will leave. I cannot predict the future, but it certainly has the potential to be very destabilising, both for the Balkan and the rest of the world.
Conclusion
Like it or not, ethnicity is the only valid argument for creating new states nowadays. All other arguments come down to the use of force - whether it is by barbarian soldiers or polished diplomats.
One of the first things newly independent countries usually do is trying to prove their ethnic credentials. Minorities are marked as intruders without rights or as apostates who should be assimilated back into the nation. Ethnic territories outside the borders are claimed.
This nationalistic first phase of new nations has obvious risks for ethnic minorities. For that reason I believe that the international community should be careful that new nations are formed along ethnic lines.
Instead the intenational community has chosen a policy that declares some "historic" borders sacred. Behind this is usually some partiality on the international side. In the case of the Sudeten the policy was that Germany should be as weak as possible and that to achieve that as much Germans as possible should stay behind as minorities in neighbouring countries. It seems that the international community has nowadays a similar policy towards Serbia and the Serbs.
It is interesting to note that in all three cases local politicians feel a bit uneasy about the situation. The presence of the minority undermines their nationalistic claims. It would be political suicide for them just to give up the contested territory. But if the international community would exert some pressure they would be happy to use that as an excuse.
Treaties alone cannot protect minorities. Every nationalist knows the tricks to make life hard for minorities without violating the letter of those treaties. This varies from the subtle economic and linguistic discrimination in Sudetenland to the situation in Kosovo where the Serbs are denied the most basic police protection.
"Special circumstances" form a good excuse to push treaties aside altogether, as the Sudeten Germans experienced in 1945. If necessary, such circumstances can be created, as the Greeks in Turkey experienced in 1955 and the Serbs in Kosovo in march 2004.
With many ethnic conflicts in the world still waiting to be resolved it would be fortunately when the international community finally realized that it cannot pursue its personal grudges without great risk of the stability of the whole world.
One of the most successfull strategies in wars is the incitement of each other's minorities. The Allied forces used this trick with great success in World War I and the result was the creation of a number of new states, including Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. The Allies were indulgent towards their new states and gave them more than the ethnic borders justified. Czechoslovakia got Sudetenland with the argument that the old borders of Bohemia shoulf be respected and Poland got the so called "Polish Corridor" because it wanted access to the sea.
Both areas were populated mainly by Germans, who would have preferred to stay with Germany or Austria, but the Allies determined differently. The situation was most painfull in Sudetenland. Allready on januari 1919 the Czech president Masyrek had said (in an interview with Le Monde) that the German population was the result of immigration and that only very loyal Germans had a future in Czechoslovakia. For the rest he expected that the German element would fastly disappear. This announcement of an assimilation or emigration policy did not have any effect. In september of that year the Treaty of Saint-Germain definitively allocated the area to Czechoslovakia.
Many elements of this period are very reminiscent of the present situation in former Yugoslavia, including a strong Czech lobby in the US and France insisting on keeping as much Germans as possible in Czechoslovakia in order to weaken Germany.
Sure, the Czech government had signed a treaty in which it promissed to protect its minorities. But this did not prevent them from a policy of Czechization and from pursuing a policy that changed the Germans from the richest population group into poverty. But the real danger was in the long term. Only a piece of paper protected the Germans from a hostile government. And for anyone who has studied history this is a very poor protection. In 1945 it would prove to be insufficient indeed when they were actually chased from their homes. The Allies - including those in the West - knew it would happen and did not object in any way.
It is usually believed that the cruel behaviour of the Germans in Poland and the Sovjet-Union during World War II was a consequence of a theory that saw the Slavs as Untermenschen. I believe it is the other way around:
For the Czechs the Treaty of Saint-Germain may have been just a matter of nationalism. But for the Germans it was a matter of survival. Allocating Sudetenland to a country that made it clear that it wanted to purge them was a crime that must have made an enormous impression on a man with a sense of history like Hitler. I believe that the obsession about Lebensraum and the dislike of the Slavs was a direct consequence of this situation. The Untermenschen theory was a just a justification for an existing feeling when it was translated in policies.
Krajna
The situation in former Yugoslavia has many similarities with that after World War I. Here too we see the Allies playing the ethnic game in order to weaken an enemy - in this case the "communist" Milosevic. And in this case too the Allies tend to give the new states more territory than strict ethnic criteria would allow them.
Tudjman was brutally clear about the Serbs. During the 1989 elections he made his infamous remark that he thanked God that his wife was neither a Serb nor a Jew. And on Serb complaints about discrimination he asked why they didn't go to Serbia if they liked it better there.
Yet the international community insisted that the Krajna and the other Serb-majority areas should stay with Croatia. For the international community it was just a matter of making a good treaty that guaranteed minority rights. But for the Serbs no treaty could make up for the fact that they would live on borrowed time in a country that would use the first available excuse to throw them out.
I think this explains much of the war crimes. While the Croats and the Muslims lived in a world where the international community would interfere if the situation got too much out of hand the Serbs lived in an existential void. If they didn't defend themselves there was no hope.
Kosovo
In Kosovo the international community is once again in the same situation. It is clear to everybody that many Albanians want all Serbs out and that there is a big chance in 10 years no Serbs will be left in Kosovo. Yet the international is moving forward with the same cynical opportunism as in Sudetenland and the Krajna towards a solution that will give the Serbs - even those in the Serb-majority north - only some token guarantees that are bound to be worthless in the long term.
I am worried about the despair and distrust that this will leave. I cannot predict the future, but it certainly has the potential to be very destabilising, both for the Balkan and the rest of the world.
Conclusion
Like it or not, ethnicity is the only valid argument for creating new states nowadays. All other arguments come down to the use of force - whether it is by barbarian soldiers or polished diplomats.
One of the first things newly independent countries usually do is trying to prove their ethnic credentials. Minorities are marked as intruders without rights or as apostates who should be assimilated back into the nation. Ethnic territories outside the borders are claimed.
This nationalistic first phase of new nations has obvious risks for ethnic minorities. For that reason I believe that the international community should be careful that new nations are formed along ethnic lines.
Instead the intenational community has chosen a policy that declares some "historic" borders sacred. Behind this is usually some partiality on the international side. In the case of the Sudeten the policy was that Germany should be as weak as possible and that to achieve that as much Germans as possible should stay behind as minorities in neighbouring countries. It seems that the international community has nowadays a similar policy towards Serbia and the Serbs.
It is interesting to note that in all three cases local politicians feel a bit uneasy about the situation. The presence of the minority undermines their nationalistic claims. It would be political suicide for them just to give up the contested territory. But if the international community would exert some pressure they would be happy to use that as an excuse.
Treaties alone cannot protect minorities. Every nationalist knows the tricks to make life hard for minorities without violating the letter of those treaties. This varies from the subtle economic and linguistic discrimination in Sudetenland to the situation in Kosovo where the Serbs are denied the most basic police protection.
"Special circumstances" form a good excuse to push treaties aside altogether, as the Sudeten Germans experienced in 1945. If necessary, such circumstances can be created, as the Greeks in Turkey experienced in 1955 and the Serbs in Kosovo in march 2004.
With many ethnic conflicts in the world still waiting to be resolved it would be fortunately when the international community finally realized that it cannot pursue its personal grudges without great risk of the stability of the whole world.
Sunday, April 16, 2006
Minority rights, respect and the balance of power
The mystery of Sarajevo
It has often been noted that while Sarajevo was under siege many Serbs were living in the city and participating in its defense on the Muslim side. It is less known that since the war ended many of those Serbs have left. And Serbs and Croats are still leaving Sarajevo. This is often explained as a resentment from the war. But this does not explain why this hostility increased after the war had ended.
I believe there is another explanation. After the war the Bosniac army fired its non-muslim commanders and Bosniac parties started a campaign that blamed the Serbs (and to a lesser extent also the Croats) for the war and painted the Muslims as innocent victims. The presence of peace keepers and other internationals didn't help very much: most of them have learned from the media at home that the Muslims are the good guys and the Serbs the bad guys. And as they stay often less than a year they don't have much time to develop a more nuanced picture.
As a consequence the social status of the Serbs has sunk. "war criminal" is now a label that is sticking on every Serb - indepently of what he did in the war. I think the phenomena is quite similar to painting Jews as the "murderers of Christ". Justified indignation about crimes is being used by bullies as a tool. It is a very effective tool to keep a minority in an inferior position.
Bosnia had a civil war. But the war was about something. It was about the distribution of power in Bosnia. Under Tito the Muslims had dominated the government. But the central government in Belgrade formed a counterweight so the Serbs didn't worry. Yugoslavia was a dictatorship anyway. But with democracy coming and Bosnia becoming independent they wanted guarantees. Not surprising for anyone who has read the book of Izetbegovic where he talks about Muslims grabbing power and sees Pakistan is the ideal Islamic state. So this was a real conflict and people can respect each other in comflict - even when war crimes are committed. There are good and bad people everywhere.
That history is now rewritten. Instead we are told about some mad power-hungry Milosevic who in collaboration with the local crazy Serbs attacked an innocent Bosnia. This is slowly poisoning the ethnic relations in Bosnia and may have far-reaching consequences in the future.
One of the consequences of less status is less power and this is very clear with the Serbs. At the moment the Dayton Treaty is torn up piece by piece and the Serbs are bullied into submission by threats from the OHR. Sure, Bosnia needs reforms, but these should be the result of an agreement of Bosnia's ethnic groups. Instead the Muslims decide alone and the West helps them to impose their will.
I remember one of Bosnia's internationals saying that the Serbs will have to go through the dust like the Germans after 1945 before the Muslims will be able to accept them again. Unfortunately this kind of ignorant people are quoted in newspapers as experts. They do not understand that they are comdemning a whole nation for the crimes of a few. Neither do they understand that they are condemning Serbs to being a kind of second class citizens like gypsies are in many countries. And least of all they don't understand that you cannot have a stable democracy where more than a third of the population is treated like second class citizens.
So now Bosnia is an instable state with bad prospects for real democracy - because democracy is based on equality. And the internationals are doing their best - with the best intentions - to make it worse.
Kosovo
In Bosnia there was a balance of power before the war and the Serbs, Croats and Muslims where reasonable equal. Kosovo has a quite different history in which at some time the Serbs and at other times the Albanians were at the top. And each of them had the habit to treat the other like second class citizens. Because of these experiences both sides tend to be much more radical than the people from Bosnia in order to secure their dominance.
This became clear immediately clear after the war when many Serbs were chased away, their properties stolen and some killed. The KFOR soldiers looked the other way and many of them thought that the Albanians were entitled to have some revenge after what the Serbs had done to them.
Unfortunately such violence is not just some onetime revenge. It builds a society where violence against minorities is considered normal and minorities are inferior citizens. Since then the UN has never been able to break this pattern. Often they are even sucked into it. When there is some attack like a bombing in a Serb village for example American soldiers start first with searching houses in the Serb village. Only when that doesn't give a result will they consider that that it might have been an Albanian from a neighbouring village.
A concrete example is this recent news report: Home of Danilo Dzolic (75) was attacked by armed group at about 1 a.m. this morning in Kosovo village of Tucep, RTS reports. No one was injured during the attack but the house in which Dzolic and his wife were at that moment is damaged. The attackers most probably wanted to steal Dzolic’s tractor because so far four tractors had been stolen in the village. Tucep residents chased away the attackers by firing their hunting guns, which Kosovo police and KFOR confiscated today. The Serbs living in the village expressed their concerns the attacks might happen again.
One sees it again: the victims are the only ones who are punished. There is no search in neighbouring villages for tractors and there is no decision to establish a police post in the village. By disarming the villagers KFOR is actually helping the attackers.
The main effect of such "protection" is to humiliate the Serbs and to diminish the respect that they get in society. It is a self-reinforcing process. The next time the Serbs have a problem many American soldiers will not feel very motivated to help "those losers".
This pattern of helping aggression has a long history. When in 2001 massive Albanian protests were planned in Mitrovica and it was feared that North Mitrovica would be overrun the USA sent soldiers to North Mitrovica to search Serb houses for weapons. And when in march 2004 UN spokesman Derek Chappell questioned that the drowning of 3 Albanian children had been the work of Serbs he was transfered to a position without press contact - making the road free for the riots.
The many occupied houses and lands from Serbs have never really bothered the UN. They payed lipservice that it was a problem but they didn't do anything. After the recent Kai Eide report a new commission has installed to attack the problem but I am pessimistic whether this will be for real. Of course occupied property is another symbol of the Serbs and other minorities as inferior people.
Most of the violence in Kosovo nowadays is the so-called low level violence. This covers throwing stones at people, houses or cars, stealing cattle and other properties, setting fires in sheds or sometimes also houses, beatings, etc. A example of how this works is this recent report from Tanjug (UNMIK translation 21 april): The inhabitants of the village of Straze, in the region of Gnjilane, have announced, following a number of robberies, that they will sell their houses and land and move somewhere else, KiM Radio from Caglavica reported. Cedomir Ivkovic from Straze says he doesn’t feel safe on his property ever since his dog was killed in the yard. “We stay awake all night long, only the dogs are protecting us, while the Albanians come to ask us whether we want to sell the house,” said Cedomir’s sister Smilja, adding that her family is under great pressure and that she is afraid to stay in the village.
The attitude of the UN is that these kind of things could at best be ignored. According to the UN the good thing is that it doesn't lead to large scale clashes. Yet it is very effective.
I disagree. This low level violence keeps alive the climate of violence. The eruption of march 2004 was possible exactly because of this climate. One can compare it to Nazi Germany. Auschwitz didn't appear out of nothing. It started with small harrassment, then came the Kristallnacht and later the Stars of David and the ghetto's. Kosovo is quite far on this road and it will need coordinated effort to bring it back to normal ethnic relations.
The problems of Kosovo are much worse than those in Bosnia. Here we have to deal with violence and witnesses who keep silent out of fear. It is difficult to establish the rule of law in such a climate and it requires a hands on style of government with an attention to detail. Unfortunately the UN seems not even to have recognized the problems.
Warcrimes
The Yugoslavia Tribunal has played a rather strange role. For a long time it seemed to restrict itself to Serb suspects. The few Albanians, Bosniacs and Croats that are indicted seem mainly to serve to avoid criticism. And even today only politicians from the Serb side are prosecuted.
I have the impression that the judges and prosecution at the ICTY are blinded by the ambition to go into the history books as the next Nuremberg. In order to achieve that they need a simple story: good guys versus bad guys.
Few people seem to realize that it was Auschwitz that made Nuremberg a success. These were facts - not abstract theories about who was guilty of the war. The verdicts about the latter are nowadays largely forgotten. In fact many people believe until today that World War II would not have happened if the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 had not been so partial.
For that reason I believe that the ICTY would have much better results if it concentrated on facts instead of theories. War crimes should not be linked to political aims or parties. Instead the tribunal should focus on the Geneva Treaties: there are standards of behaviour in war time and those standards should be maintained. The judges will find this boring: instead of unmasking the big Serb complot they will become a kind of traffic cops writing tickets for bad behaviour in the war. But it would have a much bigger moral impact on the region and work much better in preventing similar behaviour in a next war.
At the moment prosecution of war crimes has become highly politicised. It is not only the Serbs who protest and drag their feet. Bosniacs and Croats protest just as hard when their people are indicted. All parties use statements about war crimes by the others as a tool to paint the other side as bad - while ignoring the crimes of their own side.
We are told that a warcrime tribunal is necessary is order to reestablish trust between the parties after the war. As far as I can see the ICTY is doing the opposite: it politicises something that should be non-political.
I believe that the population of the Balkan is very well capable of deciding for themselves what their politicians did wrong that got them into this mess. We should just provide them with the facts. They should decide for themselves in an open discussion and dialogue about the political consequences.
I found the ICTY's effort to prove that all wars were a result of Milosevic's aim for a Greater Serbia just ridiculous. It doesn't even fit his psychological profile as an opportunist without clear convictions. Instead they would have done better to link Milosevic to one of the concrete war crimes. And if they couldn't link Milosevic to such crimes: why did they indict him them?
Reconciliation and respect
In most of the world respect is a very important term. It has not the western meaning of admiring someone. Instead it is more related to the respect you have for a man with a gun: you don't mess with him. You may like a person you respect, but it is not necessary.
In the Western world the word has lost most of this meaning. With the rule of law and the principle that all people are equal before the law there is no longer much need for this kind of respect. Only discrminated minorities like America's blacks still talk a lot about respect.
There are many projects in Bosnia and Kosovo where idealistic foreigners try to bring the different ethnic groups together in some project. The idea that is that when these people know each other better they will hate each other less. In Kosovo many of these projects have stopped after march 2004. Too much Serbs had lost their faith in those projects after they had seen their Albanian project "friends" participate in the riots.
What these internationals miss is that the main issue is not reconciliation or frienship: it is respect that is the most basic. Only when respect has been established is real friendship possible.
A parallel example from history is slavery. Many plantation slave owners had been raised by caring black nannies and friendly black house servants. Yet that didn't stop many of them to become cruel towards their slaves. Here too respect was missing.
The role of the UN as interim government
Building respect between people requires maintaining law and order. It requires also doing your best to treat all parties as equals. This is hard work and until now it has been shunned by our peacekeepers.
One of the worst aspects of colonialism was that it picked favorites among the local population and on that basis laid the basis for later ethnic conflicts. They did this not out of evil, but because it was the easiest way to rule. Without local allies it is very difficult to rule a foreign country. The best allies are usually those who could not govern on their own strength - so they remain dependent on the coloniser. Of course this is a very good argument to stay forever.
The UN rulers in Kosovo and Bosnia are following exactly the same pattern. And in both Bosnia and Kosovo one sees that with the years the distribution of power is becoming increasingly lopsided in favor of the UN's favorite. Just as with decolonisation this may give major troubles once the UN has left.
For this reason I believe that the UN should formulate and exit strategy from the beginning and put much more trust in the Balkan's own capabilities of solving problems.
In Bosnia the UN had an exit strategy in the form of the Dayton agreement. The UN should have implemented it and left. Instead they started tinkering with the treaty. Now we are told that Bosnia has too many layers of government and that many tasks are executed on too many levels. The UN is making three mistakes here. First of all Dayton stipulates on which level which responsibilities should be. If other levels implement the same responsibilities it should be clear that they are the ones who are wrong. Next comes that this is a discussion about economic efficiency. I don't think it is a task of the UN to impose economic efficiency. This should be left to the local parties. And last but not least: a peace treaty is a kind of sacred document. Tearing it up because one party claims that it is not economically efficient is for me a kind of blasphemy. There are thousand other ways to increase economic efficiency without undermining the fundament of the country.
The balance of power
In the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires and even in Yugoslavia many ethnic groups lived together without much trouble. Many people believe that if just the Serbs or the Croats or whoever hadn't become so nationalistic we could have maintained that kind of peace.
I don't believe so. Both these empires and Yugoslavia were dictatorships. The rulers saw themselves as typical upperclass people standing above the small national interests. With democracy this picture changes: parlementarians depend on having supporters and those are usually from one ethnic group. So the parliament becomes an arena of representatives of different ethnic groups competing for power and money. After some time one sees the development of ground rules and a balance of power that inhibits one party from claiming all the spoils. But this takes time and is preceded by a period of turmoil in which much can go wrong.
In Yugoslavia this process was aggravated by two factors. The country was in a period of economic turmoil in which some groups became much richer and others much poorer. So there were many people who were very motivated to pursue their interests in politics. The second factor was the federal structure that had been constructed after Tito's death. Its distribution of power did not reflect the democratic distribution so it was bound to give problems. More important perhaps was that it gave too little power to the central government: there was nobody who was above the parties.
I think that the main task of international mediation and peace keeping in this region should be to build up te ground rules and the balance of power in the parliament. We should function as the party above the parties that Yugoslavia missed. As I stated before: respect is very much related to power. So when we achieve a balance of power we achieve also a better respect for human rights.
Unfortunately many "peacekeepers" have another idea. They believe that one party is good and the other is bad and they let one party convince them that they can recreate the unity of Tito's time. Obviously they don't understand how democracy works.
One sees a similar misunderstanding in Kosovo at the moment. Kosovo's Albanian leaders are praised by American negotiator Wisner for "reaching out" to Kosovo's Serbs. But this "reaching out" is just PR talk. It won't shift the balance of power and result in more respect and a better treatment of Kosovo's Serb citizens. For that concrete measures like autonmy are necessary.
It has often been noted that while Sarajevo was under siege many Serbs were living in the city and participating in its defense on the Muslim side. It is less known that since the war ended many of those Serbs have left. And Serbs and Croats are still leaving Sarajevo. This is often explained as a resentment from the war. But this does not explain why this hostility increased after the war had ended.
I believe there is another explanation. After the war the Bosniac army fired its non-muslim commanders and Bosniac parties started a campaign that blamed the Serbs (and to a lesser extent also the Croats) for the war and painted the Muslims as innocent victims. The presence of peace keepers and other internationals didn't help very much: most of them have learned from the media at home that the Muslims are the good guys and the Serbs the bad guys. And as they stay often less than a year they don't have much time to develop a more nuanced picture.
As a consequence the social status of the Serbs has sunk. "war criminal" is now a label that is sticking on every Serb - indepently of what he did in the war. I think the phenomena is quite similar to painting Jews as the "murderers of Christ". Justified indignation about crimes is being used by bullies as a tool. It is a very effective tool to keep a minority in an inferior position.
Bosnia had a civil war. But the war was about something. It was about the distribution of power in Bosnia. Under Tito the Muslims had dominated the government. But the central government in Belgrade formed a counterweight so the Serbs didn't worry. Yugoslavia was a dictatorship anyway. But with democracy coming and Bosnia becoming independent they wanted guarantees. Not surprising for anyone who has read the book of Izetbegovic where he talks about Muslims grabbing power and sees Pakistan is the ideal Islamic state. So this was a real conflict and people can respect each other in comflict - even when war crimes are committed. There are good and bad people everywhere.
That history is now rewritten. Instead we are told about some mad power-hungry Milosevic who in collaboration with the local crazy Serbs attacked an innocent Bosnia. This is slowly poisoning the ethnic relations in Bosnia and may have far-reaching consequences in the future.
One of the consequences of less status is less power and this is very clear with the Serbs. At the moment the Dayton Treaty is torn up piece by piece and the Serbs are bullied into submission by threats from the OHR. Sure, Bosnia needs reforms, but these should be the result of an agreement of Bosnia's ethnic groups. Instead the Muslims decide alone and the West helps them to impose their will.
I remember one of Bosnia's internationals saying that the Serbs will have to go through the dust like the Germans after 1945 before the Muslims will be able to accept them again. Unfortunately this kind of ignorant people are quoted in newspapers as experts. They do not understand that they are comdemning a whole nation for the crimes of a few. Neither do they understand that they are condemning Serbs to being a kind of second class citizens like gypsies are in many countries. And least of all they don't understand that you cannot have a stable democracy where more than a third of the population is treated like second class citizens.
So now Bosnia is an instable state with bad prospects for real democracy - because democracy is based on equality. And the internationals are doing their best - with the best intentions - to make it worse.
Kosovo
In Bosnia there was a balance of power before the war and the Serbs, Croats and Muslims where reasonable equal. Kosovo has a quite different history in which at some time the Serbs and at other times the Albanians were at the top. And each of them had the habit to treat the other like second class citizens. Because of these experiences both sides tend to be much more radical than the people from Bosnia in order to secure their dominance.
This became clear immediately clear after the war when many Serbs were chased away, their properties stolen and some killed. The KFOR soldiers looked the other way and many of them thought that the Albanians were entitled to have some revenge after what the Serbs had done to them.
Unfortunately such violence is not just some onetime revenge. It builds a society where violence against minorities is considered normal and minorities are inferior citizens. Since then the UN has never been able to break this pattern. Often they are even sucked into it. When there is some attack like a bombing in a Serb village for example American soldiers start first with searching houses in the Serb village. Only when that doesn't give a result will they consider that that it might have been an Albanian from a neighbouring village.
A concrete example is this recent news report: Home of Danilo Dzolic (75) was attacked by armed group at about 1 a.m. this morning in Kosovo village of Tucep, RTS reports. No one was injured during the attack but the house in which Dzolic and his wife were at that moment is damaged. The attackers most probably wanted to steal Dzolic’s tractor because so far four tractors had been stolen in the village. Tucep residents chased away the attackers by firing their hunting guns, which Kosovo police and KFOR confiscated today. The Serbs living in the village expressed their concerns the attacks might happen again.
One sees it again: the victims are the only ones who are punished. There is no search in neighbouring villages for tractors and there is no decision to establish a police post in the village. By disarming the villagers KFOR is actually helping the attackers.
The main effect of such "protection" is to humiliate the Serbs and to diminish the respect that they get in society. It is a self-reinforcing process. The next time the Serbs have a problem many American soldiers will not feel very motivated to help "those losers".
This pattern of helping aggression has a long history. When in 2001 massive Albanian protests were planned in Mitrovica and it was feared that North Mitrovica would be overrun the USA sent soldiers to North Mitrovica to search Serb houses for weapons. And when in march 2004 UN spokesman Derek Chappell questioned that the drowning of 3 Albanian children had been the work of Serbs he was transfered to a position without press contact - making the road free for the riots.
The many occupied houses and lands from Serbs have never really bothered the UN. They payed lipservice that it was a problem but they didn't do anything. After the recent Kai Eide report a new commission has installed to attack the problem but I am pessimistic whether this will be for real. Of course occupied property is another symbol of the Serbs and other minorities as inferior people.
Most of the violence in Kosovo nowadays is the so-called low level violence. This covers throwing stones at people, houses or cars, stealing cattle and other properties, setting fires in sheds or sometimes also houses, beatings, etc. A example of how this works is this recent report from Tanjug (UNMIK translation 21 april): The inhabitants of the village of Straze, in the region of Gnjilane, have announced, following a number of robberies, that they will sell their houses and land and move somewhere else, KiM Radio from Caglavica reported. Cedomir Ivkovic from Straze says he doesn’t feel safe on his property ever since his dog was killed in the yard. “We stay awake all night long, only the dogs are protecting us, while the Albanians come to ask us whether we want to sell the house,” said Cedomir’s sister Smilja, adding that her family is under great pressure and that she is afraid to stay in the village.
The attitude of the UN is that these kind of things could at best be ignored. According to the UN the good thing is that it doesn't lead to large scale clashes. Yet it is very effective.
I disagree. This low level violence keeps alive the climate of violence. The eruption of march 2004 was possible exactly because of this climate. One can compare it to Nazi Germany. Auschwitz didn't appear out of nothing. It started with small harrassment, then came the Kristallnacht and later the Stars of David and the ghetto's. Kosovo is quite far on this road and it will need coordinated effort to bring it back to normal ethnic relations.
The problems of Kosovo are much worse than those in Bosnia. Here we have to deal with violence and witnesses who keep silent out of fear. It is difficult to establish the rule of law in such a climate and it requires a hands on style of government with an attention to detail. Unfortunately the UN seems not even to have recognized the problems.
Warcrimes
The Yugoslavia Tribunal has played a rather strange role. For a long time it seemed to restrict itself to Serb suspects. The few Albanians, Bosniacs and Croats that are indicted seem mainly to serve to avoid criticism. And even today only politicians from the Serb side are prosecuted.
I have the impression that the judges and prosecution at the ICTY are blinded by the ambition to go into the history books as the next Nuremberg. In order to achieve that they need a simple story: good guys versus bad guys.
Few people seem to realize that it was Auschwitz that made Nuremberg a success. These were facts - not abstract theories about who was guilty of the war. The verdicts about the latter are nowadays largely forgotten. In fact many people believe until today that World War II would not have happened if the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 had not been so partial.
For that reason I believe that the ICTY would have much better results if it concentrated on facts instead of theories. War crimes should not be linked to political aims or parties. Instead the tribunal should focus on the Geneva Treaties: there are standards of behaviour in war time and those standards should be maintained. The judges will find this boring: instead of unmasking the big Serb complot they will become a kind of traffic cops writing tickets for bad behaviour in the war. But it would have a much bigger moral impact on the region and work much better in preventing similar behaviour in a next war.
At the moment prosecution of war crimes has become highly politicised. It is not only the Serbs who protest and drag their feet. Bosniacs and Croats protest just as hard when their people are indicted. All parties use statements about war crimes by the others as a tool to paint the other side as bad - while ignoring the crimes of their own side.
We are told that a warcrime tribunal is necessary is order to reestablish trust between the parties after the war. As far as I can see the ICTY is doing the opposite: it politicises something that should be non-political.
I believe that the population of the Balkan is very well capable of deciding for themselves what their politicians did wrong that got them into this mess. We should just provide them with the facts. They should decide for themselves in an open discussion and dialogue about the political consequences.
I found the ICTY's effort to prove that all wars were a result of Milosevic's aim for a Greater Serbia just ridiculous. It doesn't even fit his psychological profile as an opportunist without clear convictions. Instead they would have done better to link Milosevic to one of the concrete war crimes. And if they couldn't link Milosevic to such crimes: why did they indict him them?
Reconciliation and respect
In most of the world respect is a very important term. It has not the western meaning of admiring someone. Instead it is more related to the respect you have for a man with a gun: you don't mess with him. You may like a person you respect, but it is not necessary.
In the Western world the word has lost most of this meaning. With the rule of law and the principle that all people are equal before the law there is no longer much need for this kind of respect. Only discrminated minorities like America's blacks still talk a lot about respect.
There are many projects in Bosnia and Kosovo where idealistic foreigners try to bring the different ethnic groups together in some project. The idea that is that when these people know each other better they will hate each other less. In Kosovo many of these projects have stopped after march 2004. Too much Serbs had lost their faith in those projects after they had seen their Albanian project "friends" participate in the riots.
What these internationals miss is that the main issue is not reconciliation or frienship: it is respect that is the most basic. Only when respect has been established is real friendship possible.
A parallel example from history is slavery. Many plantation slave owners had been raised by caring black nannies and friendly black house servants. Yet that didn't stop many of them to become cruel towards their slaves. Here too respect was missing.
The role of the UN as interim government
Building respect between people requires maintaining law and order. It requires also doing your best to treat all parties as equals. This is hard work and until now it has been shunned by our peacekeepers.
One of the worst aspects of colonialism was that it picked favorites among the local population and on that basis laid the basis for later ethnic conflicts. They did this not out of evil, but because it was the easiest way to rule. Without local allies it is very difficult to rule a foreign country. The best allies are usually those who could not govern on their own strength - so they remain dependent on the coloniser. Of course this is a very good argument to stay forever.
The UN rulers in Kosovo and Bosnia are following exactly the same pattern. And in both Bosnia and Kosovo one sees that with the years the distribution of power is becoming increasingly lopsided in favor of the UN's favorite. Just as with decolonisation this may give major troubles once the UN has left.
For this reason I believe that the UN should formulate and exit strategy from the beginning and put much more trust in the Balkan's own capabilities of solving problems.
In Bosnia the UN had an exit strategy in the form of the Dayton agreement. The UN should have implemented it and left. Instead they started tinkering with the treaty. Now we are told that Bosnia has too many layers of government and that many tasks are executed on too many levels. The UN is making three mistakes here. First of all Dayton stipulates on which level which responsibilities should be. If other levels implement the same responsibilities it should be clear that they are the ones who are wrong. Next comes that this is a discussion about economic efficiency. I don't think it is a task of the UN to impose economic efficiency. This should be left to the local parties. And last but not least: a peace treaty is a kind of sacred document. Tearing it up because one party claims that it is not economically efficient is for me a kind of blasphemy. There are thousand other ways to increase economic efficiency without undermining the fundament of the country.
The balance of power
In the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires and even in Yugoslavia many ethnic groups lived together without much trouble. Many people believe that if just the Serbs or the Croats or whoever hadn't become so nationalistic we could have maintained that kind of peace.
I don't believe so. Both these empires and Yugoslavia were dictatorships. The rulers saw themselves as typical upperclass people standing above the small national interests. With democracy this picture changes: parlementarians depend on having supporters and those are usually from one ethnic group. So the parliament becomes an arena of representatives of different ethnic groups competing for power and money. After some time one sees the development of ground rules and a balance of power that inhibits one party from claiming all the spoils. But this takes time and is preceded by a period of turmoil in which much can go wrong.
In Yugoslavia this process was aggravated by two factors. The country was in a period of economic turmoil in which some groups became much richer and others much poorer. So there were many people who were very motivated to pursue their interests in politics. The second factor was the federal structure that had been constructed after Tito's death. Its distribution of power did not reflect the democratic distribution so it was bound to give problems. More important perhaps was that it gave too little power to the central government: there was nobody who was above the parties.
I think that the main task of international mediation and peace keeping in this region should be to build up te ground rules and the balance of power in the parliament. We should function as the party above the parties that Yugoslavia missed. As I stated before: respect is very much related to power. So when we achieve a balance of power we achieve also a better respect for human rights.
Unfortunately many "peacekeepers" have another idea. They believe that one party is good and the other is bad and they let one party convince them that they can recreate the unity of Tito's time. Obviously they don't understand how democracy works.
One sees a similar misunderstanding in Kosovo at the moment. Kosovo's Albanian leaders are praised by American negotiator Wisner for "reaching out" to Kosovo's Serbs. But this "reaching out" is just PR talk. It won't shift the balance of power and result in more respect and a better treatment of Kosovo's Serb citizens. For that concrete measures like autonmy are necessary.
Sunday, March 26, 2006
Is better PR the solution for Kosovo's minority problem?
A few months ago I attended I attended a conference about Kosovo in Amsterdam. One of the discussions was about the position of the Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo. The representative of the Kosovo government promoted the vision that everything was ok for the Serbs and that the only thing that was needed was a bit of public relations to tell it to them. At that time I found it a rather bold statement in view of the Kai Eide report. But recently Kosovo's premier Ceku essentially said the same when he stated that Kosovo's government needs to make some gestures towards the Serbs. To make his intention even more clear he said that these gestures should lead to integration of the Serbs. Integration is the opposite of autonomy. Even UNMIK chief Soren Jessen-Petersen is talking along similar lines.
UNMIK chiefs typically go through three phases. In their first few weeks they talk like a Westerner about human rights, standards and reforms. But soon they conclude that it is difficult to impose such ideas when there is no local support and so they settle for those goals that are shared by local Albanian politicians. This is their Albanian phase that usually lasts between 1 and 2 years. They see Kosovo in a new light where all problems somehow have to do with Serbia and the Serbs - with the unresolved status on top. Human rights now are just some sideshow where people should stay calm and passive. In the third phase they develop their own vision of what is wrong. They start to see the crime, corruption and nepotism, the passive government and the desparate position of the minorities and they become reformist again. By now they know how things work and they can be more effective. But this puts them in conflict with "the tight knit network of big Kosovo Albanian families who run the region in a somewhat clan-like fashion". As a result this phase is usually short and leads to premature departure - amidst a bad press and sometimes rumours about threats. Mr. Jessen-Petersen obviously is still in his second phase.
A recent report from the CDHRF on Kosovo minorities gives some more insight in the "we need better PR" position. From a sociological point of view I found the report not very good. It does describe many impressions and incidents spread over many villages, but when one compares it with the Enquete of the Serb Academy of Sciences from 1986 one misses the systematical approach and the analysis of causes. The CDHRF report leaves one often wondering whether a problem is widespread or happens just in a few places.
Often the anecdotal nature of the report creates strange impressions. Take for example Gorazdevac: The report opens with quoting someone that the situation there is very good; later one reads that the Serbs cannot work on their lands due to the security situation, that for urban services they go to Mitrovica under KFOR protection and that the relations with a nearby Albanian village (that suffered many war casualties) are bad.
This is rather typical for the report. The generalisations sound optimistic while the facts point the other way. It doesn't take much imagination to see that Gorazdevac could not survive economically without the money from Serbia (the Serb government employs more people and pays higher wages than the Kosovo government). And one can understand that many people in this village consider to leave Kosovo when it becomes independent and the money from Serbia and the protection from KFOR may end.
Yet the report takes another route. The accent is on the negative attitude of many Serbs towards the Kosovo government. Serbs who work for the Kosovo government are seen by many other Serbs as collaborators and sometimes threatened or in a few cases even beaten up. The report also mentions Serbs who don't want to interact with Albanians (some refused to participate in the research for the report too) - often people who have lost relatives in the recent violence.
The report sees the Serb parallel institutions as central to this attitude and concludes that they should be abolished. I think this is rather sloppy thinking for an institute that calls itself a "human rights organisation". Because many Serbs cannot work on their land for security reasons the extra money from Serbia is essential to survive.
It might to better to look for cooperation and integration of the Serb institutions. If the Albanians allow real Serb majority municipalities it will be much easier to ask Serbia to support those municipalities instead of some parallel institution. Similarly for health care: why not have an official seperate organisation for Serb Health care - then the Serb government could support those organisations. The Albanians had their parallel institutions too in the 1990s. I come from Holland and we have a long tradition of having seperate catholic and protestant organisations (for health care too). Once it was a very important issue in our country; nowadays it is mostly a historic relict. Let's face it: the Serb government is pumping money in Kosovo's economy and that has a good side too.
I don't share the Albanian fear that the Serb villages will become isolated enclaves that stand with their backs to the surrounding society. Living amidst Albanains they will integrate to some extent eventually. It is no fun to live in an isolated enclave. Serbs who can't give up that attitude will sooner or later move to Serbia.
Some Albanians seem to hope that all Serbs will leave. They believe that once all Serbs have left Kosovo will be Albanian forever. I doubt whether it will work out that way. Instead I expect that it will result in a body of Kosovo Serbs that for a long time will cloud the Kosovo-Serb relations in the same way as the Cham Albanians cloud the Albania-Greece relations and the Sudeten Germans cloud the German-Czech relations even after 60 years. And without a cold war freezing the international borders it will be a permanent threat to the safety of Kosovo.
The report also notes that in some cases a few Serbs do go out and visit the neighbouring city while most people are afraid and stay at home. Many of the remaining Serbs are old people and - as old people tend to be - they are rather cautious.
This is of course the Public Relations story. Yet I think they are missing the point. The Serb distrust is based not only on the occasional violence, but also on many discriminating actions by the local and central governments. Building trust is based on taking complaints seriously - even if you think that they are overdone like complaints over a bus stop that is too close to the Serb part of a village.
Unfortunately in Kosovo an anti-Serb nationalism is prevalent and in this climate it is considered fashionable to annoy Serbs with small (and not so small) gestures. At the local level officials will "lose" or "forget" Serb requests and the fire brigade will find some excuse to arrive too late. When there are crimes against Serbs everybody claims to have seen nothing. Even at the top this behaviour can be seen at the moment by the Albanian insistence on having a delegation leader who is suspected by the Serbs of war crimes in Croatia. This kind of behaviour does more to destroy trust than any PR campaign can repair. It will take a major culture change to come to a climate where trustworthy behaviour is considered normal.
In my opinion Kosovo does need a PR campaign to solve the minority problem. But it should be aimed at the Albanian citizens. And it should tell them that it is time to change their attitude. That they should see a Serb they don't know as a normal human being, not as someone who probably did warcrimes. This should be done as soon as possible as a whole new generation of Albanians is growing up learning an ideology of hatred.
One of the weakest points of the CHDRF report is that it doesn't manage to analyze the Serb fear. It does not ask people on what their fear is based. It doesn't quantify how many villages have how much freedom of movement. In the villages where only one or two Serbs venture outside it does not ask them why they behave different from the rest. It may very well be that these are just desparate men who need to feed their families - even if it means risking their lives. According to the UNDP EWS reports over 80% of the Serbs and over 40% of the Albanians feels unsafe on the street.
Not that it is really a secret what generates the Serb fear. It was in the Kai Eide report and it has also been reported elsewhere. Things like "explosions, shootings and stoning of houses". One could add fires, thefts and beatings. The UN attitude is passive. Their message is that "the most important thing is that none of the incidents had escalated into violence". It is a climate of ethnic hatred that is fueled by newspapers that enlarge every remark from some radical Serb, while leaving out everything that might lead to a more balanced view of Serbia and the Serbs. Their latest line is that the minorities in Kosovo are privilged. To be short: this is the same climate as in Croatia and Serbia in 1990. And we know where that led.
The report contains many nice recommendations at the end (more first aid stations, better transport, action against illegally occupied property, etc.), but these nice intentions will come to nothing unless also the prevalent attitude is changed.
The Serbs in Kosovo will have to adapt a lot if Kosovo becomes independent. Giving them Serb majority municipalities will soften the transition for them. And one will have to accept that older Serbs who don't speak Albanian very probably never will learn it.
All this insistance from the Albanian side on "integration" is for me just another way of annoying Serbs. As it generates hostility it is a self-fullfilling prediction. Real integration that starts with building trust. Given the Serbs different language and religion and the hostility in Kosovo towards the Orthodox religion it will take generations.
UNMIK chiefs typically go through three phases. In their first few weeks they talk like a Westerner about human rights, standards and reforms. But soon they conclude that it is difficult to impose such ideas when there is no local support and so they settle for those goals that are shared by local Albanian politicians. This is their Albanian phase that usually lasts between 1 and 2 years. They see Kosovo in a new light where all problems somehow have to do with Serbia and the Serbs - with the unresolved status on top. Human rights now are just some sideshow where people should stay calm and passive. In the third phase they develop their own vision of what is wrong. They start to see the crime, corruption and nepotism, the passive government and the desparate position of the minorities and they become reformist again. By now they know how things work and they can be more effective. But this puts them in conflict with "the tight knit network of big Kosovo Albanian families who run the region in a somewhat clan-like fashion". As a result this phase is usually short and leads to premature departure - amidst a bad press and sometimes rumours about threats. Mr. Jessen-Petersen obviously is still in his second phase.
A recent report from the CDHRF on Kosovo minorities gives some more insight in the "we need better PR" position. From a sociological point of view I found the report not very good. It does describe many impressions and incidents spread over many villages, but when one compares it with the Enquete of the Serb Academy of Sciences from 1986 one misses the systematical approach and the analysis of causes. The CDHRF report leaves one often wondering whether a problem is widespread or happens just in a few places.
Often the anecdotal nature of the report creates strange impressions. Take for example Gorazdevac: The report opens with quoting someone that the situation there is very good; later one reads that the Serbs cannot work on their lands due to the security situation, that for urban services they go to Mitrovica under KFOR protection and that the relations with a nearby Albanian village (that suffered many war casualties) are bad.
This is rather typical for the report. The generalisations sound optimistic while the facts point the other way. It doesn't take much imagination to see that Gorazdevac could not survive economically without the money from Serbia (the Serb government employs more people and pays higher wages than the Kosovo government). And one can understand that many people in this village consider to leave Kosovo when it becomes independent and the money from Serbia and the protection from KFOR may end.
Yet the report takes another route. The accent is on the negative attitude of many Serbs towards the Kosovo government. Serbs who work for the Kosovo government are seen by many other Serbs as collaborators and sometimes threatened or in a few cases even beaten up. The report also mentions Serbs who don't want to interact with Albanians (some refused to participate in the research for the report too) - often people who have lost relatives in the recent violence.
The report sees the Serb parallel institutions as central to this attitude and concludes that they should be abolished. I think this is rather sloppy thinking for an institute that calls itself a "human rights organisation". Because many Serbs cannot work on their land for security reasons the extra money from Serbia is essential to survive.
It might to better to look for cooperation and integration of the Serb institutions. If the Albanians allow real Serb majority municipalities it will be much easier to ask Serbia to support those municipalities instead of some parallel institution. Similarly for health care: why not have an official seperate organisation for Serb Health care - then the Serb government could support those organisations. The Albanians had their parallel institutions too in the 1990s. I come from Holland and we have a long tradition of having seperate catholic and protestant organisations (for health care too). Once it was a very important issue in our country; nowadays it is mostly a historic relict. Let's face it: the Serb government is pumping money in Kosovo's economy and that has a good side too.
I don't share the Albanian fear that the Serb villages will become isolated enclaves that stand with their backs to the surrounding society. Living amidst Albanains they will integrate to some extent eventually. It is no fun to live in an isolated enclave. Serbs who can't give up that attitude will sooner or later move to Serbia.
Some Albanians seem to hope that all Serbs will leave. They believe that once all Serbs have left Kosovo will be Albanian forever. I doubt whether it will work out that way. Instead I expect that it will result in a body of Kosovo Serbs that for a long time will cloud the Kosovo-Serb relations in the same way as the Cham Albanians cloud the Albania-Greece relations and the Sudeten Germans cloud the German-Czech relations even after 60 years. And without a cold war freezing the international borders it will be a permanent threat to the safety of Kosovo.
The report also notes that in some cases a few Serbs do go out and visit the neighbouring city while most people are afraid and stay at home. Many of the remaining Serbs are old people and - as old people tend to be - they are rather cautious.
This is of course the Public Relations story. Yet I think they are missing the point. The Serb distrust is based not only on the occasional violence, but also on many discriminating actions by the local and central governments. Building trust is based on taking complaints seriously - even if you think that they are overdone like complaints over a bus stop that is too close to the Serb part of a village.
Unfortunately in Kosovo an anti-Serb nationalism is prevalent and in this climate it is considered fashionable to annoy Serbs with small (and not so small) gestures. At the local level officials will "lose" or "forget" Serb requests and the fire brigade will find some excuse to arrive too late. When there are crimes against Serbs everybody claims to have seen nothing. Even at the top this behaviour can be seen at the moment by the Albanian insistence on having a delegation leader who is suspected by the Serbs of war crimes in Croatia. This kind of behaviour does more to destroy trust than any PR campaign can repair. It will take a major culture change to come to a climate where trustworthy behaviour is considered normal.
In my opinion Kosovo does need a PR campaign to solve the minority problem. But it should be aimed at the Albanian citizens. And it should tell them that it is time to change their attitude. That they should see a Serb they don't know as a normal human being, not as someone who probably did warcrimes. This should be done as soon as possible as a whole new generation of Albanians is growing up learning an ideology of hatred.
One of the weakest points of the CHDRF report is that it doesn't manage to analyze the Serb fear. It does not ask people on what their fear is based. It doesn't quantify how many villages have how much freedom of movement. In the villages where only one or two Serbs venture outside it does not ask them why they behave different from the rest. It may very well be that these are just desparate men who need to feed their families - even if it means risking their lives. According to the UNDP EWS reports over 80% of the Serbs and over 40% of the Albanians feels unsafe on the street.
Not that it is really a secret what generates the Serb fear. It was in the Kai Eide report and it has also been reported elsewhere. Things like "explosions, shootings and stoning of houses". One could add fires, thefts and beatings. The UN attitude is passive. Their message is that "the most important thing is that none of the incidents had escalated into violence". It is a climate of ethnic hatred that is fueled by newspapers that enlarge every remark from some radical Serb, while leaving out everything that might lead to a more balanced view of Serbia and the Serbs. Their latest line is that the minorities in Kosovo are privilged. To be short: this is the same climate as in Croatia and Serbia in 1990. And we know where that led.
The report contains many nice recommendations at the end (more first aid stations, better transport, action against illegally occupied property, etc.), but these nice intentions will come to nothing unless also the prevalent attitude is changed.
The Serbs in Kosovo will have to adapt a lot if Kosovo becomes independent. Giving them Serb majority municipalities will soften the transition for them. And one will have to accept that older Serbs who don't speak Albanian very probably never will learn it.
All this insistance from the Albanian side on "integration" is for me just another way of annoying Serbs. As it generates hostility it is a self-fullfilling prediction. Real integration that starts with building trust. Given the Serbs different language and religion and the hostility in Kosovo towards the Orthodox religion it will take generations.
Monday, March 13, 2006
In memoriam: Slobodan Milosevic
Dictators rule by keeping their inferiors divided and Tito was no exception. His Yugoslavia was a "federation" where the numerically dominant Serbs where kept "in check" by a union of the different minorities. This was a recipe for disaster once the Tito died and Yugoslavia became more democratic.
After Tito's death Yugoslavia bacame rudderless. The coalition of the most advanced and the most backward member states was not capable to formulate an economic policy - or any policy at all.
It is often said that Milosevic rose to power on a wave of Serb nationalism. But that is a very inaccurate description of the situation. The federation created a climate where every republic had to fight for its own interests: it led to polarisation instead of cooperation - in every republic you saw a rise of nationalism. And it led to the call for a stronger central government. It was on those two waves in public opinion that Milosevic rose to power.
I believe that a federation is an impossible form of government in a democracy. A country needs a core around which it is organized. In the case of Yugoslavia it was clear that Serbia had to be the core. At a short distance you would have the other Serbo-Croat speaking areas: Bosnia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Croatia. Those republics could very well be melded together. The world is full of countries with more than one religion. At the third level you would have the Slovenes, Macedonians and Albanians who would have special minority rights.
Such a construction would not mean that the Serbs had more power than the others. It would just be the application of the "one man - one vote" principle. It might need some gestures to make it acceptable for the other Serbo-Croat speaking groups. For example one might have moved the capital to Tuzla or some other more central place. Another gesture might have been the abolishment of the cyrillic Alphabet for the Serb language.
It is not nostalgia that makes me consider these possibilities. I believe that Milosevic saw the weakness of the federal model and the need for a stronger core. Unfortunately he was not as a visionary, but rather instinct driven. It didn't help either that he didn't have a strong moral attitude. His solution for a stronger core was so rude that he not only failed to formulate an attractive future for the non-Serbs, but he actually alienated them - accelerating the breakup.
A similar thing applies to position of the Serb minorities in other republics. Seeing how they were discriminated he was fully right to speak up for them. But somehow he failed to understand that polarisation in the long term undermines the position of minorities.
The Western "mediation" only aggravated the situation. Most of those diplomats didn't understand anything about the issues at stake. The report of the Badinter Commission that guided Western diplomacy during most of the time is one of the worst documents ever written. It tried to impose some random values that were in fashion at the moment while ignoring other values (and common sense).
A visionary diplomacy might have made up for Milosevic's shortcomings and played on his longing for recognition. Instead we saw an opportunistic diplomacy that spoke about some vile "great-Serbia" ideal, "rightfull longing for self-determination" and the "integrity of borders" without realising that these are just three faces of nationalism.
As Von Clausewitz said: war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means. This was very true for Milosevic. But he was not the only one: all sides tried to create facts on the ground instead of waiting for diplomacy. What is striking on the Serb side is that so much of that violence was useless. There was no advantage in the massacre at Srebrenica and the Muslims of Prijedor could have been safely left as an irrelevant minority in the Serb Republic. But somehow the leadership didn't recognize this.
But here too international politics didn't help. Milosevic was very much a provincial guy who didn't understand international politics and was every time surprised when the internationals turned against him. This made the conflicts for him unpredictable and resulted in unnecessary victims. It is very well possible that if the West had left the situation alone Milosevic calculations might have worked much better and much less blood would have been spilled.
I consider it legallized torture to keep someone locked up for 10 years in a strange country far from his family where he has to attend nearly daily some stressful process. Only very strong people can keep up with that for so long and it is no coincidence that the Yugoslavia Tribunal has seen quite a few people die in prison or shortly after a medical release. A process is meant to be a place where it is decided whether someone is guilty - not as a punishment in itself.
Prosecutor Del Ponte has a history in prosecuting maffia leaders. With the maffia it is considered quite acceptable to do everything to get and keep them behind bars. And it is considered very important to get the leaders. Mrs. Del Ponte has applied the same principles to the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The claims made by the prosecution are generally very wide and have in many cases proved to be untenable. They have helped the prosecution to indict leaders like Milosevic and Mladic, but the price has been a loss of focus and moral authority.
The Tribunal has been most successful in concrete cases like Srebrenica, the Omarska concention camp and Foca. But in the case of Milosevic where it tried to prove broad and vague accusations it has gone nowhere. Even if Milosevic had been convicted it would have been widely seen as victors justice.
The Tribunal could have been a place where moral rules where set for how to behave in a conflict area. Instead it has become a circus that must confirm the West in their belief that they were on the right side. Prosecutor Mrs Del Ponte makes on me the impression to be obsessed about her career. She is a master in Orwellian newspeak and has managed to let many people believe that "indicted war criminal" is the same as "convicted war criminal". The carelessness with which she handles the rights of the suspects and her behaviour in the court room make me wonder whether she cares any more for all those senseless deaths in former Yugoslavia than Milosevic.
Milosevic was for me a rather mediocre guy with one outstanding quality: a feeling for politics and how to acquire and keep power. He lacked strong convictions and was morally weak. History placed him in the middle of number of conflicts and he failed conspicuously. But I don't think he deserves to be blamed as the single culprit. The other parties - including the West - had the same weaknesses. Milosevic blame may be larger than that of the others - but it cannote be determined without determining the blame of the others as well.
After Tito's death Yugoslavia bacame rudderless. The coalition of the most advanced and the most backward member states was not capable to formulate an economic policy - or any policy at all.
It is often said that Milosevic rose to power on a wave of Serb nationalism. But that is a very inaccurate description of the situation. The federation created a climate where every republic had to fight for its own interests: it led to polarisation instead of cooperation - in every republic you saw a rise of nationalism. And it led to the call for a stronger central government. It was on those two waves in public opinion that Milosevic rose to power.
I believe that a federation is an impossible form of government in a democracy. A country needs a core around which it is organized. In the case of Yugoslavia it was clear that Serbia had to be the core. At a short distance you would have the other Serbo-Croat speaking areas: Bosnia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Croatia. Those republics could very well be melded together. The world is full of countries with more than one religion. At the third level you would have the Slovenes, Macedonians and Albanians who would have special minority rights.
Such a construction would not mean that the Serbs had more power than the others. It would just be the application of the "one man - one vote" principle. It might need some gestures to make it acceptable for the other Serbo-Croat speaking groups. For example one might have moved the capital to Tuzla or some other more central place. Another gesture might have been the abolishment of the cyrillic Alphabet for the Serb language.
It is not nostalgia that makes me consider these possibilities. I believe that Milosevic saw the weakness of the federal model and the need for a stronger core. Unfortunately he was not as a visionary, but rather instinct driven. It didn't help either that he didn't have a strong moral attitude. His solution for a stronger core was so rude that he not only failed to formulate an attractive future for the non-Serbs, but he actually alienated them - accelerating the breakup.
A similar thing applies to position of the Serb minorities in other republics. Seeing how they were discriminated he was fully right to speak up for them. But somehow he failed to understand that polarisation in the long term undermines the position of minorities.
The Western "mediation" only aggravated the situation. Most of those diplomats didn't understand anything about the issues at stake. The report of the Badinter Commission that guided Western diplomacy during most of the time is one of the worst documents ever written. It tried to impose some random values that were in fashion at the moment while ignoring other values (and common sense).
A visionary diplomacy might have made up for Milosevic's shortcomings and played on his longing for recognition. Instead we saw an opportunistic diplomacy that spoke about some vile "great-Serbia" ideal, "rightfull longing for self-determination" and the "integrity of borders" without realising that these are just three faces of nationalism.
As Von Clausewitz said: war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means. This was very true for Milosevic. But he was not the only one: all sides tried to create facts on the ground instead of waiting for diplomacy. What is striking on the Serb side is that so much of that violence was useless. There was no advantage in the massacre at Srebrenica and the Muslims of Prijedor could have been safely left as an irrelevant minority in the Serb Republic. But somehow the leadership didn't recognize this.
But here too international politics didn't help. Milosevic was very much a provincial guy who didn't understand international politics and was every time surprised when the internationals turned against him. This made the conflicts for him unpredictable and resulted in unnecessary victims. It is very well possible that if the West had left the situation alone Milosevic calculations might have worked much better and much less blood would have been spilled.
I consider it legallized torture to keep someone locked up for 10 years in a strange country far from his family where he has to attend nearly daily some stressful process. Only very strong people can keep up with that for so long and it is no coincidence that the Yugoslavia Tribunal has seen quite a few people die in prison or shortly after a medical release. A process is meant to be a place where it is decided whether someone is guilty - not as a punishment in itself.
Prosecutor Del Ponte has a history in prosecuting maffia leaders. With the maffia it is considered quite acceptable to do everything to get and keep them behind bars. And it is considered very important to get the leaders. Mrs. Del Ponte has applied the same principles to the Yugoslavia Tribunal. The claims made by the prosecution are generally very wide and have in many cases proved to be untenable. They have helped the prosecution to indict leaders like Milosevic and Mladic, but the price has been a loss of focus and moral authority.
The Tribunal has been most successful in concrete cases like Srebrenica, the Omarska concention camp and Foca. But in the case of Milosevic where it tried to prove broad and vague accusations it has gone nowhere. Even if Milosevic had been convicted it would have been widely seen as victors justice.
The Tribunal could have been a place where moral rules where set for how to behave in a conflict area. Instead it has become a circus that must confirm the West in their belief that they were on the right side. Prosecutor Mrs Del Ponte makes on me the impression to be obsessed about her career. She is a master in Orwellian newspeak and has managed to let many people believe that "indicted war criminal" is the same as "convicted war criminal". The carelessness with which she handles the rights of the suspects and her behaviour in the court room make me wonder whether she cares any more for all those senseless deaths in former Yugoslavia than Milosevic.
Milosevic was for me a rather mediocre guy with one outstanding quality: a feeling for politics and how to acquire and keep power. He lacked strong convictions and was morally weak. History placed him in the middle of number of conflicts and he failed conspicuously. But I don't think he deserves to be blamed as the single culprit. The other parties - including the West - had the same weaknesses. Milosevic blame may be larger than that of the others - but it cannote be determined without determining the blame of the others as well.
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
The last 25 million: the EU should find a better solution for the Western Balkan
Becoming a member of the EU is a very complicated procedure. At every step the candidate country has to prove that it achieved some goals in building a state that is follows the EU model in economy and human rights.
In Middle Europe this worked rather well as all the countries were allowed into the EU at once. On the Balkan however, the EU is allowing the countries nearly one by one and this is having a devastating effect. The promise of getting faster into the EU was a major factor of the separatism in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. In Montenegro too it is the most important reason for seperatism.
But seperatism is not the only damage. The border of the EU is a kind of iron curtain that seriously hampers the movement of people and economic relations. Just consider the fate of Macedonia. In 2007 the iron curtain will fall on its east side when Bulgaria joins the EU. 5 years later Macedonia may join the EU and the iron curtain will move to its west and north, blocking the borders with Albania, Kosovo and Serbia. And this is a small country with 2 million inhabitants that is very dependent on import and export for its economy. Bosnia may have a similar fate. And then we don't even talk about the ethnic minorities that will find themselves separated from the "motherland".
The EU has now launched the idea that the Balkan countries that are not yet EU members should have their own free trade zone. I have mixed feelings about that.
Sure, it is better than the present situation of many bilateral trade ties - each a bit different from the other. But it does not solve the fragmenting effect that the whole EU access process has on the Balkan.
For that reason I believe that the EU should give up on applying this procedure for the Western Balkan. Instead it should give the whole Western Balkan basic access to the European market and allow the free movement of people from there. Specific markets like grain and milk should be closed for those countries until they have complied with the EU requirements for those markets. Those countries would not be EU members and have no votes in Brussel. Nor would they be automatically entitled to subsidies and funds.
With the whole Western Balkan having a population smaller than Romania this should not be too much of a sacrifice for the EU. And it is widely expected that for many years most EU countries will exclude Bulgarians and Romanians from their labor markets. With similar treatment for the Western Balkan there wouldn't be much protest in the EU.
By controlling access to specific markets and subsidies the EU would have enough leverage to get the Western Balkan countries to adopt the rest of the EU requirements.
Seperate accession for each country may create quite some trouble:
- former foes may use the opportunity to block the other's entrance
- given the level of corruption in Kosovo and Albania it may take a long time before they are considered "ready". It would be irresponsible to keep them all that time isolated outside the EU.
In Middle Europe this worked rather well as all the countries were allowed into the EU at once. On the Balkan however, the EU is allowing the countries nearly one by one and this is having a devastating effect. The promise of getting faster into the EU was a major factor of the separatism in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. In Montenegro too it is the most important reason for seperatism.
But seperatism is not the only damage. The border of the EU is a kind of iron curtain that seriously hampers the movement of people and economic relations. Just consider the fate of Macedonia. In 2007 the iron curtain will fall on its east side when Bulgaria joins the EU. 5 years later Macedonia may join the EU and the iron curtain will move to its west and north, blocking the borders with Albania, Kosovo and Serbia. And this is a small country with 2 million inhabitants that is very dependent on import and export for its economy. Bosnia may have a similar fate. And then we don't even talk about the ethnic minorities that will find themselves separated from the "motherland".
The EU has now launched the idea that the Balkan countries that are not yet EU members should have their own free trade zone. I have mixed feelings about that.
Sure, it is better than the present situation of many bilateral trade ties - each a bit different from the other. But it does not solve the fragmenting effect that the whole EU access process has on the Balkan.
For that reason I believe that the EU should give up on applying this procedure for the Western Balkan. Instead it should give the whole Western Balkan basic access to the European market and allow the free movement of people from there. Specific markets like grain and milk should be closed for those countries until they have complied with the EU requirements for those markets. Those countries would not be EU members and have no votes in Brussel. Nor would they be automatically entitled to subsidies and funds.
With the whole Western Balkan having a population smaller than Romania this should not be too much of a sacrifice for the EU. And it is widely expected that for many years most EU countries will exclude Bulgarians and Romanians from their labor markets. With similar treatment for the Western Balkan there wouldn't be much protest in the EU.
By controlling access to specific markets and subsidies the EU would have enough leverage to get the Western Balkan countries to adopt the rest of the EU requirements.
Seperate accession for each country may create quite some trouble:
- former foes may use the opportunity to block the other's entrance
- given the level of corruption in Kosovo and Albania it may take a long time before they are considered "ready". It would be irresponsible to keep them all that time isolated outside the EU.
Saturday, February 04, 2006
The International Crisis Group and Montenegro: mediation or agitation
In december the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report "Montenegro's independence drive". In this note I will discuss it and the ICG in general.
There is something strange about the ICG. Usually their reports are very informative and quite objective. But when you then read the "Executive summary and recommendations" it looks as if they have been written by a different person with a very partial view. You might even believe that he did not read the main text: it is not ununsual to find in the conclusions new arguments that you did not find in the main text.
The Montenegro report is a bit different. It seems to have been written by the person who normally writes the conclusions. As a consequence it is rather light on facts and quite partial. Have a look with me at the tricks that the ICG uses to
Blackening the Serbs
It begins with many negative remarks about Serbia and the Serbs. Some are true. Some quite distorted (for example mentioning Kosovo as a case of Serb territorial claims) and some years ago and only historical relevant (like arms export to Libya and Iraq).
It is rather comic to see the Serb army accused of smuggling through Montenegro's ports while it is well known that much more smuggling is done by Montenegrins and that the government of Montenegro is very involved.
But in fact all those remarks are totally irrelevant. This is about the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. Whether we in the West like Serbia is totally irrelevant.
Montengro has some bad memories about the Milosevic (a Montenegrin) time, but these aren't even mentioned in this report. As I said before: it is light on facts.
Rewriting history
According to the ICG report "in 1918, the Serbian army entered Montenegro, and the Serbian crown prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic forcibly incorporated it into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) and prevented the royal government and parliament in exile from returning. At the same time the Orthodox Church in Montenegro, which had maintained its independence for centuries, was subsumed into the Serbian Orthodox Church.".
This is a rather one-sided view. Before 1918 Montengro liked to call itself a nation of Serbs and a defender of the Serb cause. Serbia's main national epos the Mountain Wreath was written in 1842 by the Njegos - then ruler of Montenegro. What happened in 1918 certainly wasn't very democratic, but that does not mean that it was without support within Montenegro. In fact until World War II Montenegro's main political parties were the Whites (pro independence) and the Greens (pro-union).
Another trick is the emphasis on the long history of Montenegro. The ICG forgets to mention that most of the time Montengro was a mini-state like Liechtenstein. Half of Montenegro's territory was conquered after 1875. And before 1794 Montenegro's territory was yet much smaller. It is in those new territories that there is the most resistance against independence.
Blackening the anti-independence opposition
The anti-independence opposition gets a similar treatment as the Serbs.
First the reporter tries to give them an ethnic image by stating that most of its members are Serbs. Only much later in the report it is mentioned that "Serb" in Montenegro is mostly not an ethnic, but a political label. People call themselves Serb when they feel related to Serbia. But they may have a brother who calls himself Montengrin.
Later he tries to paint them as right-extremists by mentioning Milosevic and Seselj supporters among them. Giving the large support of Milosevic and Seselj in Serbia it is not more than natural to expect that many people who consider themselves Serbs in Montenegro have a similar opinion. However, most of these people vote that way because they feel that Serbs have become the victims of the recent events - not because of aggressive intentions.
The pro-independent party has at least as much stains on its image, but you won't hear that from the ICG. Djukanovic has been accused by Italian officials of connections to the mafia and involvement with smuggling. He rose to power on the tails of Milosevic. Presently Djukanovic shows quite a few symptoms of a rising dictator. After he won the elections in 1997 he appointed many followers in the public service. In 2004 editor-in-chief of the main opposition daily paper Dan was shot by unknown assassins. His most recent achievement was the dismissal of the programming director of Montenegro's television. As a result the anti-independence voice is underrepresented in the media. My impression is that Djukanovic is an opportunist just like Milosevic. For him independence is a tool to strengthen his grip on Montenegro. The most pro-independent is the coastal region - where most of the smuggling takes place.
But of course all this is irrelevant. The opinion of both sides is just as valid - regardless of how many bad traits they have. Instead of trying to paint one party black the ICG could better have tried to analyze their motives.
Downplaying the risks of ethnic conflicts
The ICG does not see any potential for ethnic conflict in Montenegro. This seems rather naive.
While ethnic relations are rather good at the moment there are certainly tensions that could grow worse in the future:
- In the north-east the relations between Muslims and Montenegrins have worsened as a spillover of the conflict in neighbouring Bosnia. Independence for Montenegro might encourage Muslims in North-east Montengro and the Sandzak to seek attachment to Bosnia.
- Not all Albanians are happy either. Until now the long road (via Rozaje) from Kosovo to Plav and Guci has kept the Albanian militants from spilling over from Kosovo to Montengro - as they have done in the past to Macedonia and the Presevo. But this should not be taken for granted now that a direct road from Decani to Plav is being built.
- Montenegro's society is also still very tribal - what increases the chance of an armed conflict according to This US army report.
Using the EU as a crowbar
The EU had a rather dubious role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was the promise of fast EU membership that made it a no-brainer for many citizens of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to vote in favor of independence. Of course this comes very close to buying votes. The ICG would like to repeat this trick once again.
In my opinion we should be careful not to repeat these mistakes. The EU should offer Montenegro market access without demanding that it gives up its ties with Serbia first.
Rewriting the rules
Accoring to Montenegran law at least 50% of the voters should turn up for the referendum to be valid. As a consequence the anti-independence opposition is considering a boycot as the easiest way to defeat the referendum. In Italy this strategy recently used to defeat a referendum about liberalization of fertility laws. In Macedonia it was used to defeat a referendum against the municipal reorganization accoring to the Ohred agreement. And allthough the ICG is very much involved in Macedonia it didn't voice any objection against that strategy.
For Montenegro however the ICG would not like the referendum to fail and so it has started a lobby to vilify this strategy. An alternative would be to have a threshold of for example 40% of the total electorate but they don't like this either.
One of their arguments is the example of the autonomy of Scotland and Wales, that were approved by a simple referendum majority. However, this comparison only puzzles me: autonomy is something completely different from independence. It may give much of the same powers, but it misses the polarising effect on a society and it can easily be undone if the need might arise. The ICG should know better than using such improper arguments.
I find this a very dubious strategy. In an already conflictuous situation one should not worsen the situation by starting a discussion about the rules of the conflict. Also the 50% bar is already low. In most countries you need 2/3 of the votes to change the constitution. So why should something even more radical be decided so easily.
Some final thoughts
I believe we should be cautious about creating yet more states. Just as changing borders splits nearly always generate conflicts. And even if they seem to happen peacefully there are often victims. Take the case of Slovenia. After independence it robbed about 30.000 people from other parts of Yugoslavia from their civil rights. These people are "erased" from all public records - giving them lots of problems. They are usually not driven out, but if they ever leave Slovenia they will not be allowed back. Already 12000 of them have left Slovenia. Besides that Slovenia has also a border conflict with Croatia that has seriously damaged the relations between those countries.
So I think that everything should be done to make sure that if the Montenegrins vote for independence it is on basis of really feeling ethnically different and not because of EU membership or other opportunistic short term reasons.
For that reason I would recommend:
- give Montenegro access to the EU market without demanding independence first.
- reform the union of Serbia-Montenegro to a less cumbersome structure. One might consider abolishing the Serb republic, so that Montenegro becomes a kind of autonomous province.
When small children have done something wrong they often try to redirect the attention by accusing someone else. This is exactly the impression that the ICG is making on me. They do there best to destabilize the situation in Montenegro out of hatred for all what is Serb related. And if things do get out of hand one can be sure that they will be in the front row to put the blame on Serbia. Really disgusting!
There is something strange about the ICG. Usually their reports are very informative and quite objective. But when you then read the "Executive summary and recommendations" it looks as if they have been written by a different person with a very partial view. You might even believe that he did not read the main text: it is not ununsual to find in the conclusions new arguments that you did not find in the main text.
The Montenegro report is a bit different. It seems to have been written by the person who normally writes the conclusions. As a consequence it is rather light on facts and quite partial. Have a look with me at the tricks that the ICG uses to
Blackening the Serbs
It begins with many negative remarks about Serbia and the Serbs. Some are true. Some quite distorted (for example mentioning Kosovo as a case of Serb territorial claims) and some years ago and only historical relevant (like arms export to Libya and Iraq).
It is rather comic to see the Serb army accused of smuggling through Montenegro's ports while it is well known that much more smuggling is done by Montenegrins and that the government of Montenegro is very involved.
But in fact all those remarks are totally irrelevant. This is about the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia. Whether we in the West like Serbia is totally irrelevant.
Montengro has some bad memories about the Milosevic (a Montenegrin) time, but these aren't even mentioned in this report. As I said before: it is light on facts.
Rewriting history
According to the ICG report "in 1918, the Serbian army entered Montenegro, and the Serbian crown prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic forcibly incorporated it into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) and prevented the royal government and parliament in exile from returning. At the same time the Orthodox Church in Montenegro, which had maintained its independence for centuries, was subsumed into the Serbian Orthodox Church.".
This is a rather one-sided view. Before 1918 Montengro liked to call itself a nation of Serbs and a defender of the Serb cause. Serbia's main national epos the Mountain Wreath was written in 1842 by the Njegos - then ruler of Montenegro. What happened in 1918 certainly wasn't very democratic, but that does not mean that it was without support within Montenegro. In fact until World War II Montenegro's main political parties were the Whites (pro independence) and the Greens (pro-union).
Another trick is the emphasis on the long history of Montenegro. The ICG forgets to mention that most of the time Montengro was a mini-state like Liechtenstein. Half of Montenegro's territory was conquered after 1875. And before 1794 Montenegro's territory was yet much smaller. It is in those new territories that there is the most resistance against independence.
Blackening the anti-independence opposition
The anti-independence opposition gets a similar treatment as the Serbs.
First the reporter tries to give them an ethnic image by stating that most of its members are Serbs. Only much later in the report it is mentioned that "Serb" in Montenegro is mostly not an ethnic, but a political label. People call themselves Serb when they feel related to Serbia. But they may have a brother who calls himself Montengrin.
Later he tries to paint them as right-extremists by mentioning Milosevic and Seselj supporters among them. Giving the large support of Milosevic and Seselj in Serbia it is not more than natural to expect that many people who consider themselves Serbs in Montenegro have a similar opinion. However, most of these people vote that way because they feel that Serbs have become the victims of the recent events - not because of aggressive intentions.
The pro-independent party has at least as much stains on its image, but you won't hear that from the ICG. Djukanovic has been accused by Italian officials of connections to the mafia and involvement with smuggling. He rose to power on the tails of Milosevic. Presently Djukanovic shows quite a few symptoms of a rising dictator. After he won the elections in 1997 he appointed many followers in the public service. In 2004 editor-in-chief of the main opposition daily paper Dan was shot by unknown assassins. His most recent achievement was the dismissal of the programming director of Montenegro's television. As a result the anti-independence voice is underrepresented in the media. My impression is that Djukanovic is an opportunist just like Milosevic. For him independence is a tool to strengthen his grip on Montenegro. The most pro-independent is the coastal region - where most of the smuggling takes place.
But of course all this is irrelevant. The opinion of both sides is just as valid - regardless of how many bad traits they have. Instead of trying to paint one party black the ICG could better have tried to analyze their motives.
Downplaying the risks of ethnic conflicts
The ICG does not see any potential for ethnic conflict in Montenegro. This seems rather naive.
While ethnic relations are rather good at the moment there are certainly tensions that could grow worse in the future:
- In the north-east the relations between Muslims and Montenegrins have worsened as a spillover of the conflict in neighbouring Bosnia. Independence for Montenegro might encourage Muslims in North-east Montengro and the Sandzak to seek attachment to Bosnia.
- Not all Albanians are happy either. Until now the long road (via Rozaje) from Kosovo to Plav and Guci has kept the Albanian militants from spilling over from Kosovo to Montengro - as they have done in the past to Macedonia and the Presevo. But this should not be taken for granted now that a direct road from Decani to Plav is being built.
- Montenegro's society is also still very tribal - what increases the chance of an armed conflict according to This US army report.
Using the EU as a crowbar
The EU had a rather dubious role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It was the promise of fast EU membership that made it a no-brainer for many citizens of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to vote in favor of independence. Of course this comes very close to buying votes. The ICG would like to repeat this trick once again.
In my opinion we should be careful not to repeat these mistakes. The EU should offer Montenegro market access without demanding that it gives up its ties with Serbia first.
Rewriting the rules
Accoring to Montenegran law at least 50% of the voters should turn up for the referendum to be valid. As a consequence the anti-independence opposition is considering a boycot as the easiest way to defeat the referendum. In Italy this strategy recently used to defeat a referendum about liberalization of fertility laws. In Macedonia it was used to defeat a referendum against the municipal reorganization accoring to the Ohred agreement. And allthough the ICG is very much involved in Macedonia it didn't voice any objection against that strategy.
For Montenegro however the ICG would not like the referendum to fail and so it has started a lobby to vilify this strategy. An alternative would be to have a threshold of for example 40% of the total electorate but they don't like this either.
One of their arguments is the example of the autonomy of Scotland and Wales, that were approved by a simple referendum majority. However, this comparison only puzzles me: autonomy is something completely different from independence. It may give much of the same powers, but it misses the polarising effect on a society and it can easily be undone if the need might arise. The ICG should know better than using such improper arguments.
I find this a very dubious strategy. In an already conflictuous situation one should not worsen the situation by starting a discussion about the rules of the conflict. Also the 50% bar is already low. In most countries you need 2/3 of the votes to change the constitution. So why should something even more radical be decided so easily.
Some final thoughts
I believe we should be cautious about creating yet more states. Just as changing borders splits nearly always generate conflicts. And even if they seem to happen peacefully there are often victims. Take the case of Slovenia. After independence it robbed about 30.000 people from other parts of Yugoslavia from their civil rights. These people are "erased" from all public records - giving them lots of problems. They are usually not driven out, but if they ever leave Slovenia they will not be allowed back. Already 12000 of them have left Slovenia. Besides that Slovenia has also a border conflict with Croatia that has seriously damaged the relations between those countries.
So I think that everything should be done to make sure that if the Montenegrins vote for independence it is on basis of really feeling ethnically different and not because of EU membership or other opportunistic short term reasons.
For that reason I would recommend:
- give Montenegro access to the EU market without demanding independence first.
- reform the union of Serbia-Montenegro to a less cumbersome structure. One might consider abolishing the Serb republic, so that Montenegro becomes a kind of autonomous province.
When small children have done something wrong they often try to redirect the attention by accusing someone else. This is exactly the impression that the ICG is making on me. They do there best to destabilize the situation in Montenegro out of hatred for all what is Serb related. And if things do get out of hand one can be sure that they will be in the front row to put the blame on Serbia. Really disgusting!
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